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This dissertation examines the origins of political and scientific commitments that 
currently frame cryptography, the study of secret codes, arguing that these 
commitments took shape over the course of the twentieth century. Looking back to the 
nineteenth century, cryptography was rarely practiced systematically, let alone 
scientifically, nor was it the contentious political subject it has become in the digital 
age. Beginning with the rise of computational cryptography in the first half of the 
twentieth century, this history identifies a quarter-century gap beginning in the late 
1940s, when cryptography research was classified and tightly controlled in the US. 
Observing the reemergence of open research in cryptography in the early 1970s, a 
course of events that was directly opposed by many members of the US intelligence 
community, a wave of political scandals unrelated to cryptography during the Nixon 
years also made the secrecy surrounding cryptography appear untenable, weakening 
the official capacity to enforce this classification. Today, the subject of cryptography 
remains highly political and adversarial, with many proponents gripped by the 
conviction that widespread access to strong cryptography is necessary for a free society 
in the digital age, while opponents contend that strong cryptography in fact presents a 






invested with these deep political commitments if it had not been suppressed in 
research and the media during the postwar years. The greater the force exerted to 
dissuade writers and scientists from studying cryptography, the more the subject 
became wrapped in an aura of civil disobedience and public need. These positive 
political investments in cryptography have since become widely accepted among many 
civil libertarians, transparency activists, journalists, and computer scientists who treat 
cryptography as an essential instrument for maintaining a free and open society in the 
digital age. Likewise, even as opponents of widespread access to strong cryptography 
have conceded considerable ground in recent decades, their opposition is grounded in 
many of the same principles that defined their stance during cryptography’s public 
reemergence in the 1970s. Studying this critical historical moment reveals not only the 
origins of cryptography’s current politics, but also the political origins of modern 
cryptography. 
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In early 2012, when the NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden was still forming plans for 
his disclosures to the press, he corresponded with documentarian Laura Poitras over 
encrypted email, concealing their conversation from the electronic surveillance 
programs that Snowden himself would soon reveal to the public in a leak of classified 
documents. In these early exchanges with Poitras, Snowden chose to remain 
anonymous. He went by the pseudonym “Citizenfour,”1 gesturing to three NSA 
whistleblowers who had tried and failed to blow the whistle before him.2 In 
communications (and attempted communications) with other journalists, Snowden 
chose pseudonyms that were equally laden with political consideration, such as 
Cincinnatus and Publius, the former an icon of virtuous citizenship during the Roman 
republic, the latter a pseudonym used by several founding fathers of the United States 
                                                             
1 Poitras, in turn, used this pseudonym as the title for her documentary which chronicled the 
Snowden leaks, Citizenfour (2014). 
2 The NSA whistleblowers who preceded Snowden in attempting to reveal the Agency’s mass 
surveillance program were Thomas Drake, William Binney and J. Kirk Wiebe. NB: an earlier 
whistleblower, James Bamford, had been successful in his public disclosure of NSA operations 





in a series of philosophical essays known as the Federalist Papers.3 Poitras and 
Snowden would continue corresponding for several months, brokering connections 
with journalists at the Guardian and Washington Post who slowly came to share 
Poitras’s confidence that their still-anonymous source really would deliver the historic 
leak he promised.4 Over these tense months, during Snowden’s private conversation 
with Poitras, he often reflected on the complex political dimensions of the events to 
come. He considered the possible outcomes of his disclosures, pondered the conditions 
necessary for genuine change, and assessed the forces working with and against their 
cause. 
The shock [among the public at seeing these documents] will provide the support 
needed to build a more equal internet, but this will not work to the advantage of 
the average person unless science outpaces law. By understanding the 
mechanisms through which our privacy is violated, we can win here. We can 
guarantee for all people equal protection against unreasonable search through 
universal laws, but only if the technical community is willing to face the threat 
and commit to implementing over-engineered solutions. In the end, we must 
enforce a principle whereby the only way the powerful may enjoy privacy is 
when it is the same kind shared by the ordinary: one enforced by the laws of 
nature, rather than the policies of man.5 
It is worth reading this passage closely, for Snowden offers a theory of the relationship 
between science, law, and power that hinges on digital cryptography — communication 
software that conceals the contents of a message using complicated math. Today’s 
cryptography rests on algorithms that, by the apparent laws of nature, are difficult or 
                                                             
3 The 85 essays making up the Federalist Papers were written by Alexander Hamilton, James 
Madison, and John Jay and published in newspapers like the Independent Journal, the New York 
Packet, and The Daily Advertiser between 1787-8. 
4 Snowden chose not to contact journalists at the New York Times because they had mismanaged 
three previous attempts to blow the whistle on NSA’s domestic spying program. 





even impossible to reverse without possessing the corresponding key. Snowden posits 
that the public can place its faith in encryption technology since it secures 
communications by way of proven mathematics and sound engineering, whereas the 
legal right to privacy had ceased to be enforced, and thus rendered moot the 
assumption that our rights could be protected through legislation alone. Unlike 
Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, the founding fathers who adopted 
the name “Publius” (also meaning “citizen”) to argue for the passage of a Constitution to 
protect a set of fundamental liberties, Snowden backs away from faith in the “laws of 
man” and places it instead in the laws of nature and a technical community committed 
to “over-engineered” solutions to protect the right to privacy. Upon delivering the first 
round of leaks to a carefully chosen cadre of journalists, Snowden included a cover 
letter underlining this political stance: 
While I pray that public awareness and debate will lead to reform, bear in mind 
that the policies of men change in time, and even the Constitution is subverted 
when the appetites of power demand it. In words from history: Let us speak no 
more of faith in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains of cryptography.6 
(emphasis added) 
Here, Snowden subverts a familiar quote from Thomas Jefferson on tyranny and the 
rule of law: “…in questions of power then, let no more be heard of confidence in man, 
but bind him down from mischief by the chains of the constitution.”7 (again, emphasis 
added) In short, Snowden treats cryptography as a means to safeguard liberty and 
contain the evils of government in our time — not the legal authority of a document, 
                                                             
6 Greenwald, No Place to Hide, p. 24. 





even a Constitution that is often treated as essentially sacred,8 but rather the 
mathematical authority of encryption, which they treat as an instrument of an even 
higher order. 
Like Snowden, the WikiLeaks founder and radical transparency activist Julian 
Assange has endorsed a Promethean view of cryptography, but an even stronger one, 
treating the means of concealing information as a force inherently in favor of 
empowering the powerless in political resistance. Assange once referred to 
cryptography as “the ultimate form of non-violent direct action,” adding that “no 
amount of coercive force will ever solve a math problem.”9 Assange traces his own 
ethos to a group known as the crypto-anarchists, or cypherpunks, who gathered in the 
early nineties around a shared interest in discussing and promoting all manner of 
radical social change that could be facilitated by modern cryptography. They discarded 
conventional ethics, treating such dicta as constrictive, and endeavored to map the 
range of new affordances that would follow from the development of  modern 
cryptography.10 Reflecting on these early days of crypto-anarchy from the pulpit he had 
built in 2012, Assange described the crypto-anarchists’ initial, thrilling coalescence 
around the idea that mathematics, marshaled in software, could be a tool for 
transformative change against once-forbidding odds. 
                                                             
8 See Michael Warner’s Letters of the Republic, which tracks the emergence of the textual authority 
now invested in the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights. 
9 Julian Assange, et al., Cypherpunks: Freedom and the Future of the Internet, p. 5. 
10 The most controversial and divisive topic of conversation among the cypherpunks was a 
discussion of how to build a fully anonymous market to order assassinations and pay the killers 





We discovered something. Our one hope against total domination. A hope that 
with courage, insight and solidarity we could use to resist. A strange property of 
the physical universe that we live in. The universe believes in encryption. It is easier to 
encrypt information than it is to decrypt it. We saw we could use this strange 
property to create the laws of a new world. To abstract away our new platonic 
realm from its base underpinnings of satellites, undersea cables and their 
controllers. To fortify our space behind a cryptographic veil. To create new lands 
barred to those who control physical reality, because to follow us into them 
would require infinite resources. And in this manner to declare independence.11 
(emphasis added) 
Here, Assange depicts the political and social hopes that he and his cohort have 
invested in encryption — a set of uses that appears to rest upon the very structure of the 
natural world as represented through mathematics. This vision is packaged with 
rhetoric that rings the first-wave cyberculture’s commitment to a fantastic vision of 
cyberspace, a frontier seemingly unencumbered by the fetters of the material world 
and its entrenched systems of power.12  
In Assange’s case, these appeals to the political affordances of cryptography evince 
full-on metaphysical commitments, whereas Snowden’s outlook of cryptography’s 
political potential rests on the committed, purpose-driven work of computer 
programmers and engineers instead. It is one thing to say, as Snowden does, that 
artifacts have inherent politics which reflect the intentions behind their design.13 To 
say that physics or mathematics could have inherent political tendencies is, on the 
other hand, a claim from another plane entirely. And yet, this is Assange’s plucky 
                                                             
11 Julian Assange, et al., Cypherpunks: Freedom and the Future of the Internet, p. 4. 
12 For the definitive statement of cyberspace as a liberated digital utopia, see John Perry Barlow, 
“Declaration of the Rights of Cyberspace,” in Ludlow, Peter. High Noon on the Electronic Frontier : 
Conceptual Issues in Cyberspace. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1996. 
13 For the classic statement of this position, see Winner, Langdon. “Do Artifacts Have Politics?” 





argument: when a cryptographic algorithm scrambles a message, rendering it 
indistinguishable from the noise on a dead radio channel, the difficulty of 
reconstructing the original message should be treated as a structural feature of our 
universe that favors hiding information over revealing it. Even if that were true, it is 
unclear why this should present an inherent advantage to the powerless over the 
powerful, even if this advantage does require “courage, insight and solidarity.” 
Snowden’s claim is more subtle. He lays the burden on software developers to design 
secure communication tools that harness mathematics and statistical principles in a 
deliberate effort to protect the privacy of digital communications. An ardent libertarian, 
Snowden had hoped for his disclosure of government surveillance programs to 
underline the need for the general public to bolster these long-established rights using 
technology in light of the realization that the government could not be trusted to do so, 
even for rights enshrined in law. The most salient point of agreement between 
Snowden and Assange in these passages is the belief that cryptography could be more 
powerful than the law itself, or at least more reliable in carrying out the purpose stated 
in the letter of the law, since cryptographic security is grounded in rigid principles of 
math and physics rather than something as sloppy and unreliable as the coordination 
of social action. This echoes the legal scholar Lawrence Lessig’s popular digital maxim 
‘code is law.’14 That is to say, real power may flow from computer code, just as real 
power may flow from the letter of the law. 
                                                             
14 Lessig, Lawrence. Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace. New York: Basic Books, 1999. See also 






This particular image of cryptography may take on characteristics of the sublime. 
For a message to be rendered utterly impenetrable, its contents totally unreadable, 
could make it appear boundless, even beautiful in its inscrutability. An unreadable wall 
of digital text may inspire awe, wonder, even a hint of uneasiness. Like hieroglyphs, 
which once provided a deep reserve of fantasy precisely because they could potentially 
mean anything at all, decipherment is tantamount to disenchantment. Today, for many 
who invest political hopes in cryptography, the transformation of a message into 
random characters through cryptography aligns with a political stance in which the 
natural world, treated as an extra-human space, may provide refuge from the state, or 
even serve the functions at which the state has apparently failed. Digital security 
experts are fond of illustrating the strength of modern cryptography with dramatic 
comparisons to the natural world. To break a message encrypted with a typical, widely 
available algorithm (TK-bit AES) would require enough energy to boil all the water in all 
the world’s oceans. Even using the most powerful computer available today, this would 
take TK million years.  
Hence the powerful allure of the cryptographic sublime to cyber-libertarians, 
crypto-anarchists, and others attracted to the idea of fashioning new, perhaps freer 
societies on foundations of digital technology.15 
The image of nature as a quasi-mystical refuge has a long history in the American 
imagination, but so does the image of technology as a force to shape these essentially 
empty landscapes into civilization. For early European settlers, the new continent was 
                                                             
15 Turner, Fred. From Counterculture to Cyberculture: Stewart Brand, the Whole Earth Network, 





alternately interpreted as an Eden untouched by the evils of mankind, or as a savage, 
god-forsaken land that required taming. Henry David Thoreau found the solace of the 
forest momentarily defiled whenever a train would pass on the rail line near Walden 
Pond, its steam whistle puncturing the natural environment that he imagined as a 
pristine refuge from the ills of civilization several miles up the road. The historian Leo 
Marx identifies this duality as a defining force in the construction of American culture, 
and he defines the experience of the technological sublime as a union of the two.16 
David Nye identifies the great bridges, dams, and skyscrapers as iconic sources of the 
technological sublime in American experience. When these structures do provoke 
feelings of the sublime, they may “represent a way to reinvest the landscape and the 
works of men with transcendent significance.”17  
Now consider Snowden and Assange, who appeal to the universal laws of nature as a 
source of both transcendent awe and mechanical certainty in cryptography. They are as 
transfixed with the cryptographic sublime as any mystic who sees the divine in coded 
texts or inscrutable symbols hidden in the natural world. In this sense, the 
cryptographic sublime is nothing new, and it is certainly not limited to the privacy and 
transparency activists who are most vocal about cryptography’s fundamental 
importance today. The political affordances ascribed to cryptography stand as some of 
the most peculiar features of its mythos. Cryptography is credited with the power to 
marshal resistance against forces that are otherwise unassailable. It is trusted not only 
to guard the world of online finance, but also to secure a growing share of mundane web 
                                                             
16 Marx, Leo. “The Machine in the Garden.” The New England Quarterly 29, no. 1 (March 1956): 27. 





traffic that is routinely monitored as it traverses the global internet. When encrypted, 
transmissions become a scrambled mess of characters, unreadable without the 
corresponding decryption key. Whereas breathless accounts of the digital revolution 
amid its onset once implied immanent transcendence beyond the restrictions of the 
physical world — promising limitless dissemination of information,18 disembodied 
virtual experience,19 even post-scarcity economics20 — cryptography has been effective 
at placing limits on digital utopian fantasies, readily contradicting some of the qualities 
once considered definitive of ‘the digital’ by the first wave of writers associated with the 
cyberculture.21 Crypto makes information unreadable, placing barriers in the so-called 
‘cyberspace’ that had once been portrayed as an ideal, boundless realm of pure 
information. The widespread use of crypto today reflects something different: a desire 
to place limits on information, reasserting conditions of the physical world we are 
accustomed to living within. Crypto can set barriers to protect against eavesdropping, 
and it is often used to block access to copyrighted content, much like television 
channels that were once scrambled for non-subscribers. Crypto can hide identifying 
information, offering anonymity, but it can also also be used to verify information using 
                                                             
18 Barlow, J.P. “Selling Wine Without the Bottles,” in Ludlow, ed. Crypto-Anarchy, Cyberstates, and 
Pirate Utopias. 
19 Lanier, Jaron, and Frank Biocca. “An Insider’s View of the Future of Virtual Reality.” Journal of 
Communication 42, no. 4 (December 1, 1992): 150–72. 
20 Stallman, Richard, “GNU Manifesto,” in The Manifesto in Literature, 3:355–57, 2013. 
21 John Perry Barlow and Nicholas Negroponte are representative proponents of this stance. See 





digital signatures.22 It is trusted to undersign such apparently unforgeable objects as 
cryptocurrency. Likewise, the digital ledgers known as blockchains, designed to 
prevent duplicate spending of cryptocurrency, are currently in the midst of fevered 
proliferation as a means of documenting and verifying all manner of digital 
transactions — essentially as a new means of doing old forms of business. If the dream 
of the early Internet would be a post-scarcity world, unencumbered by physical limits, 
so far cryptography has proved to be a reliable means of replacing and securing limits, 
barriers, and other assurances that digital information will continue to be a rivalrous 
good. Snowden’s principal cause, for instance, is to reestablish rights that have 
apparently eroded in the digital age. Noble as the cause may be, it is not a progressive 
vision of a new world. Snowden wants to maintain or even return to a past state of 
affairs. Assange, on the other hand, views cryptography as a tool to weaponize secrecy, 
undermine established regimes of power, and presumably to liberate humanity from 
state oppression. Cryptography did not appear to have any such potential a century ago, 
nor even fifty years ago, and these five chapters describe a series of historical phases in 
which cryptography has undergone progressive transformation — from art to science, 
from handwriting to computation, from mere puzzle solving to fierce political clashes 
over the right to privacy. 
Chapter 1, “Cryptography and Written Culture” calls attention to a wide array of 
uses, both systematic and unsystematic, that the increasingly literate American public 
                                                             
22 For a study of the legal status of digital signatures, see Jean-François Blanchette’s Burdens of 
Proof : Cryptographic Culture and Evidence Law in the Age of Electronic Documents. Cambridge, Mass: 






found for cryptography during the nineteenth and early twentieth century. During this 
time, secret codes and ciphers were a common feature of print and written culture, 
including letters, diaries, puzzles, fiction, and commerce. On the other hand, the 
American government and military had remarkably little interest in cryptography until 
after the turn of the twentieth century, contrary to the myth that the right to use 
cryptography has only recently been ceded to the American public in light of an 
extraordinary need for information security in the digital age. Instead, much of what 
constituted the broad popular interest in cryptography a century ago would only begin 
to be excluded through boundary work after the 1920s, as systematic, scientific 
approaches to cryptography began to be placed at the center of focus, with non-
scientific approaches increasingly marginal. And yet some handwritten codes remain 
resilient against computational codebreaking — underlining that the apparent 
universality of digital information leaves a set of marginal practices that have not yet 
been subsumed to this other logic.23 
In Chapter 2, “Communication and its Limits,” I examine the scientific view of 
cryptography that took shape with the emergence of information theory, statistical 
approaches to language, and digital communications in the first half of the twentieth 
century. There were several competing early versions of information theory, but Claude 
Shannon’s was unique in its presentation of the ‘noise’ in electrical communications as 
a controllable, even useful phenomenon. This perspective grew out of Shannon’s 
                                                             
23 Although a computer vision program tailored for handwriting recognition could feasibly cover 
some distance in breaking handwritten codes, it would still be more computationally complex 
and unreliable than breaking a purely digital code through brute force guessing by a computer 





assignment to work on cryptography during World War II, leading him to frame 
communication and cryptography as merely different ways of coding a transmission, 
whether to preserve the signal against the noise, or to give the appearance of noise to 
potential eavesdroppers or ‘enemies’. Although these terms — ‘signal’ and ‘noise’ — are 
commonly taken to mean something like ‘good information’ and ‘bad information’, 
Shannon offered a subtler mode of understanding noise than many of his peers. 
Shannon viewed the distinction between signal and noise as essentially contingent, 
context-dependent, ultimately a matter of agreement between the sender and receiver 
of a particular message using a particular code. This is a largely unrecognized point of 
difference between Shannon and his contemporaries who were working on the same 
problem, but this point would form the basis of later thinking about cryptography as an 
artful use of noise, which may be shifted to signal through coding. 
Shannon’s flexible stance on noise came after a long period of progressive, 
incremental changes in the perception of noise by his predecessors. To recognize the 
usefulness of noise in communication and cryptography stems from a shift in scientific 
thinking that Ian Hacking has called ‘taming of chance’, essentially pointing to the rise 
of probability and statistics in the nineteenth century. Hacking tracks the gradual 
appreciation of randomness as something both fundamental and useful in math, 
science, and engineering. The paradoxical implications of this shift would form the 
basis of the scientific definition of information that emerged in the first half of the 
twentieth century. Noise was slowly recognized as something controllable, often 
through technology, and this formed the basic insights underlying Shannon’s 





nature’ that many cryptographers invoke today when they describe the remarkable 
qualities of modern cryptography, although the scientific view of cryptography 
described in this chapter was not yet invested with politics. That would come later. The 
essentially apolitical Shannon viewed his work, and especially his work for the military, 
in a starkly different light than those who would later treat cryptography as a tool for 
social change. 
Chapter 3, “Classifying Cryptography,” observes the postwar moment when 
cryptography began to be strictly controlled by the American government, legally 
defined as a weapon, and research in the subject treated as a matter of utmost secrecy. 
This chapter departs from the moment when Shannon published his theories of 
communication and cryptography in quick succession after the end of World War II. His 
crypto paper was declassified in 1949, a full twelve years ahead of the declassification 
schedule stamped on its cover page. This gesture of openness would turn out to be a 
peculiar but telling outlier: his communication theory of cryptography was the last 
substantial piece of research published for a quarter century on this subject, although it 
still remained little noticed compared to his theory of communication.  
Although many historical accounts treat cryptography as the sole, longstanding 
purview of government, it was only in the postwar years that the American government 
planted a firm claim upon research into codes and ciphers. In the early years of the Cold 
War, espionage and fears of espionage had been a source of escalated geopolitical 
tensions, and the Soviet Union’s apparent acquisition of technical plans to build 
nuclear weaponry instigated calls for heightened security in military research — an 





military leaders, research administrators, and intelligence agents leading the newly 
established CIA and NSA. Largely as a consequence of increased urgency surrounding 
espionage and intelligence work, cryptography, writ large, continued to be treated as a 
classified research subject even after armistice. The Cold War powers would practice 
espionage even more intensely than they had during the war. Before cryptography 
would even gained its footing as an area of scientific study, at least openly, 
cryptography was named in international arms treaties as a weapon in itself and 
regulated alongside nuclear physics. A number of prominent American scientists 
publicly appealed for greater openness in scientific research, in general, arguing that 
persistent classification in peacetime would be out of step with the open, democratic 
ideals they had come to consider essential to the very endeavor of science.24 For the 
NSF’s founding director, Vannevar Bush, this ideological tension was a remarkable 
source of doublespeak: Bush outwardly promoted a vision of a thriving open society, 
driven by scientific progress, but he also worked to keep a great many areas of scientific 
knowledge secret, including cryptography.  
For a quarter century beginning in the early nineteen fifties, cryptography research 
would be conducted mostly in secret, sometimes in universities, but not disclosed 
publicly. Much of this research was managed by the newly established NSA, who would 
seek out the expertise of mathematicians like Shannon and Von Neumann for 
cryptographic advisory groups to offer expert consultation with difficult problems. 
Overall, this chapter examines the moment when cryptography became entangled with 
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a growing culture of secrecy that was typically justified by grave political concerns in 
the postwar period — the struggles of oppositional superpowers and the threat of 
nuclear annihilation. The result was a certain amnesia washing over the longer history 
of  social roles for cryptography that were described in Chapter 1, as well as a general 
suppression of research on cryptography, stifling recognition of Shannon’s work on 
cryptography even as information theory and computer science progressed rapidly 
through the 1950s and 60s. This amnesia is palpable in the following chapter. 
Chapter 4, “Thinking About Information Security in the 1960s,” looks at concerns 
about the rise of computing and threats to privacy rights expressed in American 
political discourse during the sixties, with particular attention to the fact that 
cryptography was largely absent from discussion. The concerns that motivated 
researchers to work in cryptography a decade later in fact emerged into conversation 
during the 1960s. This chapter is a case study centered on a 1966 proposal to establish 
a ‘National Data Bank’ (NDB) to gather information from across the US government in a 
central computer database, promising efficiency gains and better access to data for 
economic planning — but also prompting a furious backlash from many politicians and 
legal scholars, as well as broadly negative press coverage and public sentiment about 
the implications of this proposal, often expressed in literally Orwellian terms.  
The timing of the proposal for a federal database of statistical data on individual 
citizens was historically significant: following the recent passage of the Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA), opponents of the NDB were driven by a related but distinct 
interest in the growing cultural ideal of transparency. Several congressmen said the 





about citizens, and a centralized computer system could lead to even greater potential 
for the mismanagement of this information. In short, whereas FOIA promised the 
general public access to government information in light of the fact that more and more 
was being collected, opponents of the NDB treated it as a measure that could strengthen 
the negative effects of the data gathering itself. These hearings echoed growing 
concerns about information security and privacy as projections of the coming 
computer age began to percolate through American society. Many of the concerns 
voiced about privacy and computer security in 1966 carry on today, over fifty years 
later, in roughly the same language. And yet, even though this debate evinces a 
prescient grasp of looming concerns, the ultimate answer could seem naive to many 
privacy advocates today: there was broad agreement that access restrictions and legal 
penalties could help curtail abuses by federal employees with access to so much 
sensitive information. Cryptography was only briefly mentioned as a possible 
countermeasure, and quickly dismissed as too expensive. In short, the postwar 
suppression of cryptography left the field essentially stagnant and forgotten among the 
general American public from the 1940s through the 1960s, and the only mention of 
cryptography in the NDB hearings came from Paul Baran, an employee of the defense 
contractor Rand Corporation who had drawn up the original plan for the Arpanet three 
years earlier.  
The case of the NDB proposal reveals that cryptography was essentially absent from 
consideration, even in a discussion explicitly centered on computers and invasion of 
privacy. Still, much of the rhetoric of today’s cryptography advocates had already 





government secrecy was already taking shape in the broader culture. In short, the 
postwar suppression of cryptography research left the field essentially stagnant and 
mostly forgotten through the 1960s, even as concerns about computers and privacy 
began to enter serious conversation about technological changes and social hazards for 
the society to come. The strict classification of cryptography would have the 
unexpected effect of amplifying and politicizing efforts to research this subject in the 
open during the 1970s, commingling the liberation of cryptography research with the 
social concerns that led to this liberation, a subject addressed in the next chapter. 
Chapter 5, “Cryptography’s Public Reemergence,” examines the moment when 
cryptography ceased to be strictly classified, amid a gradual wave of change that 
included both compromises and outright dissent. Although NSA held a tight grip on 
cryptography research until the late 1960s, this loosened when they granted IBM a 
highly limited exception, and this inch expanded to the proverbial mile when other 
researchers refused to honor official requests to keep the matter classified. The move 
was nevertheless bold, and the purpose of this chapter is to examine the greater 
cultural context that motivated these researchers to behave so boldly. Moreover, I 
examine the political and social factors that enabled them to succeed. In short, efforts 
to conceal cryptography research during the post-war years became untenable by the 
seventies amid broader shifts in the politics of information: growing disapproval of 
government secrecy, the ascent of transparency as a cultural value, and heightened 
expressions of concern about electronic surveillance, whether in centralized computer 
databases or over nascent networks that were projected to connect computers all over 





did so against the warnings of their colleagues, as well as a series of threats stating that 
any public discussion of cryptography research would be a felony violation of 
international arms treaties. They continued this research nonetheless, and justified 
their decision to pursue public studies of cryptography on several distinct grounds: 
their belief in free speech, opposition to secrecy in science, the promise of discovery, a 
competitive desire for peer recognition, as well as a conviction that cryptography would 
soon become a subject of manifest importance for the protection of privacy in the 
information age.  
The common element in this laundry list of motivations is that cryptography 
researchers in the seventies were pushing for transparency, in a broad sense, and 
pushing against official secrecy. The reemergence of cryptography research can be 
productively understood as a post-Watergate, post-Pentagon Papers development, 
prompted by the growing sense that the public both has a general ‘right to know’ and a 
specific prerogative to distrust appeals to government secrecy. This is one of the key 
moments when cryptography began to be treated as a tool of political resistance, social 
change, and specifically as a ward against invasion of privacy through electronic 
surveillance. Although a series of legal standoffs in the nineties (often called the ‘Crypto 
Wars’) tend to be recognized as the formative moment for the politics of cryptography 
today, the seventies actually marked the moment when the Snowden-Assange view of 
cryptography coalesced, binding computational wizardry to oppositional politics.  
This also points to a distinct, separate genesis for the identification of cryptography 
as a ‘liberation technology,’ a claim often attached to computers and digital media more 





critical contrast with the liberatory claims associated with the main branch of digital 
politics, an ethos traced by Fred Turner from the sixties counterculture through the 
emergence of the nineties counterculture.25 Digital utopians promoted computers and 
the Internet as tools that could liberate us by granting unbridled access to information, 
limitless interconnection to others worldwide, and unfettered access to public 
platforms for speech. Cryptography’s politics are grounded on opposite principles: 
placing barriers on information access, securing information from exposure, 
protecting sensitive personal information, and ensuring the possibility of private 
conversation. Cryptography is not a tool of digital utopianism. Instead, we might think 
of its ethos as counter-utopian, in much the same way that Isaiah Berlin identified  a 
counter-enlightenment in which the principles of the Romantic era gestated as a 
distinct stream of thought that only emerged in full cultural flourish at a later date. The 
optimism of the early digital age has been tested, tempered, even undermined over 
time, the counter-utopian ethos expressed by Snowden, in particular, has become a 
more convincing political stance, and it is worth recognizing its historical origins not in 
the sixties counterculture or the nineties cyberculture, but in the culture of 
transparency and anti-secrecy in the seventies. 
The reemergence of cryptography research in the seventies was also the source of 
cryptography’s current scientific paradigm, which was grounded on the rediscovery of 
Shannon’s cryptographic theory from a quarter century earlier and a rapid succession 
of revisions that pulled this theory up to speed with developments from the intervening 
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years. Shannon attracts a peculiar cult of personality, much like others ascribed credit 
for founding entire fields of study, not least when they are credited with ‘inventing’ the 
present age. What’s most remarkable about Shannon’s theory of cryptography, paired 
with his broader theory of information, is that it provides the building blocks for both 
the digital utopian framing of the information age, and the alternative that has been 
cultivated around cryptography. His theory of communication grounds the possibility 
of limitless, flawless telecommunication using digital computers; his theory of 
cryptography explains how to use essentially the same coding principles to limit 
information access to only certain audiences. Cryptography itself is an often vexing 
concept, difficult to define and prone to harboring contradictions. For instance, 
although cryptography is a means of communication, it is distinguished by its capacity 
to block communication. A tool of secrecy, it is increasingly placed in the service of 
transparency. A tool of obfuscation, it may also be used to verify information. 
Cryptographic communication has always been accomplished by creating symbolic 
barriers, using the sources of communication’s failure as a means of controlling access 
to messages, but with the computer age came new affordances for secret codes. The 
formal study of cryptography today is grounded in computation, and even though the 
history of cryptography evinces many computational precursors to current methods, 
the opening chapter examines a broader cross-section of methods for both concealing 
messages and seeking hidden messages during the age of print, before cryptographic 








Cryptography and Written Culture: 






Until about a century ago, cryptography was conducted entirely with ink, paper, pencil, 
and sometimes devices like cipher wheels or letter matrices to keep track of shifts and 
substitutions.26 Both a literate skill and a tactile art, cryptography became increasingly 
common with rising rates of literacy, and its applications were often focused on the 
world of letters. Books and articles on cryptography from this period typically favored 
subjects of popular fascination like exotic cultures, the occult, ancient languages, 
religion, crime, romance, and adventure. Codes and ciphers were, in short, a popular 
feature of written culture. More to the point: many people who learned and used 
cryptography more than a century ago were not necessarily doing so because they were 
at war, or even because they were plotting something sinister, but because the written 
word was a source of entertainment and personal edification — whether in printed 
reading material, puzzles, coded correspondence, or even diaries. 
Foregrounding the popular history of codes and ciphers may help correct the 
mistaken assumption that cryptography has always been a tool for spies, criminals, and 
                                                             





the military, a bias that could make cryptography appear as though it has only recently 
begun to be used among the general public, and it leaves cryptography without a usable 
past — a cultural inheritance that could enliven a sense of cryptography’s place in 
people’s lives today.27 Standard histories of cryptography may provide a good and 
serviceable past for spies and soldiers, but most of the people using cryptography today 
on their phones and laptops are left without much of a story to understand why crypto 
has become ubiquitous, what it might mean, and how we ended up in this situation. 
What is the cause of this historiographic discrepancy? The history of cryptography 
is a small niche, but many of those who have built up the recent literature on this 
subject tend to work in archives furnishing documents on the use of codes and ciphers 
by the military and government during the tumultuous conflicts of the past century. 
Many military histories of cryptography aim to understand subjects like the Japanese 
diplomatic ciphers broken before the Pearl Harbor attacks, or the development of a 
particular cipher machine used by the Army.28 Other accounts might center on cases 
like the codebreaking operation at Bletchley Park, where the British Government Code 
and Cypher School is celebrated for the role it played in breaking the German Enigma 
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machine and accelerating the end of World War II.29 Historians of technology take a 
special interest in the latter subject because Bletchley and several other cryptographic 
research centers pushed forward the development of early electronic computers. The 
urgency of breaking Axis military codes was a major impetus for directing resources 
toward the development of powerful computers.30 Similar projects from the postwar 
period may still remain classified, and historians of cryptography who work mainly in 
military and intelligence agency archives, and one recently made a plea for accelerated 
declassification to alleviate shortages of newly declassified documents to feed their 
scholarly work.31 The NSA’s resident historian apparently does not grapple with such 
shortages given that his four-volume history of the Agency is available in both a 
classified version with redactions, and a non-classified version for the public. Like 
many historians who work directly with NSA, this series is undergirded with the 
assumption that governments have a time-honored claim on cryptography, while non-
government use of codes and ciphers is unserious, amateur work, unworthy of 
attention. Johnson writes: 
Modern cryptography has, since its earliest days, been associated with 
governments. Amateurs there were, like Edgar Allan Poe, who dabbled in the art, 
and it has held a certain public fascination from the earliest days. But the 
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discipline requires resources, and only governments could marshal the 
resources necessary to do the job seriously.32 
Several points here are incorrect or misleading, and overall it makes a specious case for 
ignoring a large part of cryptography’s past. For one thing, Poe was neither an amateur 
nor a dabbler in cryptography. He composed cryptograms for publication in 
newspapers, and his solutions to reader-submitted cryptograms relied on statistical 
analysis of character frequencies, a fairly savvy tactic for his time. Poe was paid for this 
work, making him literally not an amateur. He is even credited with minting the word 
“cryptography.”33 If anything at all could disqualify Poe from recognition as a 
cryptographer, it would only be the lack of government resources Johnson claims are 
needed to do cryptography ‘seriously.’ This stance is entrenched in a false premise that 
NSA has zealously asserted for several decades: to depict cryptography as government 
business, not because it requires such vast resources, but because NSA has been highly 
invested in controlling access to cryptography since the agency’s founding in the 
postwar years. . To carve out government and military as the only legitimate subjects of 
cryptographic history, thus discarding the rest of culture and society, suggests, at best, 
a failure to recognize subject matter beyond the narrow subject of this embedded 
political interest.  
For cryptography to have been a ‘public fascination’ is itself a compelling reason to 
chart its popular history, and this chapter highlights four subjects of popular 
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fascination that should ground an appreciation of cryptographic history in the print 
age. These include the uses of cryptography in everyday written culture; in private life; 
in commerce; as entertainment; and as the centerpiece of clubs or social groups. Codes 
and ciphers extended into many areas of cultural production and social life. They were 
posed and solved in social settings, used to hide the contents of diaries and postcards, 
even debated in the search for hidden messages in literature. In short, cryptography 
had a remarkable social life in the nineteenth century, at a time when the American 
government had neither intelligence agencies surveilling communications nor 
codebreakers employed except in war. It is worth foregrounding this stark difference 
given the reversal of this assumption by those who argue that public use of crypto 
should be restricted and regulated. There’s much to suggest that the American public 
had a more active interest in codes and ciphers than the nation’s military, foreign 
service, and even police until the turn of the twentieth century, and perhaps even as 
late as World War II. Useful subjects of study include letters and postcards written in 
code, puzzle books and games, as well as commercial codes used to conduct business 
over electrical telecommunication systems like the telegraph. Collective memory of this 
subject has weakened, but a century ago codes and ciphers were widespread, fairly 
mundane, and often innocuous, whereas officials who argue for strict control over 
cryptography today would prefer for their claim over this field to appear timeless. 
Lacking this popular history, even the best surveys of this subject continue to lean 
toward war, politics, and winners in the horserace of science and technology.34 What’s 
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more, without the memory of a popular claim to codes and ciphers, today’s advocates 
for the widespread use of cryptography as a safeguard of digital privacy are saddled 
with an unfriendly historical inheritance. Contemporary debates over cryptography are 
often freighted with the false premise that government, and specifically the American 
government, has always had a claim on making and breaking codes.35 The error here is 
not misinformation, but rather a dramatically limited frame. These errors of omission 
support a misleading history that legitimizes efforts to control codes and ciphers 
through the deceptive narrative that they have always been the sole purview of 
governments, criminals, spies, and soldiers. Leading works in the history of 
cryptography tend to either focus on military history, or else survey a train of genius 
inventors who granted a decisive advantage in war or politics. In accounts that center 
on cryptographic methods and technologies, each novel advancement seems to render 
obsolete the last generation’s codes and ciphers in a forward march of progress. A 
history of any other subject that limited itself to these touchstones would seem archaic, 
superficial, elementary, even regressive.   
In the American case, the state’s claim to cryptographic heritage is especially 
misleading. From the early republic until the turn of the twentieth century, the U.S. 
government and military treated cryptography and codebreaking as relatively 
unimportant — a necessity only in times of war, with staffs dismantled after the final 
ceasefire. Even writers who acknowledge the U.S. government’s relative lack of interest 
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in cryptography before 1914 still misconstrue this as a general, nationwide lack of 
interest in codes and ciphers. This line of thinking reveals a contemporary bias: many 
of the world’s most powerful governments and militaries would become so covetous of 
cryptography during the tumultuous twentieth century that the term “military 
cryptography” would cease to have any meaning. If all strong cryptography is, by 
definition, military grade, then it could appear as though no one but the military has a 
legitimate claim to use strong cryptography. 36 
The lack of attention paid to puzzles is especially odd because so many professional 
cryptographers actively recall a childhood interest in learning cryptography as a game, 
encountering it in fiction, exchanging coded message with friends and trying to crack 
each other’s codes.37 Those who were drawn to cryptography in adulthood often found 
their way through puzzle books, clubs, social diversions, or popular fascinations like 
seeking clues to uncover the ‘true’ authorship of Shakespeare. Although some 
additional training is typically necessary to bridge the gap between hobbyist and, say, 
military-grade cryptanalyst, it is odd that the common hobbyist is so much neglected in 
standard accounts of cryptography’s social life.  
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Among the founding fathers, those interested in cryptography were often exposed to 
the subject through classical education  or diplomatic work, but despite a documented 
capacity for writing in code, there does not appear to have been much effort placed in 
codebreaking. Benjamin Franklin sent messages from France in cipher while he was 
working to secure funding for the Revolutionary War. Likewise, Thomas Jefferson’s 
familiarity with cryptography was a rare and valuable qualification for diplomatic work, 
both as ambassador to France and as the first Secretary of State. Europe had passed 
through many centuries of war and courtly maneuvering in which written 
communications were methodically inspected in transit, if not sent to dedicated 
codebreaking bureaus known as ‘black chambers’. U.S. diplomats kept pace by 
encrypting their messages, but did not go on the offensive by decrypting other nations’ 
correspondence. In 1791, the year after his appointment to head the State Department, 
Jefferson even invented  a cryptographic tool while tinkering at Monticello.38  The 
second Secretary of State, John Adams, also used ciphers to protect sensitive 
diplomatic communiques, but likewise did not treat interception or codebreaking as 
part of his foreign mission. One explanation for this tendency is that the founding 
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fathers seemed to consider invasion of privacy (avant le mot) as inconsistent with our 
basic liberties, perhaps even as unamerican.39 If true, this would only explain the U.S. 
government’s early aversion to domestic spying. It would not explain why American 
officials did not develop codebreaking techniques for gathering signals intelligence 
from foreign nations, especially in light of the fact that many of the major European 
powers were in fact invested codebreaking, having maintained bureaus devoted to 
intercepting and decoding every missive passing their borders. In contrast, 
codebreaking was treated as a wartime concern from the early republic forward — not 
necessarily ungallant or shameful, but unnecessary. Just as the U.S. did not maintain a 
large standing military force in peacetime until after the first World War, neither did 
the government maintain offices of signals intelligence in peacetime.  Any time war 
broke out in the nineteenth century, the US would open a codebreaking office, train a 
staff of clerks, then dismantle these bureaus at the end of the war. The US government’s 
interest in codes and ciphers bordered on ambivalence, contrary to persistent claims 
from members of the intelligence community who are invested in the illusion of a 
longstanding, uncontested claim to cryptography. 
Likewise, the federal government only invested in developing its own ciphers during 
the years before the first World War, as the US was beginning to be more politically 
entangled with the European affinity for signals intelligence, where centuries of palace 
drama had made cryptography both more widely practiced and more widely associated 
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with cloak and dagger operations40 — as opposed to the pen and puzzle codes that 
entertained many Americans. 
When the Postal Service was founded, they introduced legal protections against 
snooping and tampering, obviating the tedious need to use ciphers just to ensure 
privacy.41 The sole exception being undeliverable mail. Postal security was mainly 
treated as an incentive to draw more business as they built a vast and profitable 
communication network that linked the cities, towns, and even the hinterlands of the 
nation.42 These protections were enshrined in the Postal Act of 1792, which legislated, 
among other things, the gratis exchange of news between printers, whose range of 
coverage grew as the postal communication network itself grew larger. The American 
government’s use of favorable policies to promote of communication networks for the 
mail, the telegraph, and the telephone marked a transformative factor in the nation’s 
growth from the point of its founding,43 but efforts to address communications security 
were limited to envelopes and other postal packaging. What’s more, later 
communications media were not granted the explicit legal protections of the mail. The 
basic organization of the telegraph system meant that each message passed through 
many hands — clerks, operators, and messengers — leading some businesses to send 
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messages in code to avoid disclosures of sensitive information. The early telephone 
service was similarly facilitated by operators, not to mention that household and 
community eavesdropping was common over party lines. Even when private phone 
lines became more common, wiretapping laws required the telephone company to turn 
over call records and allow the police install listening devices, given a warrant.44 
Overall, the interest in domestic surveillance was nil in the U.S. until several decades 
into the twentieth century. 
Amid the federal government's vigorous interest in building and supporting 
communication networks from the time of the early republic forward, it was private 
citizens and commercial interests that drove cryptography for the remainder of the 
nineteenth century. Communication policy fostered the growth of communication 
networks along roads and later railroads, where telegraph wires soon followed 
alongside the tracks. Tapping and intercepting these communications became a key 
source of intelligence when the Civil War broke out, but cryptographic techniques were 
lackluster on either side when they were used at all.45 The main considerations for 
military ciphers are to follow systematic guidelines and to remain secure if it falls into 
enemy hands, and European cryptographers avidly encoded these principles in 
treatises on the practice of military cryptography while the subject was still neglected 
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in the United States.46 Just as the military itself requires an orderly structure, military 
codes and ciphers must work even in a messy, distributed network of cryptographic 
novices operating on very high stakes. Outside the military, even codes with equally 
high stakes such as crime, conspiracy, and piracy were frequently unsystematic, with 
inventors often setting themselves to the development of novel codes with invented 
symbols like dots and squiggles instead of math. Like the undeciphered manuscripts of 
the Renaissance,47 several apparent treasure maps survive from the nineteenth century 
with invented languages so devilish that they still remain undeciphered.48 One less to 
take from these cases is that military cryptography tend to become more secure 
through more complicated algorithms, whereas handwritten cryptography seems to 
draw security from its formal originality. 
In 1879, the writer John R.G. Hansard suggested in the North American Review that 
the telegraph had diminished the use of older codes and ciphers that do not translate 
well to its specific mechanism. “The telegraph has made many of the most difficult of 
the old codes of cipher unavailable,” Hansard writes. “In this category must be placed 
those of arbitrary marks, or of words or letters arranged in peculiar positions — in 
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squares, parallelograms, columns, etc.”49 Hansard describes “alphabets constructed of 
arbitrary signs” or “dots and lines ordered within a geometric figures.” Strangely, he 
concludes that the “art of cryptography loses nothing by being constrained to ordinary 
letters and numerals,” but laments that “the ingenuity expended in devising new 
alphabets of dots, lines, mathematical, astronomical symbols and fantastic forms was 
wasted.”50 
Hansard’s account provides a valuable insight into the forms of cryptography that 
were less useful for the telegraph and consequently became less used, but his broader 
purpose in this article was to discuss the use of cryptography in the most recent 
presidential campaign. 
In all important political campaigns the use of a telegraphic cipher seems to be 
necessary. It would hasten the Reform millennium, however, if such messages, 
being in no right sense of the word private telegrams, but a part of the apparatus 
of popular elections, could always be collected by Congress after the close of the 
contest, and exposed to public view, on the ground that the people ought to know 
exactly how their business has been conducted. A few of the secret messages of 
the Republican agents and managers during the exciting days of November and 
December, 1876, have been examined by various committees of Congress, but 
they are of little importance, and their simple devices for concealment hardly 
deserve to be called a cipher.  
In short, Hansard argues that even if telegraphic cryptography has become a political 
necessity, the codes are so simple to decipher and the contents are of such great public 
interest that the telegrams should be revealed to the public at the conclusion of the 
campaigns. 
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Hansard’s readers in 1879 would have known that his motivation for discussing 
ciphers and political campaigns was prompted by a recent political scandal, the Hayes-
Tilden affair.51 Reporters for the New York Tribune had acquired and decoded a series 
of telegrams sent between Democratic party leaders during the contentious election of 
1878.52 The messages revealed a conspiracy to bribe delegates at the party convention 
and ensure that Samuel Tilden would receive the nomination over Rutherford B. Hayes, 
but the revelation of this plot led to disgrace and eventual disqualification for Tilden.53 
The Tribune would milk the story with follow-ups for over a year, watching closely for 
whether Tilden would be “ciphered out” of history,54 and including a full-page 
explanation of exactly how the cipher messages worked and how they were decrypted. 
“There are no fewer than six distinct systems of cryptography in this collection of 
secret telegrams — perhaps even more,” the Tribune writes, “We invite the public to 
witness every step in the process of this deciphering, partly because it is an interesting 
exercise, and partly because we wish to show that the reading we offer has been arrived 
at by no happy guessing, but by the course of sheer demonstration.”55 In this case, the 
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entertainment value of cryptography as a word game reached crossover appeal with the 
entertainment provided by a political scandal. 
In the nineteenth century, cryptography became firmly enmeshed in print culture 
as books, newspapers, and even urban signage catered to an increasingly literate 
American public.56 Edgar Allan Poe recognized the entertainment value of 
cryptography as early as 1839 when he challenged his readers to send ciphers for him 
to solve in the pages of Alexander’s Weekly Messenger, a short-lived Philadelphia 
broadsheet that billed itself as “the largest and cheapest family newspaper in the 
world” with a one dollar annual subscription.  Poe’s challenge to his readers said: “Let 
any one address us a letter in this way, and we pledge ourselves to read it forthwith — 
however unusual or arbitrary may be the characters employed.” One reader sent what 
Poe called “a jargon of random characters, having no meaning whatsoever,” apparently 
in an effort to fool the author, but Poe identified this as a prank and called it out in his 
column. What gave Poe such confidence in his challenge to break his readers’ ciphers 
was his grasp of the statistical patterns that emerge in cryptograms as a vestige of the 
structure in language itself, allowing him to not only solve the puzzles sent by his 
readers but also to identify the one that apparently contained no pattern at all.57 
It would be by no means a labor lost to show how great a degree of rigid method 
enters into enigma-guessing. This may sound oddly; but it is not more strange 
than the well know fact that rules really exist, by means of which it is easy to 
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decipher any species of hieroglyphical writing — that is to say writing where, in 
place of alphabetical letters, any kind of marks are made use of at random. … Let 
an entire alphabet be made in this manner, and then let this alphabet be used in 
any piece of writing.58 
Poe’s talent for codebreaking and dramatic presentation of solutions made his column 
a hit among the Weekly Messenger’s readership and convinced Poe to use cryptography 
as the centerpiece of his next novel, The Gold-Bug, in 1843. This novel was not only 
Poe’s most popular work during his own lifetime, but is now recognized as the earliest 
work in the genre of detective fiction, where the cryptogram would carry on as a 
common plot element.59 In 1866, even Scientific American magazine indulged in 
publishing a cryptographic mystery article under the auspices of teaching readers the 
technical details involved in breaking codes. The article is unusual for presenting a 
cryptogram through a detailed narrative of its problem and solution. Although the 
puzzle itself is staged as a detective mystery, the article leads off by defining 
cryptography for its readers through a much wider range of social practices: 
This is the art of reading and writing dispatches, messages, etc., in such a way 
that only those who possess the key can decipher them. It has borne a most 
important part in the business of life, from love to war, from mischief to money-
making, and is in daily use now for these objects.60 
The author proceeds to recount his own process of solving the cryptogram, ostensibly 
found in a foreign newspaper where a detective had enlisted the help of the public with 
his case. The author describes the initial process of seeking “some inkling of the cipher, 
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of the plan on which it proceeded,” and outlines his pathfinding method, precautions 
taken, and glimpses of various pitfalls in the code. Unlike other, more familiar codes 
presented as a plain string of numbers, like the cryptogram presented at the conclusion 
of The Gold-Bug, this cryptogram was structured in pairs of numbers set off in brackets. 
The author spins out paragraph after paragraph describing the logical operations that 
pulled him into the puzzle, the insights that mark his progress, and the nagging 
enigmas that held him back. “They pointed to a conclusion which might well have made 
[the fictional detective] Waitzen tremble for the success of my attempt,” he writes, 
describing his realization that the numbers in the code could not correspond to 
individual letters, but rather to words or phrases drawn from another, unknown source. 
The author surmised that each pair of numbers must correspond to the page and line in 
a particular book, most likely a dictionary since it would be sure to contain every 
needed word in first position on a given line. The author went to a bookseller and 
checked the code against every dictionary in stock, then he mailed the solution to 
redeem his reward for aiding the ‘detective.’ 
Although the setup for this article is almost certainly fictional, cryptograms were in 
fact commonly printed in newspapers from at least the 1850s forward, serving as an 
entertaining word puzzle even before the rise of the crossword in the early twentieth 
century. Only in rare cases were genuine cryptograms printed in newspapers to enlist 
the public in their solution, as the Scientific American article describes. During the Civil 
War, when the Confederacy fell behind in its codebreaking efforts, they submitted 





essentially outsourcing military intelligence to the reading public.61 To do this, it must 
have been at least feasible that members of the reading public were more avid and 
talented codebreakers than enlisted officers, even those in the newly established signal 
corps who were meant to specialize in these tasks. 
Coded messages written on postcards present a similar but distinct case because 
the writer does not hide the message or the fact that it has been written in code. This 
marks a distinct departure from something like the Tilden affair: it’s hard to imagine 
someone with devious intentions sending an encrypted message on a postcard, but 
many examples of this format survive.62 Why is the format so counterintuitive? The 
postcard foregoes both the physical and legal protections of the envelope, receiving a 
slightly lower postal rate, but leaving its contents open to casual reading by anyone 
within reach. On reviewing just a handful of encrypted postcards from the nineteenth 
century, the intention of the sender appears to have been playful, just as postcards 
themselves imply something more friendly, warm, or even whimsical than a standard 
letter. In short, the playful use of ciphers on these postcards evinces a case in which 
privacy and secrecy are not the goal of using cryptography. If these had been the aims 
of the letter writer, an envelope would have sufficed, not to mention requiring far less 
effort for both parties.  
European governments would have been more alert to plots sent in code since there 
was a vigorous, longstanding tradition of postal surveillance in Europe. Vienna’s code 
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breaking office, the Geheime Kabinettskanzlei, was notoriously capable of unsealing, 
copying, resealing, and finally delivering all of the foreign mail to enter the Austro-
Hungarian before midday; they would spend the afternoon deciphering any mail that 
happened to be written in code.63 Acutely aware of this practice in Europe, American 
diplomats were prepared to use ciphers from the moment it was established, but part of 
the reason that strong postal protections were written into law is because the founding 
fathers had no intention of following in this tradition of state surveillance. 
Postal surveillance in Europe was so routine and longstanding that people could 
casually joke about it in the contents of their letters. Sigmund Freud himself addressed 
this assumed lack of privacy in his correspondence with the Russian writer Lou 
Andreas-Salomé, who also carried on a prolific. Together they pondered the psychic 
effects of reading people’s mail, concluding that the awareness of being observed can 
be a lever for passive censorship — not unlike his own description of the superego as an 
internalized, self-observant agent of censorship.64 They wrote their letters in plain text, 
but not for unawareness of cryptography. In his critique of the folk wisdom 
surrounding dream interpretation, Freud labeled the common approach as the “cipher 
method, since it treats the dream as a kind of secret code in which every sign is 
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translated into another sign of known meaning.”65  That is, if you remember several 
images from your dream, like a wooden raft carrying a small dog, you only need to find 
out what these symbols means in order to understand the dream itself. Freud imagined 
the mind to be more devious at concealing itself in dreams. The contents of a dream 
could not be just symbols with stable referents, but instead riddles or rebuses 
constructed from whole cloth in the unconscious. Despite his avid rumination on the 
various means of concealing messages, Freud did not bother to encode his letters even 
when he knew that they were being read in the Viennese postal surveillance and code 
breaking office. He and Salome preferred to correspond openly and lace their 
conversation with playful critique of the surveillance itself. 
Over the centuries, a number of secret societies have used cryptography to conceal 
the contents of their texts and rituals, but over time the use of cryptography becomes a 
symbolic practice in itself.66 To read or write with these ciphers is a textbook case of 
ritual communication, in which the point is not so much to transmit a message, but 
rather to construct and maintain a shared symbolic reality.67 Cryptography serves this 
purpose beautifully, not only binding an exclusive group through their ability to read 
these secret codes, but also calling special attention to this writing as distinct from 
conventional communication. Both Freemasons and Rosicrucians have used many 
different ciphers over the centuries, but the pigpen cipher is the most widely known 
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and documented, having grown into an open secret that is even displayed in public, 
such as the message on the tombstone below.68 
[Figure 2: Pigpen cipher inscribed on the tombstone of James Leeson in Trinity 
Church Cemetery, New York, 1794. Figure from S. Brent Morris, “Fraternal 
Cryptography Cryptographic Practices Of American Fraternal Organizations,” 
Cryptologia 1:7, 1983, p. 28.] 
The pigpen cipher shares more in common with other alphabets than it does with most 
ciphers. It is a fixed set of symbols, and the messages were only ever ‘secret’ insofar as 
non-masons were not supposed to be taught this alphabet. The same principle applies 
in the case of dead languages, which remain indecipherable only because we don’t have 
access to resources, whether human or material, that could tell us how to read these 
scripts. From this perspective, the pigpen cipher was no more ‘secret’ than most 
historical scripts, which were known only by elites, and in many cases even limited to 
specific elites such as priests, scribes, and royalty. Whether cryptography is defined as 
secret, private, or hidden writing, exclusivity of access is the operative principle. This 
underlines the fact that cryptography is only treated as cryptography when it meets a 
set of social conditions, and these conditions tend to present a moving target. 
As a result, cryptographic history tends to overlook the role of simple codes and 
ciphers as they were actually used in people’s everyday lives. Just as diaries may be 
fitted with physical locks, many diarists have elected to write in code, often with an 
idiosyncratic personal shorthand rather than a cipher that relies on a key.69 For 
instance, early members of the Methodist church made extensive use of code both in 
                                                             
68 MacNulty, W. Kirk. Freemasonry: Symbols, Secrets, Significance. Thames & Hudson, 2006. 





diaries and in correspondence. In letters, the lay would offer spiritual counsel to one 
another in confidence, sometimes using code to ensure that confidence. In diaries, 
where they recorded private thoughts as a form of spiritual exercise, writing in code 
also helped ensure that these thoughts stayed private. In the case of Charles Wesley, 
one of the founders of Methodism, researchers only decoded his 300,000 word journal 
in 2007, finally deciphering his unique personal shorthand.70 The journal contained 
some of Wesley’s darker thoughts, and clashes with his brother John, neither of which 
they would have shared in public. When John Wesley decided to break his vow of 
chastity, Charles expressed his dismay privately in code: “He is insensible of both his 
own folly and danger, and of the divine goodness in so miraculously saving him.”71 The 
children’s author Beatrix Potter also kept diaries in secret code, and the subject matter 
was nothing scandalous; her entries mainly express private thoughts and frustrations, 
tinged with bitterness from the time before she found success.72 Potter’s biographer 
surmises that such candid expressions of negative thinking would have been frowned 
upon.73 Keeping a coded journal enabled Potter to express herself and work through her 
thoughts without the disapproval that would have come from sharing these thoughts 
aloud. 
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Although today we often think of shorthand as a skill for rapid handwriting, 
especially in fields like journalism, it was once common to develop a personal 
shorthand, not only for economy but to make it difficult or unreadable for others. The 
English diarist Samuel Pepys not only wrote in shorthand to dissuade casual 
snooping,74 but also recorded especially private passages in a slightly more cryptic code 
— French, which added an extra layer of obfuscation to the shorthand itself.75 Although 
this method was all art and no math, Pepys’s diary proved remarkably secure: it 
remained undeciphered for two centuries, and once broken it became one of the 
quintessential records of the English Restoration period. Pepys himself considered this 
an intimate, private document, and his use of code and shorthand reflects his interest 
in maintaining privacy in the running chronicle of his days and thoughts. Other 
diarists, such as the American educator Mabel Todd, also pursued a simple need for 
personal privacy through coded journal entries. A mentor to Emily Dickinson, Todd 
used code in her diary entries and correspondence related to secret affairs with Austin 
Dickinson and others. In the diary, she also devised a set of secret symbols to keep track 
of her menstrual cycle.76 With pen and paper, Todd devised a way to record her 
thoughts without revealing what she wanted to keep private, thus maintaining written 
records without leaving them open to casual discovery by others. This was also 
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Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s apparent reason for recording a mere four of his journal 
entries in code when he was twenty-one years old. The entries describe some fairly 
tame romantic moments like a “never to be forgotten walk with my darling,” but still he 
wished to keep his courtships and love interests hidden if someone decided to snoop in 
his diary.77 
If writing is a technique for extending the mind, in the case of an encrypted diary, a 
secret code extends the natural privacy of one’s mind to a sheet of paper. An encrypted 
diary not only extends a record of one’s thoughts, but also extends the mind’s natural 
barrier against eavesdropping. In the case of encrypted correspondence, other apt 
metaphors might be walls, doors, whispering, or other means of keeping face-to-face 
conversations private. This points to the limitation of talking about media as extensions 
only of mind or self. Media may extend or replicate features of the social world in 
addition to interior phenomena like memory, sensation, and internal monologue. 
Encryption is a pointed example of both. In an encrypted diary, the privacy of mind is 
extended onto paper. An encrypted letter may, in a sense, extend the means of private 
conversation, whether it’s behavior like whispering or an essentially legal or 
conventional barrier like an envelope. 
Cryptography found new applications with the invention and proliferation of the 
telegraph in the mid-nineteenth century. Instantaneous transmission of messages 
shifted some the basic premises of commerce,78 Telegraph customers quickly found 
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that codes and ciphers were good business, both to save money by sending shorter 
codes and to hide the contents of messages with especially sensitive or valuable 
information. Telegrams often passed through many hands, including at least two 
signaling clerks who needed to literally read the message in order to transmit and 
receive it. Desk staff and messengers might also handle telegrams, not to mention 
anyone who’s gone to the trouble of tapping the wires for eavesdropping. Instead of 
scrambling telegraph messages, many chose to use commercial code books instead to 
protect the contents of their telegrams.79  A code book lists a set of common words and 
phrases in condensed or numerical form. Code books could conceal messages 
superficially and work most of the time, but anyone with access to the same book could 
decipher the meaning in a moment. A string of numbers could be assigned to a 
particular word, and those numbers would stand for the same word each time they 
appear. In contrast, a cipher operates at the level of individual characters. Taking this 
simple distinction into account, nineteenth-century America had a wealth of codes to 
compensate for a relative lack of ingenuity in ciphers. Morse Code was remarkable for 
the level of economy that it brought to signaling, but some telegraph customers realized 
that they could use of code books to send shorter (cheaper) and unreadable (private) 
telegrams. These books contained instructions for condensing common phrases into 
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acronyms and abbreviations. While most code books were printed and sold for public 
use, in some cases a firm would devise its own internal codes.  
The act of codebreaking could at first glance appear to be inherently aggressive, but 
there are exceptions. In the case of puzzle games or the pursuit of hidden messages in 
literature, there isn’t a target or victim whose communications have been broken 
against their will. Puzzle enthusiasts and even some scholars insist that puzzle-solving 
is inherently pleasurable, and might even be one of humanity’s basic instincts.80 
Seeking hidden codes has actually been a popular literary pastime among both scholars 
and leisurely readers for centuries. In literature, this practice is essentially a secular 
outgrowth of the search for hidden codes in religious texts, especially in mystical 
traditions where the search for hidden meaning was especially encouraged.81 Among 
linguists and philologists, codebreaking techniques have aided in deciphering ancient 
languages and texts, which were once written in a public script, but turned to secret 
script unintentionally when the language died out. The line between codebreaking and 
philological deciphering was essentially nil for centuries, with the codes of the ancients 
considered richer mysteries than the codes of one’s enemies. 
Beyond religious texts, the predominant subject of cryptographic attention in 
modern English literature has been Shakespeare.82 By the 1870s, the scholarly debate 
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over the authorship of Shakespeare had also become a fairly popular pursuit among 
non-experts, with the Bard’s popularity spanning hierarchies of taste.83 The question of 
the Bard’s true identity breaks down to so-called Stratfordians (Shakespeare as true 
author) and Anti-Stratfordians (promoting another, secret author or group of authors) 
and choosing sides would become a bustling subject of debate, speculation, and even 
research, though remarkably many amateurs entered the exciting search for hidden 
messages in Shakespeare, and those who approached it through codebreaking often 
used unsystematic, even inconsistent methods.  
The perennial favorite among Non-Stratfordians tended to be Sir Francis Bacon,  the 
seventeenth-century philosopher, statesman, and scientist. Bacon attracted particular 
attention from those who approached the authorship question through cryptograpy 
because Bacon himself had invented his own original encryption technique called the 
biliteral cipher. Bacon described this cipher in his De Augmentis Scientarum, literally a 
treatise on partitioning the sciences into categories from under the broad heading of 
natural philosophy. Bacon’s presentation of this cipher states that it is able to: 
signifie omnia per omina [anything with anything]. … And by this Art a way is 
opened, whereby a man may expresse and signifie the intentions of his mind, at 
any distance of place, by objects which may be presented to the eye, and 
accommodated to the eare … as by Bells [and] Trumpets, by Lights and Torches … 
and any instruments of like nature.84  
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Bacon’s cipher works through clever typesetting. By alternating two different font 
styles, a code of the form ABAAB may emerge, and these sequences in turn are matched 
to entries in a code book. . In practice, distinguishing type styles is not only an expert 
skill in itself, but variations in type styles often emerged from the exigencies of the 
printing trade. Shortages of type were common, broken pieces were often bent back 
into rough shape, leading many books from the sixteenth and seventeenth century to 
appear as though they contain a mixed assortment of type. The quartos and folios of 
Shakespeare’s plays were no exception, providing a rich source of speculation on 
ciphers that might be discovered through careful scrutiny of their haphazard 
typography. 
Perhaps the most notorious contender in the Shakespearean authorship debate was 
a minor politician named Ignatius Donnelly who conducted highly suspect work as an 
amateur scholar with a passion for uncovering historical mysteries. With his first book, 
The Antediluvian World (1882), Donnelly offered a highly detailed fabulist account 
describing not only the true location of Atlantis, but also highly detailed accounts of 
Atlantean culture, its vast empire, the cause of its demise, and its specific imprint on 
later civilizations. For this work alone, Donnelly has been aptly named the “Prince of 
Cranks,”85 and his subsequent endeavor to unmask the true Bard using cryptography 
was no better than his armchair archaeology. By the time Donnelly joined the debate 
over Shakespeare’s authorship in the late 1880s, it was already a popular subject in the 
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nascent scholarly field of English literary studies,86 as well as parlor-room conversation 
in society circles on both sides of the Atlantic. It was not only a plausible and 
respectable position, but one in which he had unusually good company. Other 
supporters of the secret authorship case included  Sigmund Freud, Henry James, Mark 
Twain, and Walt Whitman. Coming late to the conversation, Donnelly committed his 
support to the authorship of Sir Francis Bacon. Captivated by the possibility that he 
might be the one to decisively prove this conjecture, he began hunting for messages 
that Bacon himself must have hidden in his works through his own cipher. Indeed, 
Donnelly did not stop with Shakespeare, but also claimed to find evidence that Bacon 
wrote the works of Shakespeare’s rival Christopher Marlowe, and even the French 
essayist Michel de Montaigne. Donnelly published this account as The Great 
Cryptogram: Francis Bacon’s Ciphers in the So-Called Shakespeare Plays (1888), then 
traveled to England to present these findings to the faculty at Oxford, hoping to validate 
his claim to a scholarly breakthrough. Instead, his argument was received as insulting, 
both as a poor argument and a clumsy attack on a British national icon. Donnelly’s 
evidence was not just speculative, but so elaborate as to appear arbitrarily contrived. 
He argued that this was a mark of the true Bard’s fiendish intelligence. The senator’s 
foolhardy adventure ended in embarrassment, his book was a failure. And yet, many 
more continued to look for hidden messages in Shakespeare, with a wave of equally 
unsystematic literary code-hunters continuing to labor on this task well into the 
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twentieth century. In the fashionable pursuit of secret codes in Shakespeare, it is 
difficult to pinpoint anyone who approached the task with rigor except for a couple 
named Elizebeth and William Friedman, who began on the staff of a private research 
group called Riverbank Laboratory, but would have a decisive impact on the shift 
toward more systematic, scientific, computational approaches to cryptography — as 
well as the boundary work that would disqualify techniques that did not match this 
model. 
Riverbank Laboratory was established in 1911 by the wealthy textile manufacturer 
George Fabyan on the grounds of his own large estate along the Fox River in a leafy 
suburb of Chicago, where he declared his intention to be “wrestling from Nature, her 
secrets.”87 The manor had been freshly renovated by none other than Frank Lloyd 
Wright a few years earlier, and a collection of new buildings were constructed and 
refurbished in the following years to accommodate Fabyan’s range of eccentric 
research interests. Fabyan at first established a laboratory for acoustical research, 
growing out of Mrs. Fabyan’s curiosity about whether the church bells in France 
sounded the same as the church bells in America, but within two years he expanded 
Riverbank’s mission to encompass botany, genetics, Shakespeare, Japanese 
landscaping — and cryptology. 88These projects ranged from the trivial and eccentric 
(caged bears fed on a strict vegetarian diet) to full-on pseudoscience (efforts to levitate 
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massive objects with precisely tuned blasts of sound).89 Initially, Fabyan instructed his 
researchers to pursue the latter subject through rumors of a lost Baconian invention: a 
device that could lift itself by harnessing sonic vibrations from its surroundings. To this 
end, Fabyan invited the leading expert in architectural acoustics, Wallace Clement 
Sabine of Harvard.90 In the course of seeking the levitation device, the Riverbank staff 
had been instructed to scrutinize the collected writings of Sir Francis Bacon seeking 
evidence for an even wider range of secrets — not only fantastical inventions and the 
secret authorship of Shakespeare, but also Bacon’s alleged claim to the throne of 
England as the undisclosed child of Elizabeth I. Fabyan ordered his cryptography staff 
to focus their full attention on finding Bacon’s hidden messages, whether in his own 
writings or those conventionally attributed to Shakespeare.  To head this project, 
Fabyan hired Elizabeth Wells-Gallup, whose recently published and extravagantly titled 
The Biliteral Cypher of Sir Francis Bacon Discovered in his Works and Deciphered by 
Mrs Elizabeth Wells Gallup had raised her standing among followers of this debate.91 
Still, her methods were little more systematic than Donnelly’s. In hunting for letters 
printed in contrasting type styles, she constructed ad-hoc rules to yield messages 
supporting her case.92 Without fail, the ghostly hand of Bacon would reveal itself, not by 
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breaking codes but by assembling them from wishfully categorized variants of the 
typefaces constructing each biliteral cipher. 
Not everything at Riverbank was quackery. The botany and genetics team developed 
a novel means of corn pollination, and as a result Fabyan found better luck recruiting 
and retaining trained academics for this particular enterprise. In 1914, Fabyan wrote to 
an acquaintance in Cornell’s Biology department93 and asked him to recommend 
someone to lead his genetic studies at Riverbank. The professor recommended one of 
his graduate students, the studious and well-mannered William Friedman, who 
accepted the invitation to work at Riverbank and moved into a modest room on the 
upper floor of the estate’s decorative windmill. An avid amateur photographer, 
Friedman offered to produce enlargements of the Shakespearean and Baconian source 
materials, thus aiding in the recognition of typographic contrasts that would point to 
the presence of a biliteral cipher. Friedman caught the attention of another staff 
member, Elizebeth Smith, who worked under Wells-Gallup but had grown suspicious of 
her methods. In 1915, Friedman moved to the codebreaking unit, the couple married, 
they moved into the windmill, and together they committed to conducting cipher 
studies with scientific rigor from that point forward. 
Wells-Gallup was slowly eclipsed on the Riverbank cipher unit as the Friedmans 
pushed for methodological rigor, insisting on controlled hypothesis testing and 
consistent application of decoding techniques — that is, not changing the rules as soon 
as you hit a dead end, as Donnelly and Wells Gallup had often done. Wells Gallup had 
                                                             






achieved remarkable results by feeling her way toward the fabricated conclusions, and 
she often reached her most remarkable findings through suspiciously arbitrary 
methods. For their part, the Friedmans never found any evidence of an authorship 
conspiracy during their time at Riverbank, and decades later they would lay the matter 
to rest with a book debunking the past literature seeking hidden codes in 
Shakespeare.94 But there at Riverbank, they found amusing ways of staying productive 
in their codebreaking research. As the Friedmans watched others project arbitrary 
codes onto the text, they were inspired to write a series of papers explaining, in ironic 
appropriation of Bacon’s original phrasing, “How to Make Anything Stand for 
Anything,” a set of prints outlining how to hide codes in a range of materials from sheet 
music to the placement of flower petals in botanical illustrations.  
[Figures 3-5. Baconian biliteral cipher diagrams and illustrations from 
Riverbank Laboratory, conveying the critical point that through this 
cryptographic technique you can “make anything stand for anything,” a biting 
comment on unsystematic searches for hidden messages in Shakespeare, but 
also a useful insight into the generative capacity of coding.] 
Though this work was whimsical, sarcastic, and made little effort to conceal its poking 
fun at pseudoscientific cryptography, the Friedmans developed a highly systematic 
grasp of cryptography that was far more rigorous than anything else practiced on their 
side of the Atlantic at the time. In spite of its dubious mission and management, the 
Shakespeare group at Riverbank was the leading center of cryptographic research in 
the United States. When the country went to war in 1917, the honorary Colonel Fabyan 
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put his lab at the nation’s disposal since, as always before this moment, codebreaking 
bureaus were not maintained in the U.S. during peacetime. The Friedmans returned to 
Riverbank only briefly after the war, but accepted an invitation to work as full-time 
codebreakers with the US military, which had only started to recognize a continuous 
need for codebreaking and cryptographic expertise to keep pace with other world 
powers. Still, the Friedmans continued to follow the Shakespearean authorship debate 
throughout their lives, especially when an entrant to the conversation would return to 
the cryptographic approaches which they themselves had found methodologically 
bankrupt in their years at Riverbank.  
One of the leading factors in the popularity of the Shakespearean authorship debate 
in America was its popularity as a topic of discussion at social clubs, a fixture of high-
brow leisure and society in many American cities during the nineteenth century.95 
Drawing from the general popularity of cryptograms as a brainy diversion, these 
puzzles became popular at social spaces like the Diamond Club of Philadelphia, the 
Sphinx Club of Detroit, and the Tutshi Cryptogram Club of Vancouver, which purported 
to be the northernmost organization devoted to solving cryptograms. Eventually this 
niche grew into a national association dedicated solely to the hobby of solving 
cryptograms. The American Cryptogram Association (ACA) was founded in 1929 by a 
group off puzzle enthusiasts in several different states whose shared mission was to 
foster an appreciation of the cryptogram as the intellectual equal of chess or bridge. 
That is, they viewed the cryptogram as a source of such fine entertainment and 
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personal edification that they formed a dedicated association to raise its status and 
esteem among the general public. 
As soon as the ACA was established, they began publishing a bimonthly magazine 
called The Cryptogram as a way to build community among their geographically 
dispersed membership.96 Beginning with the second issue, the title header declared the 
ACA’s main article of faith: “the cryptogram is the aristocrat of puzzles,” a 
pronouncement from the founding statement of the association’s president, who 
honored and elevated the cryptogram itself in language that would be difficult to take 
seriously if not for the seriousness with which members devoted themselves to the club 
itself. 
The popularity of the problem play and mystery fiction demonstrates that the 
public loves to be intrigued, and it is this quality, together with its high 
development, that marks the cryptogram as the aristocrat of puzzles. Crossword 
puzzles which now appear in many papers and magazines, will be replaced by 
cipher problems as surely as was casino by contract bridge. 
The American Cryptogram Association was organized to devote its entire 
activities to this one puzzle, and to place it upon a scientific basis to rank with 
chess and contract bridge, thus contributing to the happiness of mankind. 
To this high purpose I invite the cooperation of all, the superiority of the 
cryptogram will make this association a power in this country.97 
Although it’s unclear what sort of ‘power’ Warner aspired to, his competitive approach 
to other kinds of puzzle seems to have been shared by other members of the ACA, 
whose testimonials profess to the unrecognized glory of the cryptogram. “I agree that 
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the cryptogram has a greater intellectual value than the crossword puzzle, and would 
like to do my share in placing the cryptogram on the high, scientific basis the society 
aims for,” wrote Verona McKeown of Chicago, Illinois. “It seems, the more membership 
this organization gets, the more chance cryptograms have of becoming famous as a 
‘science’,” wrote F. Ernest Meyer of Provo, Utah.  A wider public interest in codes had 
been noticed by Charles Parsons of East Millinocket, Maine, who wrote, “As a librarian 
… I have already noticed considerable interest in such cryptograms as our reading table 
has had from time to time.” 
The first cohort of ACA members established a pleasantly learned, inclusive, and 
welcoming atmosphere around their love for cryptography. Members were encouraged 
to adopt a nom de plume, a gesture to remove the trappings of formality and to ensure 
that the association’s many female members would be treated as equals. These 
monikers reveal both the playful quality of the club and the fascinations that pulled 
them toward this hobby. Many members chose noms de plume that evoked fantasy, 
mythology, and the ancient world, including Oedipus, Artaxerxes, Madame Sphinx, 
Zoroaster, and Persephone.  These literary and antiquarian fascinations also prompted 
early articles in The Cryptogram that outlined highlights of cryptography’s cultural and 
literary history, omitting war and politics in favor of wide-eyed entrancement. “Many of 
you who are interested in cryptography possibly do not realize what an ancient and 





striven ingeniously to protect the confidence of his written communications, his notes 
and his diaries by resorting to various means of cryptic composition.”98 
The ACA membership grew as they actively formed a network of geographically 
isolated enthusiasts who contributed puzzles, solutions, and articles to The 
Cryptogram. They partnered with other puzzle clubs, encouraged cross-membership, 
and shared facilities for annual meetings.99 They praised and promoted other groups 
and publications united in their promotion of cryptography’s recreational value.100 In 
short, the ACA was genuinely devoted to fostering a network of cryptogram enthusiasts 
and encouraging a community of puzzle enthusiasts to give greater attention and 
prestige to the cryptogram as a brainy pastime. This attitude is clearly conveyed in the 
solutions for the first round of cryptograms submitted to be printed in The Cryptogram 
and solved by its readers: “Why do we work cipher messages? It makes our minds alert, 
and we enjoy, unconsciously, the stimulation.”101 
Beginning in 1933, an ACA member from small-town Arkansas named Helen 
Fouché Gaines started writing a regular column for The Cryptogram, each piece 
explaining the method of solving a different type of cipher with remarkable clarity and 
rigor. In 1938, several ACA members encouraged Gaines to collect these pieces into a 
handbook, and in 1941 the handbook was published as Cryptanalysis: A Study of 
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Ciphers and Their Solutions,102 a handbook later used and cited by the mathematician 
Claude Shannon when he was conducting his own work on cryptography.  
An understudied feature of American social life, puzzle clubs like the ACA provide a 
rich example of cryptography’s past as a venture of innocent entertainment. Further 
work could be conducted on detective magazines from the period that are frequently 
referenced by ACA members. Not only did these members genuinely enjoy solving 
cryptograms as a recreational diversion, they wanted to meet other people who could 
teach, challenge, or simply entertain them. Their members magazine The Cryptogram 
is also remarkable as a specimen of cryptographic culture unencumbered by today’s 
typical claim that codes and ciphers have always been the closely guarded secrets of the 
government and military, and before scientific or computational frameworks began to 
eclipse the wider range of literary interests that characterized cryptography in the past.  
When did cryptography begin to be treated scientifically, and what was entailed in 
this development? Why did scientific approaches to cryptography overtake others? And 
what were the social and cultural factors that shaped the scientific framework which 
guides cryptography today? A litany of questions, necessary only because it’s a difficult 
point to place correctly. Computational approaches to cryptography stretch far back 
into history, representing some of the first serious applications of probability and 
statistics, before even the Renaissance, when the Islamic scholar Al-Kindi found that he 
could use frequency analysis (also Poe’s method) to break simple codes. The fact that 
cryptography appears to precede gambling as the first practical application of 
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probability deserves deeper attention in another venue since this case tends to be 
excluded from leading histories of probability and statistics. The questions at play 
around the turn of the twentieth century belong to the same protracted lineage. 
Friedman has garnered ample attention from historians of cryptography, who credit 
him with various inventions and distinctions, but really the most striking feature of the 
Friedmans’ legacy is his rejection of the humble, unscientific, popular uses of 
cryptography in print and written culture. “We had a lot of pioneering to do,” Elizebeth 
Friedman wrote. “Literary ciphers may give you the swing of the thing, but they are in 
no sense scientific. There were no precedents for us to follow.”  
The Friedmans conducted textbook boundary work in delineating science from 
non-science, a practice that Thomas Gieryn pins to material and professional 
incentives beyond the overt scholarly motivations often voiced by scientists and 
philosophers of science when they assert these boundaries.103 
When William Friedman coined the terms ‘cryptology’ and ‘cryptanalysis’, these 
terms helped sort and delineate what counts in the field and what doesn’t. Although the 
Friedmans were not the first to treat cryptography as a science, nor the first to 
recognize the use of probability and statistics in breaking codes, their boundary work 
was particularly notable in the context of this study because over the course of their 
careers there slowly ceased to be a distinction made between ‘military cryptography’ 
and cryptography proper. Friedman’s 1925 book titled Military Cryptography 
pinpointed its subject as a style of coded communication used in war. He not only 
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gathered copies of books written in the past for this specific purpose, but in several 
cases also commissioned translations of books on military cryptography written in 
French, German, or Italian, sometimes over a century earlier. Military cryptography 
furnished a rigorous, methodical framework that yielded great success for the 
Friedmans, whether in breaking cipher machines or breaking the codes used by rum-
runners during Prohibition. They sliced through these codes using an increasingly 
sophisticated statistical toolkit largely of their own design. Perhaps they would have 
found a faster route to deciphering Pepys’ shorthand; perhaps they would have 
deciphered hieroglyphs without the aid of the Rosetta Stone; though they never gained 
a foothold to decipher the strange handwriting in the Voynich Manuscript, a sensation 
when it first surfaced in the 1920s. Nevertheless, treating cryptography on the rigid 
terms once used almost exclusively under the conditions of war proved advantageous, 
and the Friedmans pushed the boundary in this direction, but it remains the case that 
the specific demands and constraints of military communications do not apply in many 
other forms of communication. 
As a matter of historical contingency, it is worth noting that the Friedmans’ career 
in cryptography followed from a series of chance occurrences — for Fabyan to contact 
Friedman’s graduate advisor at Cornell when he wanted to hire genetics researchers for 
Riverbank; for this genetics laboratory to be collocated with Wells Gallup’s group 
conducting literary research with cryptography; for Friedman’s amateur interest in 
photography to be useful for enlarging the details of early print editions of 
Shakespeare; for the lack of rigor in Wells Gallup’s search for secret messages to offend 





rigorous methodology for codebreaking; and for the US military’s lack of codebreaking 
personnel at the outbreak of World War I to lead the honorary Colonel Fabyan to pledge 
the service of Riverbank Lab to the war effort. Friedman’s national service as a 
cryptographer will reappear in Chapter 3, when he serves as an instrumental figure in 
the formation of the National Security Agency in the postwar years, as well as his 
enlistment of prominent early figures in computer science to consult on NSA 
codebreaking during the Agency’s early years. 
Despite Friedman’s ubiquity in the recent history of codes and ciphers, having 
worked, wrote, and lectured prolifically on the subject of mathematical codebreaking 
throughout the twenties, thirties, and forties, he tends to be snubbed by academic 
cryptographers today when it comes to granting credit for the scientific foundations of 
their field. His legacy is held in higher esteem in the intelligence community, who 
remember Friedman for his accomplishments in breaking codes at critical moments. 
For them, he could be considered something like the American Turing, but with the 
notable difference that Friedman lacks crossover recognition among scientists. At face 
value, this is more than a little puzzling since Friedman was a public figure, widely 
known as an expert in codes and ciphers, and made a number of breakthroughs in 
mathematical cryptography that were published in the open literature. Although the 
applied codebreaking manuals that Friedman wrote for the US military were kept 
classified, his more rarefied work on the application of advanced statistical methods to 
cryptography were publicly available. His The Index of Coincidence and Its 
Applications in Cryptography (1922) introduced a method for essentially measuring the 





In short, it was a computational method for determining the least random and thus 
most easily broken points in an encrypted message.104 A variant of this technique called 
the kappa test, developed by Friedman’s protege Solomon Kullback, remains one of the 
soundest methods for cracking open a code that appears to be nothing more than a 
random string of characters. 
In 1928, the editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica commissioned Friedman to write 
the entry on “Codes and Ciphers” for their 14th edition. The article he produced was 
remarkably dry, forgoing the wonder and mystique so commonly deployed in other, 
contemporaneous writings on cryptography, including many of his own. Overall, the 
article bears a closer resemblance to technical manuals for military cryptography, and 
his bibliography counts a handful of these manuals as its sole reference points, noting 
that when it comes to the history of cryptography, “modern works are relatively few in 
number.”105 When Friedman was invited to update his entry in 1958, he reworded this 
point in stronger terms, lamenting the lack of decent historical work on this subject and 
also describing the persistent barriers to writing such a history. 
It may as well be stated at the outset that as of the 1950s there did not exist in any 
language a detailed, authentic and publicly available history of cryptology. 
Moreover, because of the curtain of secrecy which is invariably placed around 
cryptologic work of an official character, accurate accounts of historically 
important events or of noteworthy inventions and improvements in cryptologic 
technology usually enter into the public domain only many years after the event 
or invention has occurred. Therefore, although it is difficult or impossible to 
ascertain with certainty much about the origin of any specific item or fact of 
cryptographic or cryptanalytic importance, the data should be traced back at 
                                                             
104 According to David Kahn, the index of coincidence “must be regarded as the most important 
single publication in cryptology. It took the science into a new world.” The Codebreakers, p. 186. 





least as far as the open or public records will permit. With this limitation in 
mind, this account will begin by noting that secret modes of signalling and 
communication have probably been in use from the earliest times, since the 
desire for secrecy in communication is certainly as old or nearly as old as the art 
of writing itself. However, mysteries such as the prophetic and apocalyptic 
writings of the orient and the Sibylline oracles are generally not regarded by 
cryptologists as coming within their province; nor do they generally do anything 
more than merely refer to the various systems of stenography or shorthand used 
since the time of the Romans… 106 
As the anointed, encyclopedic authority on this subject, Friedman took considerable 
latitude in asserting the consensus among cryptologists. Perhaps he was doubly 
justified, given that he had coined the term ‘cryptology’ himself. Emerging from the 
previous age, Friedman actively worked to shape the very meaning of cryptography to 
fit his own conception of it. In this light, the passage is not only narrow-minded and 
dismissive, but slightly disingenuous as well. By this point in time, Friedman was both 
personally and professionally invested in developing the scientific groundwork for 
cryptology, complete with boundary work to disqualify techniques like 
steganography107 and shorthand that were not based in mathematics. Moreover, as the 
nation’s Chief Cryptologist, Friedman had directed his staff to maintain the very 
“curtain of secrecy” that he believes has hindered historians in writing comprehensive, 
accurate accounts of the subjects he considers central to the subject — that is, 
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“cryptologic work of an official character” rather than the array of unofficial 
cryptography that thrived in messy, unsystematic, unscientific techniques for 
concealing communications. Though it might be foolish to rely on these techniques in 
war, nevertheless it narrows the set of communication practices that even count as 
cryptography, and thus narrow the possibility for a history that treats the subject with 
the social and cultural depth that it deserves. 
Although William Friedman dedicated his career to advancing the scientific rigor of 
cryptography, introducing categories and nomenclature, not to mention pushing non-
scientific cryptography to the margins, most cryptographers today do not credit him 
with paradigmatic status. He is revered by many in the American military and 
intelligence community for his work in breaking enemy codes. He is credited with 
several breakthroughs in the statistical analysis of language. He and his wife Elizebeth 
were even awarded the prestigious Folger Prize for their contributions to Shakespeare 
scholarship — that is, for debunking the literature claiming Bacon or anyone else had 
hidden ciphers in these plays and sonnets. Despite all the work that Friedman 
committed to elevating mere cryptography to the science of cryptology, his work lay in 
the machine age, just barely reaching across the cusp of the computer age. He retired in 
1964, passed away in 1969, and had spent a full twenty years as the nation’s Chief 
Cryptologist carefully guarding and classifying much of the knowledge and expertise 
accumulated on the subject of cryptography during these two decades. The field of 
cryptography, as we know it today, only emerged in the mid-seventies from this 
enforced hibernation, a subject addressed in Chapter 5. The next chapter looks instead 





cryptography as a subfield of information theory. For it was a one-off paper written by 
the mathematician Claude Shannon in 1949 that computer scientists adopted when 
they framed cryptography as a fledgling subfield in the seventies, and even today 
cryptography is imprinted with the highly stimulating weirdness of Shannon’s work — 
particularly its reliance on the vexing concept of entropy.  
In the course of becoming a science, cryptography had to be furnished with the 
various cultural trappings of a science. William Friedman recognized this, and he 
conducted vigorous boundary work delineating genuine cryptography from 
pseudoscience. This boundary work would prove to be at least as consequential as any 
of the practical techniques or inventions he contributed to this field, including the 
index of coincidence. William Friedman is often regarded as the greatest cryptographer 
of the twentieth century, perhaps of all time.108 And yet it is not Friedman, but Shannon 
who enjoys paradigmatic status and general recognition today as the figure who made 
cryptography into a science. Twenty-five years younger than Friedman, having only 
written a single article on cryptography, itself intended as a corollary to his broader 
mathematical theory of communication (the subject of Chapter 2), in contrast to the 
dozens of books, manuals, and articles that Friedman wrote throughout a five-decade 
career in cryptology, a term that Friedman coined himself.  
Credit aside, the most striking development in cryptography between the 
nineteenth and twentieth century was the shift away from earlier forms of 
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cryptography — popular, often unsystematic practice centered on literature, puzzles, 
and various forms of communication — these were mostly eclipsed by the 1940s, with 
only some detective magazines, children’s, and the ongoing activity of clubs like the 
ACA to suggest the broader range of cultural forms that had employed cryptography 
throughout the nineteenth century. The most remarkable difference between 
cryptography today and in the age of print is that cryptography by hand is no longer 
considered practical or feasible, with computational methods slowly eclipsing an 
eclectic range of others, and computers themselves eventually taking over the practice 
of cryptography and codebreaking. 
Looking back, cryptography was deeply entangled with arts and letters, news and 
entertainment, puzzles and parlor games. It was useful for writers of letters and diaries 
— that is, writers who were writing in private venues. There is ample material to 
develop a social history of cryptography that bolsters the public claim to cryptography 
and develops this neglected corner of cryptographic history. 
The definition of cryptography printed in Scientific American in 1866 bears 
repeating, as it takes a broad, socially oriented stance that appears to have carried on 
until at least the 1930s. 
This [cryptography] is the art of reading and writing dispatches, messages, etc., 
in such a way that only those who possess the key can decipher them. It has 
borne a most important part in the business of life, from love to war, from 
mischief to money-making, and is in daily use now for these objects.109 
Today, war and mischief tend to outweigh the greater “business of life” in perceptions 
of cryptography. Even though the writer recognized the “daily use” of cryptography 
                                                             





back in the 1860s, the use of cryptography in everyday life during the present ‘digital 
age’ may still seem like a strange and novel development rather than a continuation or 
return of a longer tradition. For the popular use of cryptography to have a truly usable 
past, the everyday uses of codes and ciphers deserve greater recognition, and those 
outlined in this chapter depict a popular claim to cryptography in America long before 
the digital age.  
Is hiding a message in an acrostic poem cryptography? Is invisible ink? Friedman 
would say no, following European authorities on military cryptography who preferred 
orderly, regimented techniques that would not collapse if they fell into enemy hands.110 
Instead, it is steganography, or a technique for hiding messages in plain sight. 
According to Shannon’s maxim, discussed in the next chapter, the first rule of 
cryptography is to assume that the enemy knows the system. This assumption makes 
sense in a military context, where wide distribution of a cryptosystem across an army 
makes it sensible to assume that security should rest entirely in the key, but it’s an 
unfortunate limitation to place on past practices, especially if it determines which 
subjects should be qualified or disqualified from historical consideration. Nobody could 
fault the Friedmans for their irritation with the nonsense cryptographic work feeding 
Shakespearean conspiracy theories, but as they made the field more systematic and 
rigorous, they also clamped a narrower lens upon cryptography, and as they were 
drawn into codebreaking work for the government and military, the Friedmans 
together represent a historical pivot point. They entered the field through literature, 
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through the study of rare books and the mysteries they might conceal, and in this 
experience they witnessed the resplendent quackery that sometimes accompanies the 
quest for hidden knowledge. Cryptography’s longer history is rife with examples of 
false translations of hieroglyphics or other hidden codes imagined into existence. As 
the Friedmans worked to develop scientific bases for their work, and during their 
unexpected entry into military codebreaking in World War I, they supported the 
development of rigorous computational methods and the arrival of cipher machines 
that would require these computational codebreaking methods. The Friedmans 
witnessed the U.S. government begin to take an active interest in ciphers for the first 
time after World War I, and both of them dedicated long careers to service in this field. 
The Friedmans also witnessed as cryptography transformed from a literary practice in 
the age of print, to become a fully computational and mechanical practice in the age to 
come, although these simpler approaches to cryptography never disappeared 
completely, they were only pushed beyond the boundary of what counts as 
cryptography. 
Cryptography’s history of quacks is nevertheless a part of its history. This is not 
intended as a defense of quacks, but rather a warning against disqualifying the popular 
history of cryptography as though it had been nothing but quackery. It was the 
freelance writer Poe who made of the cryptogram a popular genre before even 
commercial codes had landed on the telegraph. It was journalists at the New York 
Tribune who uncovered the greatest political scandal of the 1870s by puzzling through 
a tranche of telegrams intercepted (somehow) from the Democratic Party. And much 





privacy has a much longer history than even today’s advocates of privacy rights have 
yet found available. Whether or not the historical reach of the popular claim to 
cryptography would be particularly convincing to the public is largely immaterial: what 
such a history does accomplish is undermining the claim that cryptography, at least in 














Communication and its Limits in Cybernetics and Information Theory: 






Perhaps the most remarkable stylistic feature of Claude Shannon’s “Communication 
Theory of Secrecy Systems,” is that he never betrays even a hint of excitement about his 
subject matter — that is, a formal mathematical description of secret communication 
through cryptography. Shannon halfheartedly describes the subject as “an interesting 
application of communication theory,” he admits that his work is “limited in certain 
ways,” and he even suggests that this article is only “intended to complement the 
treatment found in standard works on cryptography” — such as the Manual of 
Cryptography written several years earlier by ACA member Helen Fouche Gaines. Even 
as an ‘interesting application’ of communication theory, Shannon’s mathematical 
theory of communication is itself credited as a foundational work in information 
theory, computer science, and numerous other fields that have adopted computational 
methods over the last half century.111  
                                                             
111 See Shannon, Claude E. “The Bandwagon.” IRE Transactions on Information Theory 2, no. 1 
(1956): 3. In this article, Shannon dismissed the appropriation of his work as a “bandwagon,” 






Still, in a late-life interview Shannon said that the theories of cryptography and 
information were inextricable, though he carefully hedged his response in order to fend 
off the leading questions of his overzealous interviewer. “I worked on both of them 
together and had some of the ideas while working on the other,” Shannon told his 
interviewer. “I wouldn’t say one came before the other — they were so close together 
that you couldn’t separate them.”112 Although this particular point may be impossible to 
untangle, it is clear that communication theory was Shannon’s passion, while 
cryptography was a subject that landed on his desk as a wartime assignment. Despite 
Shannon’s apparent indifference to the subject of cryptography, this article is 
considered fundamental to the study of cryptography within computer science today. It 
is typically the first case posed to graduate students or advanced undergraduates  as 
they wade into the formulae, models, variables, terminology, and norms that undergird 
the field today. 
But even this would only happen decades later: cryptography only emerged as a 
branch of computer science in the late seventies, still granting credit to Claude 
Shannon, who quizzically wrote only this one paper on cryptography and spent most of 
his career working on entirely different subjects.113 Several other odd details surround 
the story that Shannon ushered cryptography into scientific practice. It was an accident 
or coincidence that Shannon ever worked on cryptography at all. He viewed this subject 
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as an excuse to work out the details of a personal project he’d been thinking about for 
years. The finished results of his cryptography project were initially classified, and 
even after Shannon was permitted to publish this work, it landed with a thud and was 
essentially ignored for twenty-five years while his work on information theory 
propelled him to academic fame. The rediscovery of Shannon’s cryptographic theory in 
the 1970s and the anointment of this work as canonical will be described in Chapter 5, 
but the purpose of this chapter is to examine how the key concepts in Shannon’s 
broader theory of communication and information were formed in conversation with 
his theory of cryptography.  
Reading only Shannon’s theory of communication, noise seems like something 
purely destructive to communication, but in cryptography, noise is essential. To hide 
the contents of a message, you turn it into noise, sometimes even using a source of 
noise as a computational resource. To hide it perfectly, you make it look as random as 
possible, ideally resembling white noise, another concept developed at Bell Labs. 
Shannon’s experience with the usefulness of noise in fact tempered his stance 
compared to many of his predecessors seeking a mathematical theory of 
communication. He recognized that noise is often just whatever we choose to call 
‘noise,’ and he noticed that a useful measure of information could treat it by analogy to 
entropy, a phenomenon closely connected to noise and randomness. And yet the 
success of Shannon’s information theory often extended the reach of terms like signal 
and noise without noise, itself, being treated with any subtlety. Just as entropy can be 





cryptography are both processes of encoding messages, and the resulting information 
can appear either orderly or disorderly from different perspectives. 
Shannon’s theories of communication and cryptography are fastened together by a 
statistical understanding of language, expressed through the concepts of signal and 
noise, a pair of terms that emerged from the jargon of electrical engineering in the late 
nineteenth century, proliferated through the forties and fifties, and also entered into 
related fields like cybernetics as part of a toolkit of concepts and metaphors largely 
drawn from media and technology. The purpose of this chapter is to probe Shannon’s 
double theory as the paradigmatic origin of the scientific and mathematical approach to 
modern cryptography; to describe the differences between Shannon’s approach to 
communication theory and what was offered by his predecessors and cyberneticists 
like Norbert Wiener; and to discuss the ongoing misinterpretation of noise, not only 
among Shannon’s readers but also those who passively received the idea of signal and 
noise as a readymade framework to describe communication and its sources of failure. 
Foregrounding Shannon’s theory of cryptography reveals not only that noise can be 
something useful in communication, but also that there was growing interest in seeing 
the positive characteristics of noise, and related concepts like chance and entropy, both 
at Bell Labs and in the broader cultural sphere of postwar science in America. 
In order to place Shannon’s work in context, this study begins several decades 
earlier. Although Shannon’s work is often treated as though it was an isolated work of 
genius, the conditions in which he worked — at MIT, the Institute for Advanced Study in 
Princeton, and at Bell Labs — offer a productive basis to depart from the prevailing 





through the values, terms, models, and metaphors at play in his professional and 
academic environment. These, I argue, can be found in decades of grappling with signal 
and noise, especially at Bell Labs as they sought to improve telecommunications 
according to a rigid framework of engineering values, terms, and assumptions. 
• 
The problem of noise as electromagnetic interference had presented itself during 
the very birth of electrical communication in the early nineteenth century, but noise on 
the telegraph and telephone wires presented noticeably less trouble than it would for 
later communication technologies like the telephone and radio. For early radio 
operators and the first wave of radio audiences, the fuzz and hum on the dial were a 
conspicuous obstruction in what otherwise seemed like an expansive, untethered 
medium transported through the vast, empty space poetically named the 'luminiferous 
aether'. Radio pioneers soon found that the open air is permeated by electromagnetic 
signals, most of them natural phenomena that populated the radio spectrum long 
before the first broadcast.114 Like noise on an electrical wire, airborne noise was treated 
only as an obstruction to transmission. Noise, in this general sense, became the 
adversary of communication in an age that was increasingly defined by the affordances 
of instantaneous long-distance transmission.  
In the midst of this development, the concepts of noise and entropy became 
interconnected, and in the early decades of the twentieth century they became central 
concerns in the development of communication technology. At first, these were 
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considered to be totally chaotic phenomena, either resistant to understanding or 
destructive to transmission. But as communication researchers at Bell Labs studied 
noise to develop means of suppressing it, they found statistical regularity and genuine 
randomness in noise. Through statistical models and formulae, these researchers 
began to find both theoretical and practical uses for noise.  
Reframing noise in this way laid the conceptual foundations for the mathematical 
theory of communication. While metaphors of miscommunication have been linked to 
audible disruption for many centuries, the metaphor of ‘signal and noise’ as we know it 
today is quite young, while appreciation for the uses of noise is even younger. There 
was a shift in the understanding of mechanical ‘noise’ in communication systems from 
roughly 1914 to 1945, and the significance of this shift in the development of modern 
cryptography is that noise was recognized as something that could be captured, 
domesticated, and rendered useful for communications. 
The terms used by Shannon and the concepts he employed in information theory 
not only emerged in the nineteenth century, but were actively developed in the decades 
before he conducted his major work. It was in the course of experimenting on 
electromagnetic fields that scientists and inventors first considered the possibility of 
wireless communication at a distance. For the German experimentalist Heinrich Hertz, 
the problem was not yet noise, but rather generating signals strong enough to endure 
over a distance before they were swallowed by sources of interference. In 1886, when 





transmitter, the signal traversed only the span of a single room in his laboratory.115 Over 
the next decade, other experimenters gradually extended the strength of wave 
transmissions so that they could be detected at greater distances.116 In the decades 
preceding the development of radio wave transmission, the means of recording and 
transmitting images, sounds, and text had changed dramatically, but a similar problem 
arose in each case: how to isolate the part that matters from what is extraneous.117 
Similarly, for audio recording, the means of imprinting sound waves rested on the 
problem of developing sensors that could gather only a precisely limited range of 
airborne vibrations, imprint them in a durable medium, and reproduce those 
vibrations convincingly.118 By the turn of the twentieth century, the endeavor to 
reproduce sounds accurately had been extended to performance spaces, like concert 
halls and amphitheaters, where the acoustics of an open space began to be treated as a 
laboratory subject, shaped and tuned according to relative resonance of tones across 
the space, as well as the means of amplifying sounds in larger spaces so that the 
placement and tuning of amplifiers would be consonant with the sonic measurements 
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of the space itself.119  A considerable part of this process was architectural noise control, 
especially soundproofing to isolate outside sources of disturbance. These new means of 
controlling and reproducing sound carried the concept of noise across media as a 
disruptive force, tacitly connecting the many varieties of noise and turning the very 
idea of ‘noise’ into an increasingly broad abstraction. 
For AT&T, mitigating the problem of noise to improve transmission quality became 
a central priority in their research and development division, the Volta Laboratory 
established by Alexander Graham Bell in 1893.120 Much of the company’s research was 
conducted there until they merged with the research division of Western Electric in 
1925 to form the Bell Telephone Laboratory in New York City. At Bell Labs, engineers, 
mathematicians, and physicists were provided with nearly unbridled research space to 
pursue the advancement and improvement of communication technologies. This 
typically meant improving the range, clarity, or economy of electrical transmissions, 
but the studies conducted for these ends covered a abundant range of subjects even 
when the Labs were first founded. 
Many of the communication engineers at Bell Labs were engaged with the 
implications that followed from a half-century of experimentation and theorization by 
laboratory staff.121 Much of the conceptual work was first carved out by physicists 
                                                             
119 Thompson, Emily Ann. The Soundscape of Modernity: Architectural Acoustics and the Culture of 
Listening in America, 1900-1933. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2002. 
120 Fagen, M. D., Amos E. Joel, G. E. Schindler, and Bell Telephone Laboratories, eds. A History of 
Engineering and Science in the Bell System. New York: The Laboratories, 1975. 
121 For historical accounts of classical thermodynamics and the development of statistical 
mechanics across the natural sciences, see Krüger, Lorenz, ed. The Probabilistic Revolution. 





studying the puzzling nature of thermodynamics, and who applied the rules of 
statistical mechanics to demystify this subject. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth 
century, physicists studying the behavior of microscopic phenomena and the nature of 
electricity were surprised to find that these systems were not orderly, regular, and 
predictable, but rather that they behaved erratically, unpredictably, and increasingly so 
over time. This property was named entropy — the increasing, irreversible randomness 
of systems over time. The principle of entropy was enshrined as the second law of 
thermodynamics, and statistical mechanics was gradually accepted over the late 
nineteenth century as the most useful way to model and understand microphysical 
phenomena — though the counterintuitive implications raised famous paradoxes and 
sat uneasily with most people who grappled seriously with the implications of entropy.  
 Ian Hacking has mapped this shift in scientific perspective across several books 
and articles, but particularly in The Taming of Chance,122 where he argues that the 
emergence of probability and statistics in the nineteenth century marked a dramatic 
shift in how scientists, philosophers, and even social theorists viewed the nature of 
randomness and large numbers, and especially the kind of knowledge and 
understanding that we can build around apparently chaotic phenomena. Hacking 
foregrounds the subversive novelty of these changes, and he charts the challenges that 
these methods posed to previous modes of understanding. Chance and uncertainty 
appeared threatening to the reigning modes of understanding when scientists and 
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mathematicians first attempted to locate and systematize their paradoxical 
regularity.123 Hacking articulates the unusual philosophical implications of tackling this 
subject from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, when the mechanical certainty 
of so much scientific work made the clockwork action of deterministic systems so 
appealing. And yet many events resist prediction, from coin flips to the weather, and 
twentieth-century science has internalized this premise while often effacing the 
epistemic discomforts that it implied when it was first imposed. Hacking frames the 
development of probability and statistics as the taming of chance, the subjugation of an 
unruly subject. By the end of the nineteenth century, chance, which once seemed like a 
holdout against scientific understanding, could be framed within a new set of analytic 
methods that made new sense of topics ranging from microphysics to demography. Yet 
it also created a disorienting new outlook on the rules that govern the physical world. In 
Hacking’s words: 
Chance became tamed, in the sense that it became the very stuff of the 
fundamental processes of nature and of society. In the early years of the century, 
it was assumed that statistical laws were reducible to underlying deterministic 
events, but the apparent prevalence of such laws slowly and erratically 
undermined determinism.124 
In observing the development of the laws of probability, and their application in fields 
from physics to demography during the nineteenth century, Ian Hacking recognized a 
dramatic shift in the prevailing scientific understanding of the world, where “a new 
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kind of ‘objective knowledge’ came into being, the product of new technologies for 
gaining information about natural and social processes.” At the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, chance and randomness presented a genuine metaphysical 
challenge to the deterministic worldview that was commonly accepted among scientists 
at the time. But the development of statistical methods actually started to offer more 
elegant solutions to phenomena in both the natural and the social sciences.  
Although the ‘taming of chance’ had shifted the balance of scientific consensus by 
the turn of the twentieth century, it would take several more decades before 
communication engineers would start ‘taming noise’ in the same way, developing 
statistical models and techniques to understand and make use of noise. Beginning in 
the early 1920s, the Bell researchers J.B. Johnson and Harry Nyquist, both trained as 
physicists, published a series of papers that formalized the understanding of electrical 
noise in sober, coherent terms referring to electrical interference on a wire, as well as 
its relationship to the signal or informative part of the transmission.125 Over time, they 
learned to see noise as something regular, even orderly, despite the impression of most 
listeners that the sounds of electrical distortion were chaotic, unpleasant, even 
dangerous. Johnson, started doing spectrum analysis on the noise they were seeing on 
phone lines, and he realized that if you run an electrical current through almost any 
material under controlled conditions, you get noise with essentially the same 
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properties. This ‘thermal noise,’ whether found in a copper wire or a tungsten filament, 
followed a random pattern scattered evenly across the measured spectrum. It was so 
even that Johnson called it ‘white noise,’ like the white light that covers the entire 
visible spectrum. Other forms of regular, colorful noise followed, sharply contrasting 
with forms of noise that remained problematic such as ‘shot’ noise. 
Once noise was recognized and defined as something orderly and comprehensible, 
it was not long before another Bell Labs researcher designed a device to suppress a 
noise source by picking out its regular qualities. Harold Black’s 1927 invention of the 
negative feedback amplifier was a moment of insight often mythologized among 
communication engineers.126 One morning, Black was riding the Hudson River ferry 
from Hoboken, New Jersey, to the Bell Laboratories complex on the western edge of 
Greenwich Village, Manhattan, when he realized that the regularity of most noise could 
be the key to extracting it from a signal. Still riding the ferry, as the legend goes, Black 
quickly recorded his insight by sketching a diagram of a device to feed a signal back 
around to its starting point in a circuit, just a fraction of a moment later, and subtract 
the earlier signal from the tone currently entering into the circuit. Since the signal (say, 
a voice) varies to a greater degree than the unwanted noise, what’s removed will be 
mostly the noise humming with a certain regularity and not the signal itself which 
tends to change from moment to moment.  
[Figure 7: Diagram of Harold Black’s negative feedback amplifier.] 
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The negative feedback amplifier made it possible to boost a weakened signal at a 
relay point without raising the noise along with it.127 The insight that led Black in this 
direction hinged upon the realization that most electrical noise is random, but not 
exactly chaotic. Electrical noise tends to be quite orderly and predictable in its 
randomness if you watch it over time. In fact, what’s crucial is that electrical noise is 
more orderly and predictable than the signal that travels alongside it in a 
communication channel, enabling the signal to stand out against the negative feedback 
amplification. From that point forward, from a certain perspective, engineers could see 
electrical noise as more orderly than the signal it disrupts. 
White noise, for instance, is oddly pristine in its chaotic regularity. Further ideal 
noise types followed, each with examples drawn from natural phenomena. To 
distinguish new varieties of noise would soon become a niche activity at Bell Labs, with 
further varieties often labeled according to color.128 Once other Bell researchers started 
measuring and plotting different kinds of random activity, not just in electrical 
signaling systems but in physics and astronomy, they found other kinds of noise that 
were similarly regular but not as evenly distributed as white noise. A separate, less 
orderly category of distortion is labeled burst or impulse noise. Unlike the steady hum 
of noise on a wire, for instance, impulse noise arrived suddenly, often forcefully, and 
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without a predictable tone or wavelength. The lightning strikes that disrupt radio 
broadcasts act as impulse noise, a sharp disruption that crosses many wavelengths.  
Among the many Bell Labs researchers concentrated on ameliorating the problem 
of electrical noise and creating clearer transmissions, only a single researcher, Gilbert 
Vernam, had devoted himself to developing systems for hiding transmissions through 
cryptography.129 In 1917, Vernam collaborated with an Army signal corps officer named 
Joseph Mauborgne, whose longstanding interest in cryptography was recently awarded 
a series of promotions after the military began to take its codes and ciphers more 
seriously after the recent war. As a means of keeping telegrams secret, Vernam and 
Mauborgne proposed shifting each letter in a message according a non-repeating 
sequence of random numbers,130 then reversing the code using the same series of 
numbers at the receiving end. Mauborgne and Vernam reasoned that a truly random 
series of numbers would be impossible to crack because it would leave no patterns. 
Vernam filed no fewer than 46 patents on ciphering machines between 1917 and 1932, 
including applications of his mechanism to the telegraph, signal repeater stations, 
radio, and even media that were little more than prototypes at the time — like systems 
for transmitting pictures, handwriting, and even television. The only practical factor 
holding back these systems would be the difficulty of producing large quantities of 
random numbers — large enough for the telegraph, the telephone, the radio, and even 
the television system. All of these would have been fair game if there had been 
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sufficient urgency to encrypt these communications media that it would justify 
acquiring mountains of random numbers to encode every iota of sensory data 
transmitted. More often, the Vernam cipher was used with pencil and paper, coming to 
be known as the ‘one-time pad’ system since you and your correspondent could only 
use each page on the encryption pad once or else compromise the security of the 
message. Despite vision and utility, Vernam’s more ambitious work was not pushed to 
market, his patents languished through the twenties and thirties as AT&T did not invest 
in developing encryption systems, and it was only with renewed interest in 
cryptography during the second World War that brought attention to the work he had 
published two decades earlier. 
• 
In late 1941, when the drums were beating for the U.S. to enter World War II, the 
young mathematician Claude Shannon was already wondering which military research 
project he would be assigned when he was drawn into the war effort along with the rest 
of his peers on the Bell Labs staff. The Labs occupied a full block near the Hudson River 
on the far side of Greenwich Village, and the energetic Shannon was flourishing in the 
City, juggling long hours of work and a multitude of hobbies.131 Shannon enjoyed 
playing chess in nearby Washington Square Park and taking the train uptown to hear 
jazz concerts. He often scribbled at equations until late at night, but also waded through 
James Joyce’s novels, taking a special interest in the riddlesome Finnegan’s Wake. 
Shannon had no intention of enlisting — besides, he was unlikely to pass the medical 
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exam due to low body weight. So Shannon stayed in New York for the war, knowing that 
other scientists were already being badgered into projects as the Bell Labs building was 
filling up with more military personnel every week.  
Still, Shannon was surprised when his orders arrived from higher up the chain of 
command than the usual managers at Bell Labs. First, the powerful researcher 
administrator Warren Weaver from the Rockefeller Foundation placed Shannon on a 
ten-month fire-control project based at the University of Pennsylvania, separate but 
alongside Norbert Wiener’s larger, more ambitious effort to develop a device to predict 
the path of enemy aircraft making random, evasive movements.132 Once Shannon 
completed his brief stint on this project, he was even more surprised to receive his next 
assignment from an old friend: his MIT mentor Vannevar Bush, who now served as the 
president of the Carnegie Institution and chairman of the Office of Scientific Research 
and Development (OSRD), a group to manage research projects and coordinate 
collaborations between industry, academia, and the military throughout the war. Bush 
and Shannon’s lives had changed a great deal in these three short years since they had 
worked together at MIT. Bush’s work often pulled him away from campus life, and 
Shannon’s interests had drifted away from his dissertation on genetics, back to the 
electrical engineering material he had studied during his master’s degree. Still, 
Shannon had written to Bush several years back to describe the new problems that had 
earned his obsessive attention. Before coming to Bell Labs, Shannon had taken a 
postdoctoral stint at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, seated alongside 
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luminaries like John Von Neumann and a steady stream of other émigré intellectuals 
whose escape from Europe had been secured by the US government.133 And although 
Shannon’s time in Princeton was personally difficult, leading to the annulment of a 
brief marriage and a hasty decision to leave for Bell Labs, he wrote to his old mentor 
Bush in 1939 to describe the first inkling of an idea that would consume him for the 
next decade. Shannon told Bush he had been considering “some of the fundamental 
properties of general systems for the transmission of intelligence, including telephony, 
radio, television, telegraphy, etc.,” treating these in a general sense as information and 
formulating ways to reduce transmission time in the presence of noise.134  In this letter 
to his former advisor, Shannon sounds hopeful of the promise, but humble in his 
expectations of success. As he continued working on this problem over the years, 
Shannon thought this work would be entirely theoretical, abstract, and not at all useful 
for his employers at Bell Labs, let alone the military whose research agenda Bush now 
managed. Bush’s major project over the previous decade had been to build a 
mechanical, analog computer called the Differential Analyzer that was mainly useful for 
plotting missile trajectories, but by the time war broke out, he had also begun work on 
several secret projects to build computers to decrypt encoded messages.135 Another, 
separate cryptographic project would be based at Bell Labs, where they were asked to 
build a telephone impervious to eavesdropping. The latter would be Shannon’s project 
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— known internally by the dramatic title Project X — but since he did not have sufficient 
security clearance at the time, his work would be confined to the sort of mathematical 
abstraction of communication that Shannon had described to Bush in his earlier letter. 
Shannon needed to develop a formal proof for the security of this encrypted telephone, 
which worked on a principle identical to the Vernam cipher. The device itself was 
developed as a collaboration between a select group of Bell Labs staff with clearance 
and officers from the Army Signal Corps, some of the very few soldiers trained in the 
use of codes and ciphers at this time. The room where they worked on the encrypted 
telephone had its windows painted black from the inside, a string of dark squares 
visible to Shannon and the rest of the Lab staff from the courtyard where many sat for 
lunch breaks. 
[Figure 8. The Sig-Saly encrypted telephone] 
Despite the fact that Shannon was forbidden from seeing the encrypted telephone  — 
codenamed as Sig-Saly, but soon to acquire many nicknames136 — he developed a full 
mathematical schema to assess not only whether this particular system (the Vernam 
cipher) was sound, but whether any communication system is secure against ‘enemy’ 
eavesdroppers. Earlier in the development process, in the opening months of 1943, the 
British mathematician Alan Turing traveled to America under direct orders from the 
Allied generals to verify the security of the encrypted telephone, which would be used 
only for secure conversations between FDR, Churchill, and a few top officers. During 
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Turing’s busy, two-month stay at Bell Labs, he struck up a friendship with Shannon, 
and the two would often meet for tea in the afternoon. These daily meetings continued 
over the course of Turing’s stay, but their conversation never wandered toward 
wartime projects, each pursued on opposite sides of the Atlantic and aimed at opposite 
sides of a top-secret subject. Turing’s work at Bletchley was devoted to codebreaking, 
his mission to Bell Labs was arranged so he could assess the security of Sig-Saly, and 
Shannon was working out the theoretical security of the system through proofs and 
security axioms  — and  it is these formal points that would come to form the basis of the 
scientific practice of cryptography when it was established decades later. 
Shannon would later insist that he and Turing “had an awful lot in common,” but 
“talked not at all about cryptography … I don’t think we exchanged word one about 
cryptography.”137 However, they did discuss other subjects of mutual interest, 
especially the distant possibility of artificial intelligence. But when they discussed 
Shannon’s ambitious effort to produce a mathematical theory of communication, 
Turing judged the idea to be underdeveloped, even grandiose. Laughing aloud, Turing 
said, “Shannon wants to feed the machine cultural things!”138 Still, Shannon 
remembered these meetings fondly, claiming he could at least guess at the time that the 
real purpose of Turing’s visit must have been tied to the cryptography machine behind 
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the black-painted windows. Shannon demurred that people just didn’t ask too many 
questions in those days.139 
Nevertheless, Shannon had the pieces needed for his purely formal, abstract, 
mathematical task. He was asked to develop a proof for the security of the cipher 
Gilbert Vernam had previously devised at Bell Labs in 1917. If the Project X team could 
create a Vernam cipher for the telephone, the system promised unbreakable security, 
as well as the familiar convenience and conversational affordances of the telephone for 
important discussions between the Allied leaders. The team at Project X used the 
thermal energy from vacuum tubes to produce genuine random numbers, they 
inscribed just two copies of these numbers onto two gold-plated phonograph records, 
these two identical records were produced by the Muzak corporation, and the signal 
corps officers who delivered the master copies to the Muzak headquarters were 
transported by a military escort between Midtown and Greenwich Village. As long as no 
two records, no two series of random numbers was ever repeated or reused, the code 
was assumed to be unbreakable, but this project was deemed too important to assume 
so much.  
It was Shannon’s job to prove the security of the Vernam cipher from a 
mathematical standpoint. In the course of this project, he was able to work out many of 
the finer points for his side project, a mathematical theory of communication that he 
believed interesting only as a high-level exercise without any practical applications. 
The connections between these two theories are considerable, and although this 
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resemblance is often noted in passing, I will outline a case for treating the two as a 
‘double theory’ and highlight subtle, even overlooked aspects of these theories that are 
more clearly apparent when observed side by side. 
In recent decades, mathematicians and computer scientists have built a more rigid 
framework of definitions around the practice of cryptography, while the pen and paper 
tradition described in the Chapter 1 has given way to an almost exclusive reliance on 
computers.140 Mathematicians, engineers, historians of computing, and journalists 
readily point to Shannon as the figure who established the foundational theories of both 
digital communication and cryptography, though it’s rare for the connections between 
these two theories to be probed at any depth.  
• 
The mathematical theory of communication often appears as a case of simultaneous 
invention between two mathematicians, Claude Shannon and Norbert Wiener, and the 
careful work of adjudicating this point has filled volumes.141 Their works were 
published within the same year, aimed at many of the same problems, and even used a 
similar equation, but a crucial philosophical difference between the two is their 
treatment of underlying concepts: noise, entropy, and randomness. Shannon would 
later reveal to an interviewer that he never thought Wiener really understood his work, 
and he would extend the same charge to many of his most enthusiastic readers, 
especially among the broad swath of academics who have integrated his information 
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theory into disciplines from linguistics to theoretical physics. The nature of noise would 
become a special point of contention during the Macy Conferences, a regular gathering 
where the principles underlying the new scientific discipline of Cybernetics were 
debated in the late forties and early fifties.142 
Wiener was distinctly troubled by the idea that we might live in a universe governed 
by chance and contingency, the worldview that was taking shape during Wiener’s youth 
at the end of the nineteenth century. His yearning for the old, deterministic worldview 
put Wiener conspicuously out of step with other scientists, especially in the post-war 
years when he rose to prominence as the figurehead of a new, interdisciplinary science 
known as Cybernetics. Even Albert Einstein had turned his back on the quantum theory 
supported by many of his contemporaries and offered the contrarian rebuttal “God 
does not play dice.” Wiener agreed that “a rigid deterministic world is more acceptable 
than a contingent one,”143 though an increasing number of scientists had become 
accustomed to the strange indeterminacy of microphysics. Following a historical arc 
much like the one Ian Hacking found so critical in The Taming of Chance, Wiener 
traced this worldview to the rise of statistical mechanics in the late nineteenth century, 
and the discordant realization that physical systems tend to become increasingly 
disorderly over time through entropy. Wiener viewed this as a moral danger, a literally 
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‘Augustinian’ struggle of order against chaos, and cybernetics as the science devoted to 
subjects that reverse entropy and bring order to the world. “While the universe as a 
whole … tends to run down,” Wiener writes, “there are local enclaves whose direction 
seems opposed to that of the universe at large and in which there is a limited and 
temporary tendency for organization to increase. Life finds its home in some of these 
enclaves. It is with this point of view at its core that the new science of Cybernetics 
began its development.”144 Wiener considered it evident that randomness is destructive 
to purposeful systems, and thus he laid moral ballast upon the tendency toward 
entropy, characterizing the random character of the universe as an “organic 
incompleteness … which without too violent a figure of speech we may consider evil.”145 
One of the central elements of Wiener’s cybernetics was a theory of communication in 
which he defined the fundamental measure of information as negative entropy or 
negentropy — in short, a measure of order. This definition followed naturally from 
Wiener’s worldview: information and communication actively create order even as 
other things degrade into chaos. In the early pages of Cybernetics, Wiener wrote: 
We have made of communication engineering design a statistical science, a 
branch of statistical mechanics. The notion of statistical mechanics has indeed 
been encroaching on every branch of science for more than a century.146 
The key to Wiener’s unlikely truce with entropy is a famous paradox posed by the 
physicist John Clerk Maxwell back when the laws of thermodynamics were first 
proposed. Maxwell asked his readers to imagine two chambers joined by a tiny door, 
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each chamber filled with gas particles, and a tiny demon who can choose to open or 
close the door, letting certain molecules pass from one chamber to the other. If the 
demon selectively allowed the fast-moving molecules to pass through to one chamber, 
and the slow moving molecules to the other, the second law of thermodynamics would 
seem to be violated as one chamber heats and the other cools, decreasing the entropy of 
the system. For Wiener, every living creature works against entropy in similar ways —
 we bring order into our environment, building structures and harnessing energy, but 
even our biological makeup evinces a force of order pushing back against the tendency 
for matter to decline into ever greater entropy. The central terms in Wiener’s new 
science of Cybernetics would be communication, feedback, and control, together 
describing the general means of reversing entropy and creating order. 
Shannon viewed entropy through an entirely different lens. Instead of treating 
entropy as mere disorder, somehow devoid of content, he viewed the sheer complexity 
of a random system as an indication of its enormous information quantity. The more 
orderly a system, the less effort goes into defining it. Orderly systems have less 
‘surprise value’ because they fall into patterns. Greater order means less complexity, 
hence less information. The counterintuitive implication of Shannon’s theory is that we 
don’t always want more information. In fact, Shannon shows that many systems 
contain pattern and redundancy that can be useful for reconstructing them when 
information is missing or distorted. Written language, for instance, is hugely 
redundant. Consider just a few common regularities: certain letters almost always 





letter combinations we actually treat as words, often we can guess a word or phrase 
even with some letters missing.  
The pattern on a tile floor is highly redundant, thus easy to repair or reconstruct 
elsewhere. The picture on the cover of a jigsaw puzzle box offers a redundant source of 
information to help you put the pieces back in place. Now picture a large ancient 
mosaic depicting a vivid scene, but over the centuries a few dozen tiles have gone 
missing. To restore the mosaic, a specialist might be able to make pretty good guesses 
based on contextual cues, but these might still be a very weak source of information 
redundancy. Through the lens of information theory, the mosaic contains a lot of 
information, but very little redundancy, making reconstruction extremely challenging.  
Despite this fundamental difference in perspective, Wiener and Shannon arrived at 
nearly identical equations — save for a minus sign that turned Wiener’s measure of 
information into negative rather than positive entropy. Recognizing this quizzical 
similarity, Shannon wrote to Wiener, who had been a faculty member at MIT during 
Shannon’s graduate work although the two apparently interacted very little. In his 
letter, Shannon praises Wiener’s new book, predicts that it will have tremendous 
philosophical impact, and finally asks whether Wiener himself considers the minus 
sign to be a substantive discrepancy between their respective equations. Wiener 
demurred, responding that the difference would be immaterial in practice. So much for 
the Augustinian struggle against disorder. So much for negative entropy as the 
principle that links humans, animals, and machines as agents of order with the 
definitive capacity to create and communicate information. And yet the minus sign 





The difference between Shannon and Wiener’s approaches to information theory 
hinges on a subtle quality that is often overlooked: Shannon treated signal and noise as 
relative — one can be transformed into the other. As an employee of the Bell Labs, 
Shannon approached this point from the perspective of a communications engineer. 
And at least on the surface, Shannon used the terms signal and noise as his engineering 
colleagues had for decades: signal is the message and noise is what disrupts it. The 
subtle maneuver that Shannon performs is to strip away most of the difference between 
signal and noise. The difference is a contingent property introduced by the agents of 
communication. Shannon’s perspective on noise suggests he was a monist when it 
came to the elements of communication: he viewed information as something that 
emerges from an essentially undifferentiated substance, its properties derived from the 
interested judgment of the agents involved. It is the code that makes order, and 
agreeing upon a code is the necessary social basis of information. The noisiness of 
noise is not essential, but emergent. Randomness is not necessarily even disorder, as 
Wiener would have it. Even the chanciest of processes, such as coin flips, tend toward 
another kind of order: the even distribution of outcomes over time. Such is the order of 
white noise, as well. 
While Wiener remained vexed over the demise of the orderly, deterministic 
Newtonian worldview, and the promise of ybernetics to bring structure to a chatoic 
world, Shannon’s work embraces the paradoxical order underlying chance and 
randomness. Wiener, like many scientists in the nineteenth century, viewed the 
embrace of randomness in science as troubling, even morally dubious, as the 





that the physical world rests on a foundation of chance. For many who grappled with 
the implications of thermodynamics, chance was no foundation at all, because 
presumably nothing can rest on a principle that moves and shifts by its very nature. 
Many would change their minds. Hacking traces how new forms of reason were 
developed to make sense of the paradoxes presented by chance and randomness. The 
taming of chance led toward the taming of noise, which circulated in technology and 
the arts after the turn of the twentieth century. When communication engineers who 
began to view noise sources through the lens of probability and statistics, pattern and 
regularity began to emerge. The taming of noise was a critical element in Shannon’s 
theories of both communication and cryptography, and many of the key figures in this 
development were his predecessors at Bell Labs, and even fellow travelers in Wiener’s 
field of Cybernetics. 
The roots of cybernetic thinking can be traced to a variety of pre-war industrial and 
military pursuits, such as factory automation, ballistics research, and communications 
engineering.147The struggle against noise in telecommunications resembled the classic 
struggle Norbert Wiener describes between civilization and nature, order and chaos, 
the good of a well-ordered society and the evil inherent in its decay.148 Amid the nation’s 
extension into the vast and often forbidding Western frontier, mechanical invention 
was viewed with great promise as a means of overcoming distance, accelerating matter 
and messages through space and time. In order for the railroad to traverse rivers and 
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mountains, builders often detonated obstructions and otherwise reshaped the 
landscape to their needs. The earliest telegraph and telephone lines were erected 
alongside railroad lines, and these electrical signals faced their own challenges in 
transit: the natural world was a source of resistance and disruption in electrical 
transmission, and the delivery of messages, like the delivery of locomotives, required 
inventive means of overcoming obstacles.  
The British cyberneticist Gordon Pask once defined cybernetics itself as “the art and 
science of manipulating defensible metaphors.”149 When Warren McCulloch reflected 
aloud during the tenth and final meeting of the Macy Conferences on Cybernetics, he 
articulated a fundamental shift in metaphors after the fifth meeting in March of 1949. 
Earlier meetings had focused on the feedback of energy, as in a servomechanism, but 
the group had later begun to treat communication as the crucial factor in dynamic 
systems, whether organic or mechanical. “This turned our attention to computing 
machinery,” McCulloch said, “to the storage of information as negative entropy. Here 
belong questions of coding, of languages and their structures, of how they are learned 
and how they are understood.”150 
The timing is significant: the first half of Shannon’s “Mathematical Theory of 
Communication” appeared in the fall of 1948, the second installment followed in spring 
with an extension of the work to analog systems, though this remains less recognized 
and is often ignored outright in favor of the digital theory laid out in part one. And yet, 
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as often as the group discussed communication in these positive senses, the 
conversation at the Macy Conferences was equally attuned to noise and 
miscommunication, which offered a productive antithesis in their discourse. 
When the core metaphor of cybernetics shifted from feedback to information, the 
constituent parts of this new metaphor, signal and noise, were drawn from the 
conception of information among communication engineers. There were alternatives 
not chosen. As the proponent of one alternative himself, the British physicist Donald 
Mackay was keen to point out that the Shannon-Wiener definition is neither intuitive 
for the layman, nor is it consistent with the conception of information in other 
mathematically oriented fields like physics and statistics. 
In Britain, information theory had grown in parallel across the Atlantic, and these 
camps were only rarely in conversation. Dennis Gabor had given a definition of 
“amount of information” as the number of independent propositions necessary to 
define its amplitude over a given period. Gabor, who had already won a Nobel Prize for 
inventing holography, would publish a statistical theory of information in 1946, 
preceding both Shannon and Wiener by two years, but his work passed largely 
unnoticed. Instead, MacKay suggested a definition of information adapted from the 
work of British statistician Ronald Fisher. In the 1920s, Fisher had defined information 
as the reciprocal of the variance in a statistical sample, that is, the degree to which the 
actual data points diverge from the line that models this data set. Put simply, ‘Fisher 
information’ is a measure of how much a known variable tells you about an unknown 
one. The more the results vary from the prediction, the less informative the model. 





determining the necessary sample size for an experiment. It is not, however, treated as 
a measure with any explicit bearing on communication. MacKay’s attempt to develop a 
more intuitive measure of information in communication was largely unsuccessful, but 
the discussion of MacKay’s work at the Macy Conferences offers a useful view upon the 
discourse surrounding signal and noise. MacKay, following Fisher, devised a measure 
of information that was linked to the predictive accuracy of a model given the level of 
deviation in the data. In short, information varies with the amount of ‘noise’ that make 
the data more or less inaccurate as they are being gathered. The more these points 
diverge, according to MacKay, the more ‘noise’ is in the system — although Fisher 
himself had never used the word ‘noise’ — and thus, from a Fisherian perspective, the 
data would be less informative. In other words, if we take the case of communication, 
Fisher made ‘amount of information’ depend on the amount of noise present in a signal 
— to be precise, the ‘noise power,’ or at any rate the variance of the amplitude — taking 
the reciprocal as his measure. According to this line of thinking, the more noise, the 
less information it carries.  
This is precisely the opposite of Shannon’s information theory, in which noise is a 
kind of stowaway taking up space in an information channel, but also the more random 
noise is in a transmission, the more information needs to be transmitted. When a noisy 
message arrives at its destination, it is positively saturated with information such that 
the original signal is difficult to detect amid the flurry of random information that 
surrounds it. MacKay’s definition is, in many ways, closer to the sense of information 
that many people intuitively hold: we tend to think of information as something orderly, 





means a closer approximation to the actual state of things. MacKay calls this ‘metrical’ 
information in contrast with Shannon and Wiener’s information measure, which he 
labeled ‘selective’. “Selective information is defined only relative to an ensemble — to a 
filing cabinet,” MacKay said. “It is a measure of the amount of trouble it would give you 
to pick out the thing you are talking about in the filing cabinet if the filing cabinet is 
designed according to optimum principles.” Katherine Hayles has argued that MacKay 
promised a counterfactual alternative for Cybernetics in this formative early moment. 
She surmises that Mackay’s approach to information theory would not have promoted 
the same movement toward ‘post-human’ tendencies in digital culture,  such as AI, 
cyborgs, and a broader tendency to diminish what’s special about embodied human 
experience by assuming these functions can be exactly replicated by a machine.151 
Under MacKay’s measure of information, a collection of readings, measurements, or 
any other data should be considered more informative when there is less noise present. 
Relating this approach to a scientific experiment, Mackay said that his measure of 
information is usefully analogous to experimental evidence: “we can define a measure 
of our total evidence for the propositions which we can eventually formulate, as the 
total amount of metrical information provided by the experiment.” For many at the 
conference, who were just becoming accustomed to the implications of Shannon and 
Wiener’s use of entropy to define information, MacKay’s work presented some 
difficulty despite its basis in a longstanding principles of statistics and experimental 
science. When McCulloch asked MacKay about the role of entropy in metrical 
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information, MacKay answered that this presented “a paradox” that reveals the 
problems inherent in defining information the way Shannon and Wiener had proposed. 
Broader debate about noise at the Macy Conferences would hinge on the analogy of 
radio transmissions, even when noise was interpreted in the commonsense way, as 
though it had an essential rather than contingent noisiness. The young psychologist 
and future DARPA administrator J.C.R. Licklider presented a series of results from 
experiments in which his laboratory had blasted subjects with different varieties of 
noise under different conditions in hopes of reaching a deeper understanding of 
audible disruption.  
To this point, a psychologist named John Stroud urged caution with the brute 
application of these concepts. “I would remind you that this restriction upon what is a 
signal and what is a ‘not’ signal is often highly arbitrary,” Stroud said. “Very frequently, 
it is not stated, much to the detriment of the discussion that follows, even in your 
[Licklider's] treatment of it.”152 But still Licklider was unwilling to approach ‘noise’ with 
the conceptual flexibility Stroud suggested. Though Licklider’s acoustic research 
employed a lavish array of artificial noise machines and sound scramblers to test the 
limits of apprehension, each meticulously crafted form of noise he blasted at his 
subjects was just noise, plain and simple. Like Shannon, he took the liberty of labeling 
noise himself, and considered this label reasonable for his purposes, but unlike 
Shannon he did not consider the context-dependence of the distinction between signal 
and noise. Licklider would go on to be the research director of DARPA, where he was 
responsible for funding many projects that are now treated as critical touchstones in 
                                                             





the development of the personal computer and computer networks. These technologies 
featured practical implementations of many theoretical points from Shannon’s theory 
of communication, including error-correcting codes to account for noise in computer 
components and networking cables. While Licklider had recognized the use of noise in 
his laboratory studies, it escaped him in the broader sense that Shannon had 
recognized in his work on cryptography, and even the legendarily lavish DARPA 
research budget did not support the development of digital cryptography even as it was 
laying the groundwork for so many other key elements of the digital age. 
The logician Walter Pitts seemed content that ‘noise’ was adequately defined for 
their purposes — that is, adequately enough to satisfy a Logical Positivist trained by 
Rudolf Carnap, as Pitts himself had been. Still, Pitts challenged Shannon to offer a clear, 
essential distinction between signal and noise to prove that the concepts themselves 
are not so contingent as Stroud suggested them to be. Shannon chose neither position. 
Was there any essential, durable quality that distinguishes signal from noise? Shannon 
dismissed the problem of definitions so essential to a Logical Positivist, but also 
insisted that the reference of noise cannot be ambiguous or uncertain because noise is 
always just what you decide is noise. 
I have never had any trouble distinguishing signals from noise because I say, as a 
mathematician, that this is signal and that is noise. But there are, it seems to me, 
ambiguities that come in at the psychological level. If a person receives 
something over a telephone, part of which is useful to him and part of which is 
not, and you want to call the useful part signal, that is hardly a mathematical 





cases in which there is a great mass of information going together One part is 
information for A and another part is information for B.153 
In short, outside the pure mathematical scenario, in which signal and noise can be 
defined a priori, the assignment of signal and noise in practice ultimately depends on 
context, codes, listeners, and their interests.  
When pressed, Shannon gave an example. He conjured the image of two radio 
stations broadcasting on frequency bands placed too close together. Each would be a 
source of noise to the other. Whether AM or FM, the waveform of one signal would 
combine with the other, warping each one and creating noise. Just as the 
electromagnetic corona of a power plant can create a zone of interference on the radio 
spectrum, and signal jamming technology facilitates a flood of noise to block 
communication over a given frequency range, even apparent non-noise can be a source 
of noise. This exchange from the Macy conference of 1952 is critical to understanding 
the conceptual subtlety of Shannon’s theory — a subtlety that both distinguishes his 
work from others, and yet was lost upon many of those who avidly adapted information 
theory and its terminology for their own uses as Shannon’s work developed the 
canonical status it holds today. 
At the Macy Conferences, as models, metaphors, and terminology of electrical 
communication and information systems were applied more broadly to matters of 
human communication, the concepts of signal and noise were frequently deployed in 
order to frame the erroneous, intrusive, and undesired aspects of communication in 
this broader set of cases. Signal and noise emerged as a framework used to describe 
                                                             





electrical communication through devices like telephones and radios, as well as factors 
like static and distortion that may disrupt the quality of transmission and reception. 
But among the cyberneticians, for whom communication technology might not only be 
analogous to a human being, but perhaps even sufficient to build a new science of 
human beings, animals, machines, and even society, cybernetics typically sidestepped 
‘society’ in favor of the other three, the metaphor of signal and noise took on a 
significance that is worth examining closely. In this discourse, the core metaphor of 
electrical communications began to be treated abstractly, discussed philosophically, 
and applied across the full range of subjects under examination at the Macy 
Conferences. 
Following Harold Black and others from Bell Labs, as well as the Russian 
mathematician Andrey Markov, Wiener surmised that the noise in his problem would 
fall into regular, predictable patterns, while the pilots path could be predicted as a 
‘random walk’ problem in which a line meanders randomly on the Y-axis while 
proceeding steadily along the X-axis. Despite its unpredictability from moment to 
moment, the ups and downs, lefts and rights, would tend toward a predictable middle 
over time. In short, the target exhibiting the most unpredictable behavior in Wiener’s 
problem was not the noise, but the signal — the moving target, an object whose position 
in space would shift according to the pilot’s choices, reactions, and even their mistakes. 
Wiener wrote that the “ ‘randomness’ or irregularity of an airplane’s path is introduced 
by the pilot,” whose behavior he framed, in proto-cybernetic terms, as “a servo-
mechanism, attempting to overcome the intrinsic lag due to the dynamics of his plane 





degree to which he has failed to accomplish his task.”154 For instance, an airplane may 
change its course at any time, but its movement is subject to certain confining factors. 
The trouble in this case, as formulated, is that both the signal and the noise are random, 
so the means of discerning the signal requires differentiating between two subjects that 
may appear very similar in the full spectrum of inputs under analysis. Wiener’s 
solution involves comparing a known model of the stochastic process under 
examination, e.g. an airplane, to a purely random stationary process, e.g. the noise from 
the radar, and to extrapolate the desired signal from the full field of random inputs. 
White noise, as a pure and formally consistent abstraction, offered Wiener the means to 
operationalize a haphazard process of measurement and prediction in the presence of 
error and inconsistency — whatever the environmental factors which had kept his 
device from ascertaining the desired signal. Wiener published these insights in a 
classified report that circulated among the fire-control team and to a few other defense 
engineers during the war. Many remarked on the unbelievable difficulty of the material, 
branding the report the ‘Yellow Peril’ in a casual display of racism.155 Wiener’s own 
theoretical breakthrough was the formulation of a technique now known as the Wiener 
filter, which helps to locate unknown signals that are hidden in a field of noise. 
Specifically, Wiener’s filter helps to home in on signals that are the result of a stationary 
linear stochastic process, in which a value varies with consistent randomness over 
time. When the anti-aircraft servomechanism gathers information about its target, and 
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computes its future path according to Wiener’s formula, an orderly understanding is 
pulled from a chaotic system. Wiener defined information as negative entropy, and 
applied a minus sign to the measure in his equations. This is one of the only substantive 
differences between his work and Shannon’s regarding signal, noise, and information. 
Scholarly treatments of Wiener’s work tend to downplay the place of noise in 
Wiener’s wartime research. Peter Galison’s reading of Wiener implies that the noise in 
the system is entirely an abstraction of the human pilot and the maneuvering plane. It 
does not include such apparent noise sources as aberrations in radar, clouds 
obstructing line of sight, and measurement errors of the machine itself. Wiener’s filter 
is an equation to model not only the enemy’s unpredictability as noise, but also the 
presence of random obstructions and sources of error in observation. What was taking 
shape in Wiener’s early forays into cybernetics was an appreciation of uncertainty as 
measurable, and thus useful in making predictions in the presence of noise. 
For many others in the first wave of Cybernetics, noise was something subtler than a 
bete noire, as for Wiener, instead seeing noise and other sources of uncertainty as a 
frequent point of reflection through their careers. In 1961, a decade after the Macy 
Conferences ended, McCulloch was invited to give a lecture on any subject, and he 
chose the long-standing question that he said had driven him throughout his career: 
“What is a number, that a man may know it, and what is man, that he may know a 
number?” After reminiscing on the ways that this remarkable question had led him 
through his career, he pivots into an expansive history and critique of western logic. 
This logic was enshrined by Aristotle, then carried forward by the medieval scholastics 





salvaged by Bertrand Russell. Still, classical logic can only answer the first half of 
McCulloch’s guiding question: it defines a number in terms of concepts like the set and 
the principle of identity, but does not describe the nature of the human mind, which is 
not all as exacting or unbending as the dictates of classical logic. In his 
neurophysiological work, McCulloch was confronted with the puzzle that the brain 
appeared be a rigidly ordered electrical mechanism, but that the mind is not only 
fallible, but in fact fixates on doubt and even revels in ambiguity. It is not deterministic, 
but probabilistic: the laws of probability are grounded in uncertainty, and it is in a logic 
of multiple truth values that McCulloch offers a definition of the mind as signaling 
mechanism that is nevertheless subject to error — to the deleterious effects of ‘noise’ in 
even the most pristine mechanism. “Such is a number that a man may know it and a 
man, made of fallible neurons, that may know it infallibly.” 
Glib as this conclusion may be, perceptual fallibility and logical uncertainty are 
issues at the core of cybernetics, and McCulloch’s embrace of a probabilistic theory of 
mind implies beginning with uncertainty, but finding comprehensible and even 
correctible approaches toward well-grounded forms of understanding. Noise, in short, 
is fundamental to cybernetics because they must reckon with and alongside sources of 
error. 
Stroud was particularly keen to reflect on the concept of noise. Stroud asked 
whether the concept of noise is somewhat arbitrary, and perhaps even a detriment to 
noticing phenomena that could hold unrecognized importance. Others asked if ‘noise’ 





signal can be another person’s noise.156 Gathered in a palatial, neo-Renaissance high-
rise hotel on the Upper East Side of Manhattan, the group participated in a famously 
broad range of discussion stretching from the foundations of digital computing to the 
potential applications of hypnotism as a device of mass mediated persuasion. 
Beyond Bateson, the physicist John Stroud was one of the few natural scientists 
besides Shannon to take such a generous stance toward noise at the Macy Conferences. 
“I know I am often very amply rewarded by stopping to find out what the stuff I call 
noise in a message is,” Stroud said. “Sometimes it turns out to be more valuable than I 
had implied when I said it was noise, when I said that the 'not' signal I was interested in 
was noise.”157 As Shannon suggested to Walter Pitts, noise is best seen as a moving 
target, as easily shifted from one source to another as flipping from one radio station to 
the next. 
Like many of the social scientists who entered the orbit of Cybernetics, Gregory 
Bateson had gravitated toward the promise of rigorous new theoretical approaches to 
social science. In his classic ethnographic fieldwork with Margaret Mead in Bali, the two 
had reached many striking and original insights into social dynamics, and Bateson 
even applied these insights while constructing propaganda broadcasts with the OSS 
during World War II, but he harbored personal doubts about whether the work was 
scientifically valid. He had taken particular interest in the causes of polarizing conflict 
such as rivalry and tribalism, grouping these phenomena together, coining the term 
schismogenesis, and identifying several distinct varieties. After entering into 
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conversation with Wiener and the other early members of the cybernetics group, 
Bateson reformulated his theory of schismogenesis in new terms: as the results of 
positive or negative feedback loops in group communication.158 Likewise, in his later 
work treating schizophrenics at the Palo Alto Veterans Affairs Hospital, Bateson tried to 
understand his patients through a combination of cybernetics and the recent work of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein in the philosophy of language. Bateson had found an oblique, just 
faintly detectable sense of rationality in schizophrenic speech, and he likened them to 
participants in a Wittgensteinian language game where only they were aware of the 
rules. Bateson considered bending social rules to be a form of play — not in the sense of 
playing a game, but playing with its rules in order to frame and reframe the scenario at 
hand. For Bateson, play is the initial act that establishes the game at hand or shifts to a 
new game; it is an essentially dynamic act, and often a healthy one. Over time, Bateson 
began to view ‘play’ as analogous to noise; playful behavior may reframe a scenario, 
erasing the previous significance of actions, objects, and our surroundings to fit the 
game. When two trees become goalposts, or a punchline flips the meaning of a joke, 
Bateson would call this an artful use of noise to warp the previous meaning into a new 
form. This perspective on noise led Bateson toward ways of seeing communication 
practices, including cryptography, as deeply embedded in mind and culture. Looking 
toward examples of obfuscation and misdirection in nature, Bateson viewed 
cryptography by analogy to camouflage. When a hare becomes invisible in tall grass, it 
acts out a long-evolved capacity to make the visual signal of its presence appear 
indistinguishable from the surrounding environment. In short, this coat of fur is a 
                                                             





source of noise, finely tuned to its environment as well as gaps in the perceptive 
faculties of its predators. 
• 
Compared to Shannon’s fellow mathematicians, engineers, and even the pioneers of 
Cybernetics, this counterintuitive stance on noise places Shannon in closer company to 
many modernist artist and writers of the early twentieth century, some of them his 
contemporaries and others working a generation before. In fact, just as Shannon’s work 
was taking off in the late 1940s and early 1950s, another resident of Greenwich Village, 
the composer John Cage, took a remarkably similar, though more audacious stance on 
signal and noise. Cage called explicit attention to noise as a compelling, misunderstood, 
ascendant concept not only in modern music, but in the broader aesthetics of the 
modern world. Cage’s  key objectives had been to subvert the neat delineation of signal 
and noise and foreground the value of noise itself, taking a prescient interest in 
subjects that were beginning to coalesce into the field of Cybernetics in the 1940s.159 
Although Cage would not read Cybernetics until the early 1960s, he treated chance and 
randomness as generative elements of dynamic, lifelike systems in his work from the 
forties and fifties. He insisted on treating communication, information, and sensation 
itself in the broadest possible terms, famously dismissing the idea of silence as a 
deceptive limitation that keeps us from hearing a full soundscape. Cage’s treatment of 
signal and noise also reveals his supple understanding of technological and cultural 
changes in his midst — changes that lay at the foundation of the mathematical theory of 
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communication and its counterpart, the theory of cryptography or secrecy systems. 
Much of Cage’s work turned on the interchangeability of signal and noise, just as the 
formal efficacy and originality of Shannon’s information theory turned on a subtle 
realization that had escaped his predecessors at Bell Labs, and his competitors like the 
MIT polymath Norbert Wiener and a handful of British cyberneticists. 
Cage’s early appreciation of this point is especially prominent in a piece released 
just three years after Shannon’s first paper on information theory. In 1951, at the 
McMillan Theater of Columbia University, Cage debuted a piece called “Imaginary 
Landscape No. 4.”160 He scored the piece for unconventional instruments: just twelve 
consumer-grade radio sets. When Cage raised his baton to conduct his ensemble, the 
performers powered on their radios and began to move the tuning dials across the FM 
band, deliberately passing over broadcast stations and lingering in patches of audible 
static. With dials in movement, the faint chorus of noise was punctuated by bursts of 
speech and music as they moved across a broadcast station’s frequency band. These 
chaotic snippets of music interrupted an otherwise placid soundscape, a droning 
chorus of fuzz that each radio pulled from unoccupied (though not exactly empty) 
bands of the radio spectrum. Ideally, the audience is expected to hear the noise become 
the signal. Cage treats the radio stations as a source of interference to the static, in 
much the same way that Shannon had tried to explain to the audience of cyberneticians 
at the Macy Conference that noise is a moving target. 
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Or at least that was Cage’s intention. The results were disappointing in practice. 
Cage later recalled that the audience applauded when a familiar fragment of Mozart 
escaped from one of the speakers. This response suggested a fondness for familiar 
tones was exactly the sort of listening bias that Cage had hoped to challenge. He 
intended to feature sounds that are otherwise dismissed as absence or obstruction of 
sound — to highlight that there is “no such thing as silence,”161 in his iconic later 
phrasing. Cage wanted the entire audible spectrum to be granted equal consideration. 
Dismissing one tone in favor of another — or even the presence of sound above its 
absence — evinced a perceptual shackle that many of us unwittingly place on our own 
sensation. This was the power of Cage’s provocation when he asked his performers to 
reframe noise as signal — transgressing not only an aesthetic boundary, but one that 
foregrounds the noisy chaos of nature against the orderly signals of broadcast media. 
After half a century during which electrical communications media had grown into 
familiar devices, reversing signal and noise had already become a palpably disruptive 
symbolic act, and Cage harnessed this discomfort to produce a striking piece of 
experimental music. 
Cage’s work rested on the premise that there is no essential difference between 
music and noise, nor sound and silence, while Shannon’s treated signal and noise as 
interchangeable. To be clear, Shannon stopped short of exalting noise, as Cage would. 
Whereas Shannon’s stance toward signal and noise amounted to ambivalence over 
where you choose to direct your attention, Cage insisted that deliberately facing our 
attention toward things typically called noise would result in a dramatic expansion of 
                                                             





musical possibility. Cage had called for a radical reversal in our understanding of noise 
as early as 1937, in an essay titled “The Future of Music: Credo”: 
I believe that the use of noise to make music will continue and increase until we 
reach a music produced through the aid of electrical instruments which will 
make available for musical purposes any and all sounds that can be heard. … 
Whereas, in the past, the point of disagreement has been between dissonance 
and consonance, it will be, in the immediate future, between noise and so-called 
musical sounds. The present methods of writing music, principally those which 
employ harmony and its reference to particular steps in the field of sound, will 
be inadequate for the composer, who will be faced with the entire field of 
sound.162 
Cage was attuned to a broader push for conceptual reconfiguration of noise in his 
midst. Following the seminal provocation of Luigi Russolo, the Italian futurist who 
celebrated the discordant sensorium of industrial modernity, Cage insisted that artists 
should elevate ‘noise’ to a point of aesthetic contention in which sounds that are 
unwanted and even unlistenable may grapple for equal recognition. This point was 
echoed by Gertrude Stein, who declared “nothing is noisy” and endeavored to prove it 
with the unconventional tone of her poetry, both jarring and melodious: “If lilies are lily 
white if they exhaust noise and distance and even dust, if they dusty will.”163 Elsewhere, 
Cage connected this point to an even broader range of trends in media, technology, art, 
and American culture.164 He wrote aleatoric pieces that took shape through random 
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events like dice rolls. Sound and dance would proceed according to chance factors that 
Cage had encoded within his pieces and given over to random processes. By limiting 
the intervention of the performers and even the composer, himself, Cage wanted to 
create pieces that transcend the biases we might introduce, however unintentionally. 
Throughout his career, Cage’s most memorable gestures were designed to extend the 
boundaries of music until they disappeared entirely.  
The conceptual backdrop for Cage’s inclusive view of noise had developed over the 
preceding five decades. Even the radios that Cage used for his performance were 
substantially less noisy than they would have been a few decades earlier, and this can 
be credited to the work by communications engineers whose designs were specifically 
aimed at preserving the fidelity of radio signals and eliminating sources of natural 
interference. Whereas Cage saw noise as an intrinsic aspect of sonic experience, much 
like the sounds that go unnoticed in moments of apparent silence, the phenomenon of 
‘noise’ had moved beyond the merely audible during the half century preceding Cage’s 
conception of “Imaginary Landscape No. 4.” 
Shannon and Cage had latched onto a more abstract sense of ’noise’ that emerged in 
the midst of industrial modernism. Cities were packed with dense tenements, lined 
with factories, and increasingly connected by steam engines that announced their 
presence with the blast of deafening horns. Modern life had become noisier, yes, but the 
early age of electrical communication charted out an entirely different landscape with 
its own variety of noise. 
The ability to move back and forth between signal and noise, transforming one into 





Shannon a matter of coding — to actively reorder a signal so that it appears to be noise. 
Cage tried to shift the sonic gestalt of his audience, turning background into 
foreground, if only for the duration of a performance. Shannon’s deepest insight was to 
notice that messages can be coded with redundant bits to remain comprehensible in 
the presence of noise, whereas cryptograms are coded into noise, perhaps even using 
noise to do so, for the sake of making the message incomprehensible to outside 
listeners.  
This insight into the contingency of ‘noise’ has been little understood, not only in 
the standard vernacular use of noise but even amid the spread of information theory 
into other disciplines.  Certainly it is less widely understood than Cage’s calls for sonic 
universalism. Although Cage had taken an early interest in Norbert Wiener’s 
Cybernetics, at least by the late 1950s, when experiments with randomness, 
information, and control would play a greater role in Cage’s later work, there’s no 
indication that he took notice of Shannon’s work, nor of the work conducted on noise by 
others working at Bell Labs. The near miss of their historical trajectories is all the more 
remarkable considering that Cage lived in an apartment at the corner of Hudson Street 
and Greenwich Avenue, just two blocks from the Bell Labs building — half the distance 
of Shannon himself, living south of Union Square. Shannon haunted the City’s jazz 
clubs but not the avant-garde venues where Cage performed; he played chess in 
Washington Square Park, but did not mix with the modernists and emigre intellectuals 
who gathered in nearby cafes. 
For both Shannon and Cage, what is signal and what is noise turns out to be highly 





intentions, and the language or code they are using. This vexing complexity can be 
untangled by focusing on the pragmatics of language. Ludwig Wittgenstein, in his later 
work, held that the meaning of a word is its use, and the acceptable use of a word 
depends on the tacitly understood rules of the language-game in which the word is 
used. Shannon at least tacitly understood that the words ‘signal’ and ‘noise’ may 
migrate across language-games with ease. A clear radio transmission, which is signal to 
an engineer, may be considered noise the moment the broadcast disrupts somebody's 
conversation. What is signal to the typesetter of a Soviet newspaper, who arranges the 
layout for easy reading, is noise to the kremlinologist scanning for clues about the 
hidden machinations of the Politburo. What is signal to the author of a database might 
be noise to the user who feels overwhelmed by the enormous volume of information 
stored there. As the context changes, so does the use of the word noise — and 
Wittgenstein himself would warn us against the bewitchment that results from seeking 
answers in words themselves. 
As information theory spread into wider use, Shannon's terminology and abstract 
formulas were still useful even when the subtle treatment of signal and noise was 
overlooked or misinterpreted. In short, people could assume that there is a clear 
difference between signal and noise, effectively reifying this commonsense, even 
visceral distinction, and they would still get useful results from Shannon's theory. The 
question of how something ends up being treated as signal or noise is all but 
immaterial. The ad hoc definition of each one often comes quite naturally — and 
reassigning referents, as John Cage and others did, may appear at worst peculiar. 





noise after leaving a Cage performance, the message of the piece was clear: you could 
do so at any moment without some brute, material truth intruding to insist that the 
identities of signal and noise are immutably assigned to one thing or another. 
As Chapter 1 illustrated, even Edgar Allan Poe used statistical analysis to break 
simple codes in the 1840s, and even those techniques had been around for centuries. 
Poe’s contemporary,  the British inventor Charles Babbage, developed even more 
advanced statistical techniques for breaking the most challenging cipher in use at the 
time, often called le chiffre indechiffrable, the indecipherable cipher.165 A case could be 
made for William Friedman and not Claude Shannon as the person most responsible 
for turning cryptography into a science, but neither claim carries much ballast given 
that statistical approaches to codes and ciphers have been used for centuries. In fact, 
there’s a very long tradition of using statistics to gain insight into linguistic patterns, 
whether in secret messages or undeciphered ancient tongues. The use of statistics in 
cryptography not only preceded the tumultuous taming of chance described by Ian 
Hacking, but oddly it has also been omitted from leading histories of probability and 
statistics.166  
Although Shannon acknowledged the connection between his mathematical theory 
of communication and cryptography, and many writers have since noted this 
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connection in brief, the connection is rarely treated with anything deeper than a glance 
— frankly, because it can be dizzying. Some point to simultaneity and topical overlap 
alone as a significant historical point.167 Others gesture at the similarity between 
Shannon’s diagram of a communication channel and cryptosystem (see Figures 9 and 
10) as a source of insight into the semiotic implications of communication theory.168 
Others are clear on the technical details and have ridden the realization toward original 
technical work (outlined in Chapter 5).169 
Beyond anything Shannon may have invented, his more remarkable quality was his 
restraint — a talent apparently at odds with the widespread influence that gathered 
throughout the fifties and sixties.170 Shannon was humble about the limits of 
information. Much like the early Wittgenstein, whose Tractatus concludes with an 
appeal to honor the limits of symbolic logic, passing in silence over matters that resist 
clear expression, Shannon spent years insisting that others had misjudged the 
implications of his mathematical theory of communication and overextended it to an 
unfit set of distant subjects. Certainly Norbert Wiener hadn’t showed such restraint. His 
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vision for the new field of cybernetics soared on the premise that a mathematical 
theory of communication could unify the pursuit of knowledge across disciplines.  
Despite the influence of early cybernetics and information theory on contemporary 
thinking about cryptography, this influence was significantly delayed. The rush of 
wartime research and postwar publishing described in this chapter was followed by a 
considerable gap in the history of cryptography. The next chapter examines this gap, 
stretching roughly twenty-five years after the publication of Shannon’s declassified 
theory of cryptography in 1949. One of the purposes of this chapter is to examine the 
origins of the paradigm at the center of cryptography today, though Shannon’s theory of 
cryptography would only be entered into paradigmatic position in the 1970s (a 
development described in Chapter 5). Today, mathematicians and computer scientists 
who work on cryptography credit Shannon with transforming cryptography from an art 
into a science, but the classification of cryptography itself for the better part of 
Shannon’s career in fact meant that the work of framing Shannon as the bringer of 
scientific of order to this field was in fact performed by others, decades later, and under 
vastly different political circumstances than Shannon’s.  
Reflecting on their rediscovery of Shannon’s theory of cryptography in the 
seventies, the two researchers most responsible for launching the widespread study of 
cryptography in computer science were convinced that they had discovered the 
skeleton key to understand the other half of Shannon’s work. These researchers, 
Hellman and Diffie, surmised that this paper could only have been declassified by 
accident given the strict secrecy imposed on this subject by the seventies. And as they 





its deep connection to communication theory, but that Shannon could only have landed 
upon his insights into communication through his chance encounter with 
cryptography. Shannon’s early letters with Bush and his later interviews suggest this is 
not the case, and that Shannon instead funneled the insights from his pet project on 
communication theory into his day work on cryptography. But for Diffie and Hellman to 
imagine that they had discovered the secret origin of their academic field was a truly 
intoxicating motivation to continue exploring the subject of cryptography, despite the 
fact that the subject had become increasingly more strictly classified, the subject 
examined in the next chapter.   
 
 








Classifying Cryptography in Postwar America: 






After Shannon’s theory of cryptography was declassified and published in 1949, the 
literature in this area essentially went silent. Nothing else saw daylight during the 
postwar years from among the classified cryptography projects that continued to be 
carried out in the burgeoning military-industrial-academic complex of the postwar 
years. Not even the encrypted telephone Sig-Saly was declassified for another two 
decades: Shannon’s theory of cryptography had been directly entangled with this 
project, but was ostensibly based instead on the earlier Vernam cipher. Shannon’s 
“Communication Theory of Cryptography” would be the only such paper to appear in 
the open literature for another twenty-five years, a long, fallow period in which 
cryptography lay mostly underground.171  
Many stories from the second World War that have since entered the standard 
repertoire of cryptographic history after remaining classified until at least the 1970s. 
The work of Alan Turing and others in breaking the Enigma machine at Bletchley Park 
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was only disclosed in 1974,172 nearly twenty years after Turing’s own tragic death.173 
Project X and the Sig-Saly encrypted telephone were not declassified until 1975.174 The 
CIA’s Venona program to decrypt the communiques of Soviet agents in the US was only 
disclosed in the 1990s, at the request of an outraged Senator. Even Shannon’s mentor 
Vannevar Bush had spearheaded work on two different codebreaking computers 
during World War II, but neither reached a working state before they were abandoned 
at the end of the war, and both would still remain classified long afterward.175 
How did Shannon’s cryptography paper slip out into the open? Decades later, one of 
the researchers who revelled in the rediscovery of this work conjectured that it could 
only have been declassified by mistake.176 Such was their surprise and delight upon 
rediscovering this paper and digesting its implications (a topic covered in Chapter 5). 
Still, this claim is not supported by evidence, and it remains unclear how or why 
Shannon’s cryptography report was declassified. Given how much of Shannon’s theory 
of communication was foreshadowed on the pages of his cryptography report, it is 
possible that some material from this report was declassified for the sake of publishing 
                                                             
172 “War Secret.” The Globe and Mail, October 8, 1974, p. 4. 
173 In 1952, when the UK still had strict laws forbidding homosexuality, Turing was sentenced to a 
regime of chemical castration, supposedly to ‘cure’ him, but instead the hormonal changes 
caused him such anguish that Turing committed suicide in 1954 at age 41, two full decades 
before his wartime codebreaking work would be revealed to the public. See Hodges, Andrew. 
Alan Turing : The Enigma. New York: Walker, 2000. 
174 Patent: Speech component coded multiplex carrier wave transmission. US3991273 (A), issued 
March 9, 1976. 
175 Burke, Information and Secrecy. 
176 Whitfield Diffie and Susan Landau offer this explanation for the declassification of Shannon’s 
wartime cryptography report, but without supporting evidence I can only assume that it is 
based on conjecture alone. See Diffie, Whitfield, and Susan Eva Landau. Privacy on the Line: The 





Shannon’s communication theory, loosening the cords that otherwise would have 
fastened the remaining material in the report, at least in accordance with the 
declassification schedule that was initially assigned. On the other hand, given that the 
ostensible subject matter of Shannon’s cryptography was the decades old, widely 
known Vernam cipher, perhaps those responsible for the declassification decision did 
not realize the connection between this report and Sig-Saly, the aptly named Project X 
that would remain classified much longer. Indeed, Shannon himself was presumably 
still in the dark about this project at the time.  
And yet, even with William Friedman’s level of access as the nation’s Chief 
Cryptologist, he appears to have been unfamiliar with Shannon’s theory of 
cryptography until at least 1954, when he requested a copy from the publications office 
at Bell Labs.177 Perhaps Friedman was unaware that this article descended from a 
military report; perhaps he preferred to request documents through the Bell Labs 
bureaucracy. 
For all the flags that point back to wartime innovation as a critical phase in the 
history of cryptography, at least in terms of the prevailing historiography, the postwar 
record of wartime work remained out of view for a long time, and the record of the next 
two decades was even emptier. The subject of this chapter is this very empty stretch in 
the record, taking the markers of its beginning and end as a cause for examination of 
what we know, what we do not yet know, and what we may infer in Chapter 5 about the 
effects of this fallow period upon the work in the seventies when several researchers 
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broke the research embargo on cryptography, reinvigorated interest in Shannon’s long-
forgotten theory of cryptography, and framed their enterprise as a political and social 
necessity amid the rise of the information society. 
Cryptography was kept closely under wraps during the Cold War, and familiarity 
with codebreaking techniques would become both rare and rarely mentioned outside of 
intelligence agencies and the military. As the escalation of the Red Scare and threat of 
nuclear war drove military research deeper into secrecy, the study of cryptography was 
entered into the category of military secrets. Alongside the knowledge of enriching 
uranium and splitting the atom, the science of making and breaking codes would be 
treated as a weapon in itself. Very few academic articles even mention cryptography 
during the three decades following the end of World War II, and not a single patent was 
granted for a cryptographic design , although former NSA cryptographers recall a 
regular stream of letters from inventors eager to contribute the ciphers and 
cryptosystems they had developed themselves. None could be taken seriously against 
the classified techniques for military cryptography, but the secrecy surrounding these 
advancements left the civilian public in the dark. 
The suppression of cryptography research after WWII was facilitated by the 
apparent urgency of secrecy in weapons research, especially the nuclear program. 
Encryption protected secret information from the spies who were trying to steal it, and 
cryptography provided codes and security schemes guarding access to the weapons 
themselves. Nuclear codes are secret codes, after all. What’s more, The rise of 





would lead to the personal computer and the internet, but these agencies also 
monitored and controlled the research agendas of classified subjects like cryptography. 
Consider the disparity in citations of Shannon’s two landmark papers from 1948-9, 
in which he first offered a theory of communication and then a theory of cryptography 
roughly six months later. The cryptography paper was cited just three times in 1951, 
twice in 1953, and not once more until the year 1973 (See Appendix Table 1). Over the 
same span of time, the two installments of Shannon’s article on communication theory 
were cited a total of 1,090 times. The five citations that Shannon’s cryptography paper 
did receive in its first two decades were glancing footnotes amid discussions of broader 
developments in cybernetics and information theory. The disparity in recognition of 
these two theories is surely even greater if you account for the book Shannon published 
with Warren Weaver in 1949. The influence of this book has outweighed the original 
article so heavily that it is often called the Shannon-Weaver model, though Weaver 
himself readily admitted that his own piece was just a layman’s introduction get 
readers up to speed for what they would find in Shannon’s chapter. And although 
Shannon had originally intended for his communication theory and cryptography 
theory to be bundled together in this book, the cryptography section was not in the 
proposal Warren Weaver made to the University of Illinois Press.178 
Like Weaver, Bush tends to be remembered today as a visionary research 
administrator, first as the director of the OSRD during World War II and later as the 
founding director of the National Science Foundation. His most familiar piece of 
writing is an article for the Atlantic Monthly in 1945 titled “As We May Think,” in which 
                                                             





he described the future evolution of the computer into something more than a tool for 
crunching difficult math problems: it would become an immersive visual tool to rapidly 
access information resources from massive electronic libraries. Bush’s memoir 
frequently expresses pride for building the framework that would support the 
expansion of American universities and other research institutions to international 
preeminence,179 although for this same feat he could equally be credited with nurturing 
the growth and expansion of what Dwight D. Eisenhower would ominously call the 
“military-industrial complex” in an eleventh-hour warning before he turned his office 
over to John F. Kennedy. In the case of classified cryptography research, Bush’s legacy 
stands at odds with a record of willingly directing projects that were not just conducted 
in secret, but remained classified for years to come. While he rhapsodized about the 
expansive vistas of open science and limitless information access through new 
technologies, Bush cultivated a bureaucracy that stifled open research on subjects like 
cryptography, flagging these proposals and forwarding them to NSA.180 
In contrast to the popular history of cryptography outlined in Chapter 1, the postwar 
years mark a turning point in the historical framing of cryptography. The US 
government’s growing interest in cryptography and the classification of this subject 
made it possible to forget cryptography’s popular past and misremember the military’s 
claim upon it as though it extended so far into the past that it holds sole, legitimate 
claim. Stories of spycraft and military intelligence that dominate most histories of 
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cryptography are grounded in a stark discursive shift in the treatment of cryptography 
during and after World War II. This chapter aims to understand how the secrecy 
imposed on cryptography during the postwar period made it difficult to remember or 
reconstruct a moment just a few decades earlier in which conditions surrounding 
cryptography in America were very different. 
Moves to classify so much scientific research were met with mixed reception after 
the war had ended and many scientists expected their work to shift back into peacetime 
routines. Some of those who willingly participated in secret research projects during 
World War II began to publicly object to the concealment of their work under 
government orders, especially those who had been drawn to emigrate to the United 
States based on its reputation for respecting and supporting scientists to work 
autonomously. Many of them believed that the scientific enterprise itself rests on the 
ideals of open publishing, public debate, and granting credit to those whose work 
appears first in public forums like books and academic journals. Still, the scientific 
norm of open publishing is balanced by a coinciding tendency to operate with extreme 
secrecy before publishing, locking competitors in a high-stakes races to put their work 
on record first and secure exclusive recognition of the achievement.181 These were the 
same motivations that had driven competition between Wiener and Shannon when they 
were both working on a mathematical theory of communication. Other scientists, 
especially those who dabbled in the philosophy of science, began to see the openness of 
scientific communities as both an expression of democratic ideals and an ideal for 
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democratic societies to aspire to. For Karl Popper and Michael Polanyi, the open, 
transparent pursuit of knowledge was not just a scientific aim, but a political one, and 
their writings in exile during the second World War aimed at elucidating the 
philosophical and scientific ideals that either support the development of an open 
society, or obstruct it. As obstructions, Popper pointed to the concealed fascistic 
tendencies in philosophers going back to Plato, culminating in the obscurantism of 
Hegel, who insisted that an understanding of one’s own time only emerges as it passes 
by — perhaps to excuse himself from stating his own ideas clearly — Popper considered 
tantamount to regression into primitive religion. Although scientists are elites, and 
their work is sometimes inaccessible to non-experts, Popper stresses the importance of 
open discourse. Scientists publish their work, they make it accessible to their peers, 
and excusing the unusual case of war — especially a war so all-consuming as a World 
War — classifying scientific results appeared antithetical to the norms, ethics, and even 
the emerging political commitments held by many scientists. 
When the sociologist Robert Merton delineated four of the central norms that guide 
scientists in their work, he called this aim for openness and transparency the norm of 
‘communism’ (alternately: ‘communalism’).182 Scientists treat their findings as public 
goods, both for an audience of other scientists and for the greater benefit of science 
itself as a collective enterprise. Following Merton, the former Manhattan Project 
director J. Robert Oppenheimer also described the ‘communism’ of science as one of its 
central virtues, though he tried to distance himself from the political meaning of the 
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word communism. Oppenheimer was invited to give the BBC’s prestigious Reith 
Lecture in 1953, delivering a series of vivid reflections on the world-historical urgency 
of science in the post-war moment. Just a year later, during the ongoing Red Scare, 
Oppenheimer’s security clearance was pulled and he was removed from classified 
research projects after several family members and his Berkeley social circle had been 
accused of communist sympathies.183 As the director of the Institute for Advanced 
Study in Princeton, Oppenheimer remained in a position of some stature even though 
he would never regain his security clearance, and thus was barred from the expanding 
space of classified research between government, industry, and academia. 
As the founding director of the NSF, Bush at least sounded a lot like Oppenheimer. 
He had adopted a similar rhetorical stance in the inaugural address translating the 
OSRD’s wartime operations into a peacetime mission of forward progress toward the 
future, the greater good, and so forth. Bush’s piece quotes the late President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt, whose first concern for the transition to peacetime science was this: 
“What can be done, consistent with military security, and with the prior approval of the 
military authorities,” Roosevelt began, “To make known to the world as soon as possible 
the contributions which have been made during our war effort to scientific 
knowledge?”184 
Seeming both ardent and conflicted at once, FDR’s apparent concern for a return to 
scientific transparency at the war’s end was shuffled underneath not one, but two 
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trump cards, military security and military authority. Still, Bush organized an entire 
section of his remarks under this heading: “The Lid Must Be Lifted.” He states that the 
“vast amount of information” accumulated during wartime research will be a boon 
overall to American industry and education, but hedges again: “Some of this 
information must remain secret, but most of it should be made public as soon as there 
is ground for belief that the enemy will not be able to turn it against us in this war.” 
Despite mincing, Bush spotlighted the open pursuit of science as one of the hallmarks 
of a democratic society, and he predicted that the spectrum of benefits the West would 
gather by taking this stance would ensure our scientific, political, and economic 
preeminence moving forward. Bush had been a quintessential academic power broker 
leading up to this moment, rising quickly through the ranks of the MIT faculty, finding 
the ear of FDR during wartime, and earning his support in establishing the Manhattan 
Project. 
In both his letter to President Truman proposing the NSF, and his essay in The 
Atlantic promising a future transformed by computers, Bush established his reputation 
as a visionary scientist and cemented his status as a leader of the burgeoning military-
industrial complex. Bush promised to improve the nation through technology, and like 
Shils, Popper, and Oppenheimer he connected the longstanding ideals of Western 
science to those of Western democracy. He said the nation would thrive and prosper 
through openness and transparency — although he appended a few exceptions. 
Although Bush adopted the rhetoric of open science, his public addresses 
acknowledged his intention to maintain classified research as needed. After appealing 





pilot these classified research projects as director of the OSRD during the War, after 
armistice Bush appealed for this institution to persist, along with the tremendous 
power he wielded, not only in academia but in industry and the military. Although the 
American public would increasingly value transparency in a variety different ways by 
the sixties and seventies, with a trend of ‘opening up’ visible in many venues of 
American life, the rhetoric of open science was fairly hollow, especially so given its 
apparent philosophical connection to the open, democratic society that was held as an 
ideological pillar of the West. Within the nascent military-industrial complex, the ideals 
of openness were both professed as scientific norms and also selectively suppressed in 
matters considered too politically sensitive. Tellingly, Bush hinted at the codebreaking 
operation at Bletchley Park, still to be classified for another twenty years, when he 
gestured at the dire consequences that may hinge on secret research. “The bitter and 
dangerous battle against the U-boat was a battle of scientific techniques - and our 
margin of success was dangerously small,” Bush said, more or less invoking the 
subjects of signals intelligence and cryptography as justified secrets to anyone who 
understood the context of this remark.185 
To classify cryptography would thus fall on the far side of the boundary that Bush 
and others had mapped around the otherwise open, transparent space of scientific 
inquiry they professed to be so broadly and inherently healthful for society.  
The NSF was both a catalyst for American science and a mechanism to monitor and 
direct the activity of American research. The large pool of grant money ensured that 
many of the nation’s scientists would submit applications detailing their research plans 
                                                             





and explaining the potential value of the work. In short, by judging which projects to 
fund, the NSF held up a meritocratic standard for research funding and also occupied a 
position in which they could steer American science toward the priorities established 
by its leading administrators.186 
• 
In 1956, the sociologist Edward Shils argued that that recent escalations in 
government secrecy had prompted a stark shift in the relative boundaries of the public 
and private sphere. Shils viewed these spheres as locked in a sensitive relationship 
where imbalanced emphasis on one inevitably affects the others. For Shils, writing a 
series of essays on this subject in the early fifties, an abrupt rise in secrecy in the 
immediate postwar period had sent visible shockwaves through American society, from 
the Red Scare to the increasing presence of intelligence agents and classified research 
projects on college campuses.187 
Reflecting on the Cold War in the early 1990s, Daniel Patrick Moynihan viewed the 
secrecy of cryptography programs as an especially reckless abuse of secrecy that 
needed to be reformed.188 The intelligence gathered through these programs could have 
contributed immensely to public understanding of issues like Soviet spying and the 
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nuclear threat. Moynihan considered the Venona codebreaking program as a specific 
example of secrets held too long and without justification. 
A review of cryptography policy in 1984 claims “exponential growth” in 
cryptography research since World War II,189  grounding this measure on the account of 
NSA whistleblower James Bamford. Although Bamford does offer a detailed account of 
the work conducted in the mysterious “puzzle palace” beyond the fortified perimeter of 
the NSA headquarters at Fort Meade, the lack of additional records to support this 
“exponential growth” makes it difficult to confirm this claim. This is a symptom of the 
ironclad secrecy that surrounded serious cryptography research at this time. The 
reemergence of crypto research in the 1970s could easily appear like an eruption 
breaking the still surface of an idle discourse; but for those who could see beneath the 
surface, where classified research carried on, the reemergence of civilian research 
would appear to be part of an ongoing flow. Though some of this classified work was 
conducted in universities and corporate research labs,190 the journals, conferences, and 
lectures that typically form the public life of these institutions would give no indication 
of how the field of cryptography had actually progressed since the end of the second 
World War.  
Amid a postwar boom in funding and productivity of scientific research, as well as a 
general expansion of American universities in both size and cultural prominence, 
cryptography became one of the select areas treated as off limits. The leading edge of 
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cryptography research was now conducted in a secret garden behind walls stamped 
“classified”, the open literature on cryptography had become something like a fallow 
field, unplanted and untended, and thus especially fertile when it was replanted. 
• 
The dire importance attached to cryptography and secrecy in the postwar years is 
especially striking in contrast to the relative lack of interest in cryptography and 
codebreaking in the U.S. just a few decades earlier. If you view the history of American 
cryptography through its role in military and government, the nation was a bit of a 
backwater compared to the surveillance and codebreaking operations in many 
European countries, where sophisticated interception and decryption work was 
conducted on a daily basis, sometimes in the black chambers established for regular 
codebreaking and postal surveillance. It must have seemed quaint to the hardened 
spymasters of the Old World when the U.S. Secretary of State Henry Stimson 
proclaimed outrage at learning, in 1929, that the nation had established its own black 
chamber little more than a decade earlier. When Stimson shut down the bureau, he is 
reported saying “gentlemen do not read each other’s mail.”191 
The reader of gentlemen’s mail was Herbert Yardley, the first American appointed 
to monitor domestic communications during peacetime on home soil. Yardley had been 
appointed to the top codebreaking office in 1915, but his work accelerated after the 
revelation of the Zimmermann telegram prompted the American government to build 
up its capacity for signals intelligence. Often cited as the principal pretext for America’s 
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entry into the first World War, this intercepted telegram purported to reveal a scheme 
proposed by the German foreign secretary, Arthur Zimmermann, to lure Mexico into 
the Axis alliance in exchange for the return of former territory held in the American 
southwest.192 The telegram had crossed US borders en route from Germany to Mexico, a 
choice that could have been incredibly careless if not for the fact that America had no 
interception sites in place. British intelligence was far more invested in signals 
intelligence at the time, in part because they controlled most of the world’s 
transoceanic cables. They intercepted the Zimmerman Note from the transatlantic 
relay station at Land’s End, then had it decrypted at Room 40, the British codebreaking 
agency that would be the forerunner of their later operations at Bletchley Park and then 
the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). The Zimmerman note was 
finally delivered to the US embassy in London in hopes that it would convince the 
reluctant President Wilson to join the war. Once the American ambassador was 
convinced of the note’s authenticity, he relayed it back to Washington, and the public 
support for joining the war began rising nearly as soon as the papers hit the 
newsstands. This war America entered despite a lack of cryptographic savvy, but it 
marks the beginning of continuous signals intelligence offices monitoring foreign 
communications and breaking codes in times of war and peace. 
Yardley was first hired by the U.S. government in 1912, at the age of 23, when he was 
presented with a diplomatic cryptogram that had been sent to President Woodrow 
                                                             






Wilson.193 This was intended as a test, both of Yardley’s abilities and of the cipher itself, 
but he would later boast that American ciphers were so rudimentary that he solved the 
test quickly with pen and paper. When the nation went to war, Yardley joined the small 
corps of codebreakers whose wartime powers granted unbridled access to legal 
wiretaps. Before long, Yardley headed this fledgling intelligence division that gathered 
and decrypted messages passing through American communication hubs and 
interception points. At the close of the war, Yardley was named the country’s spymaster 
and charged with monitoring foreign mail and telegrams to guard against the 
Zimmermans of the future. 
After Stimson shut down the American Black Chamber in 1929, Yardley responded 
by writing a tell-all memoir about America’s first domestic spying operation. While 
Yardley was not prosecuted for revealing these secrets, his successor William Friedman 
considered Yardley a traitor and opportunist. What’s more, in measuring codebreaking 
talents, Friedman judged Yardley to be incompetent, never matching the exaggerated 
boasts in his memoir. Yardley’s case did double work for Friedman as he guarded the 
disciplinary boundary of cryptology. First, he placed Yardley in the sub-scientific camp 
of amateurs and other unsystematic practitioners. Second, he denounced Yardley for 
disclosing state secrets, both betraying his country and transgressing the professional 
code of cryptographers. 
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Before Yardley began surveillance work in 1917, the American government had not 
conducted domestic surveillance during peacetime, nor codebreaking of encrypted 
communications. Early communications law in the United States tended to favor strong 
individual privacy, both against government surveillance or the incursions of fellow 
citizens. The Radio Communication Act of 1912 prohibited intercepting private 
communications, even by the government. 
The Military Intelligence Division of the Army established the Cipher Bureau (MI-8) 
under Yardley in 1917, and in 1918 the Navy’s own bureau was absorbed into Yardley’s. 
In 1920, Herbert Yardley leased a townhouse on East 37th Street near Lexington 
Avenue in Manhattan, where each day he climbed four flights of stairs to his office on 
the top floor. This unassuming brownstone had a tailor’s shop on the ground floor to 
distract attention from the foot traffic of those working on the upper floors: this was the 
central interception post for the US Military Intelligence Department. Every telegram 
that passed through the United States was delivered to this office and decrypted, if 
necessary. Yardley referred to it as the American Black Chamber, in reference to the 
codebreaking offices of the Old World. As our first dedicated crew of wiretappers, this 
was the nation’s first signals intelligence agency and thus the spiritual precursor of the 
National Security Agency (NSA). 
After World War I ended and legal protections against warrantless interception of 
communication went back into effect, Yardley had to make deals with 
telecommunication companies  in order to regain the listening powers he had become 
accustomed to using in day-to-day operations during the war. So Yardley went across 





Carlton, gladly complied with requests for dragnet interception of foreign telegrams. “It 
was easier than I had imagined,” Yardley later wrote. “After the men had put all our 
cards on the table, President Carlton seemed anxious to do everything he could for 
us.”194 Other companies, like the Postal Telegraph Company, were somewhat less eager, 
but by the end of 1920, Yardley’s office was collecting every telegram to traverse 
American cables, breaking the encrypted ones, and reviewing this trove from their 
humble headquarters on 37th Street. 
When the US entered the War, Fabyan had also offered his cryptographic lab for the 
service of the nation. In addition to Yardley’s division, Riverbank’s researchers broke 
enemy codes for the military during World War I from the idyllic grounds where they 
had previously combed through Shakespearean verse looking for hidden messages. 
After the end of World War I, Friedman published a series of monographs under the 
imprint of Riverbank Labs. These monographs collected the insights and methods he 
had developed while breaking codes throughout the war. One of these monographs, 
number 18, was titled The Index of Coincidence and Its Applications in Cryptography, 
and carries special significance in the history of cryptography because it introduced the 
very concept of “index of coincidence.” The index of coincidence is a statistical 
measure of the likelihood that any two letters in an encrypted message were originally 
the same letter in plain text. By measuring the index of coincidence for different letter 
pairs, the cryptanalyst can make increasingly accurate guesses about the length of the 
key and its identity. 
                                                             






The interwar years also saw the invention of the first automated, mechanical 
systems for cryptography. Vernam of Bell Labs designed a machine for encrypting 
telegraph messages with a one-time, random paper tape containing a sequence of 
random digits; the machine on the receiving end would use the corresponding tape to 
reverse the process and retrieve the original message.195 In 1918, an inventor from 
Oakland, California, named Edwin Hebern patented a machine to encrypt a message by 
scrambling its letters with a complicated system of metal rotors.196 Friedman invented 
his own cipher machine in 1933, while in the process of breaking Hebern’s code. This 
first wave of mechanical ciphering devices vastly accelerated and complicated the 
process of encrypting messages. The most famous example is the Enigma machine 
used to coordinate the Nazi U-Boot fleet, but there were many other models in use 
during this period. Each was similarly formidable to codebreakers when used properly, 
and rotor machines would remain in use by various world governments for the next five 
decades.197 
With Yardley’s dismissal and the dissolution of his Cipher Bureau in 1929, William 
Friedman was anointed as the new American spymaster at a moment when global 
communications infrastructure was on the rise and global political stability was 
showing little improvement. Friedman’s ascent to the head of American codes and 
ciphers placed him in the public eye. When Encyclopedia Britannica invited Friedman 
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to write an entry on “Code and Ciphers,” he treated it as an opportunity to expound on 
the wondrous, ancient history of cryptography.198 He wrote about Poe’s contribution to 
American cryptography in an essay for the journal American Literature.199 Friedman 
was fond of beginning public lectures by reflecting on the task of deciphering the 
Egyptian hieroglyphs. The subject matter carried an aura of mystery that exceeded 
cryptography itself. Friedman would describe the brilliant errors of the seventeenth-
century Jesuit scholar Athanasius Kircher, who mistakenly believed that he had solved 
the code. Friedman would revel in the chance discovery of the Rosetta Stone, outlining 
in detail the scripts and information it contained, before dissecting the incredible 
codebreaking task that confronted Champollion even with this new evidence before 
him. 
Friedman used this anecdote not only to arouse a sense of wonder in the dry, 
methodical work of codebreakers, but also to mark a distinction between historical 
practices and the present state of the field. Those best suited for codebreaking work in 
the past had been philologists or linguists, who could apply their knowledge of various 
grammars and the regularities of different tongues to hypothesize about the language 
that might reside behind a given code. Friedman’s father was a rabbi fluent in nine 
languages. When Friedman spoke at his alma mater, Cornell, in 1959, he explained his 
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detour from biology to cryptology as a movement between codes, much like his father’s 
capacity to work across different tongues.200 
While the story of British codebreaking at Bletchley Park looms large in the recent 
history of wartime cryptography, the reaction of American intelligence to the Pearl 
Harbor attack had a different effect: it intensified efforts to make up for lost time, 
mobilizing scholars and engineers to bring the nation to preeminence in the means of 
keeping its secrets. This moment was indeed transformative: the military-industrial-
academic complex eventually did bring American science and technology to global 
preeminence. But whereas the military always has secrets, and industry has trade 
secrets, the notion of secrecy did not fit naturally in scientific culture. Many of the most 
outspoken philosophers of science, like Karl Popper and Michael Polanyi, had propelled 
the idea that the openness of scientific discourse could be a model for the kind of open, 
democratic society that should be cultivated everywhere.  
The Hollywood epic “Tora! Tora!” ends with an iconic, though probably apocryphal, 
quote from a Japanese admiral concerned that the Pearl Harbor attack had not struck a 
critical blow, but only “awakened a sleeping giant and filled him with resolve.” 
Although this quote refers to the American military, as a whole, the particular corner of 
the military most vigorously shaken to attention was the one that had borne most of the 
blame for not detecting this impending attack — that is, the various offices of signals 
intelligence. Though Friedman had already cracked the Japanese diplomatic code 
“Purple,” and many of their communiques were already under surveillance, the cause 
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of the failure would remain a subject of debate long afterward.201 The official 
investigation concluded that it was largely a failure of communication siloes between 
the various branches, while a later scholarly treatment by a defense contractor framed 
the whole debacle, root and branch, as a problem of signal and noise, making use of the 
fashionable extension of Shannon’s information theory into broader matters of 
communication and its sources of failure.202 Still, Pearl Harbor provided Friedman with 
justification for expanding his codebreaking operations, and the staff of his wartime 
office would become the foundation of the later NSA. 
By the end of the second World War, the core cryptographic team that Friedman 
originally recruited and trained in the 1920s had risen to higher stations in American 
intelligence, as well as greater prominence as experts at the intersection of statistics, 
linguistics, and information theory — the niche that Friedman had begun to occupy as 
he developed his own mathematical codebreaking techniques. Shannon himself 
crossed paths with Friedman only a few times in the context of occasional consulting 
work for NSA, but later accorded him greater credit for foundational work in 
cryptography that today tends to bear Shannon’s name instead. “Friedman is the father 
of statistics in cryptography,” Shannon said to an interviewer in 1984, and proceeded to 
name Friedman’s protege Solomon Kullback, in particular, as someone whose mastery 
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of statistics had led to further breakthroughs in codebreaking.203 Clearly Shannon had 
been keeping up with the literature. Research that Kullback published on the side 
during cryptography’s classified years was titled “Information Theory and Statistics,” 
presumably as a cursory measure to conceal its connection to cryptography.204 
Friedman published books, articles, and technical manuals at a rate of two or three a 
year throughout the thirties, forties, and fifties, with roughly half stamped classified 
and the others presented for a public audience. The work from Riverbank never left the 
Friedmans, and they continued to follow the debate over Shakespearean codes in their 
spare time, always skeptical as they continued testing and discrediting a continuous 
stream of new work on this subject. Thirty years after departing Riverbank Laboratory, 
the Friedmans’ commitment to use clear-headed, systematic rigor in searching for the 
secret codes in Shakespeare, if any should exist, concluded with a volume compiling 
their rebuttal of supposed secret messages brought forward over the years, culminating 
in their rejection of the Bacon cipher thesis, a case that yielded no convincing evidence 
during more than half a century of energetic efforts from scores of aspiriging literary 
code-hunters. 
Instead, Friedman continued to develop and promote a rigorous scientific 
scaffolding for cryptography. After the second World War, Friedman began to enlist 
leading mathematicians and scientists with expertise in cryptology to form a working 
group that would aid his new intelligence agency in solving particularly difficult 
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problems. The team was named the Special Cryptologic Advisory Group, or SCAG — and 
their invitation letter specifically notes that if anyone asks, they should avert suspicion 
by saying the “C” stands for “Communication.”205 It took some effort to find candidates 
with sufficient security clearance to be briefed on classified material regarding enemy 
codes. They brought in Von Neumann, whose work with the Manhattan Project required 
the highest security clearance. They also enlisted Ralph Potter, who had administered 
the top secret Project X at Bell Labs. Potter in turn enlisted Shannon, who would be the 
last of eight outsiders invited to join the SCAG. Correspondence between the organizers 
of this meeting suggests that Shannon’s security clearance had been raised since the 
end of World War II, when he was granted only the faintest details about the encrypted 
telephone they built in Project X.  
Shannon was invited to join the SCAG as a late entry, due in part to some confusion 
over whether he had sufficient security clearance for a project that would deal with 
such sensitive information as American codes and ciphers. Although Shannon’s 
relatively low security clearance during the war had kept him mostly in the dark on 
Project X, documentation of the SCAG meeting notes that by this time, six years later, he 
held “Q” clearance — the highest level granted by the Department of Energy, serving as 
the equivalent of “top secret” clearance in the military and intelligence agencies.206 
 It was not until 1952 that Friedman would write to Shannon and request a copy of 
his declassified article published in the Bell Labs journal. This suggests that Friedman 
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had neither seen the classified report of 1945, nor the declassified report in 1949. As 
Chapter 5 will show, the paradigmatic privilege afforded to Shannon’s theory of 
cryptography did not emerge until the 1970s, when computer scientists aiming to 
kindle the open literature of cryptography found Shannon’s work felicitous in part 
because his work on information theory had already become canonical during that 
time. Although Shannon’s 1949 paper on cryptography was part of the open literature, 
having been published in the Bell Systems Technical Journal, it went largely unnoticed 
for nearly a quarter century. 
By the early 1950s, the nascent U.S. intelligence community had contained the open 
literature on cryptography to a hush. With the most talented cryptologists either on 
staff or employed as consultants, Friedman could monitor outside work and ensure that 
new developments stayed within the closed discourse of classified literature within the 
newly established National Security Agency. Brockway McMillan, a colleague of Claude 
Shannon in the mathematics division at Bell Labs, published one of the few papers to 
build upon Shannon’s theory of cryptography in 1953, but this paper left even less of a 
footprint than Shannon’s. Even in the post-war years, the connection between 
mathematics and cryptography did not attract much attention, even among most 
mathematicians. In an article from 1941 titled “Some Mathematical Aspects of 
Cryptography,” the University of Chicago professor A.A. Albert takes a measure of 
caution in stating that this connection exists at all: “It would not be an exaggeration to 
state that abstract cryptography is identical with abstract mathematics.”207   
                                                             





One exception to this trend was Jack Levine, a mathematician who continued to 
work on cryptography regularly during the post-war years. Levine had been interested 
in codes and ciphers since childhood, but his research interest in the subject emerged 
only upon entering Princeton in 1930 to do graduate work in mathematics, placing him 
five classes ahead of Turing’s arrival in the same doctoral program.  Although Levine 
wrote twenty-eight papers published between 1958 and 1974 that relate in some way to 
cryptography, they focus on theoretical applications of algebraic cryptography. Few are 
concerned with practical applications, and only one mentions computers (in 1961).208 
Many of Levine’s papers address obsolete systems like the seventeenth-century 
Vigenere cipher which is “readily solved by cryptanalysts” because it is nevertheless 
“interesting … from a mathematical point of view.”209 
Why were just a few mathematicians like Levine able to publish research on codes 
and ciphers during the post-War years while others had been warned away from this 
subject by peers and officials alike? Levine was perhaps the most notable exception, 
and he had been publishing cryptological work since the prewar years. Although as a 
tenured professor, he would have enjoyed some measure of protection in pursuing his 
research agenda, the more likely explanation is that Levine’s work dealt with innocuous 
subjects like the Vigenere cipher, which had already been soundly broken a century 
ago. Although Levine’s work must have had some originality and interest to 
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mathematicians, the cipher machines and computers of interest of interest to NSA were 
operating on another plane of complexity. 
Nor was cryptographic puzzlecraft muted at this moment. Despite all the espionage, 
supercomputing, and high-level mathematics, cryptography remained a humble hobby 
for many Americans in the Postwar years, just as it had been for many prior decades. 
Amateur codebreaking societies thrived, puzzle books were stocked by many 
bookkeepers, and even some newspapers continued to print simple ciphers even after 
the ascent of the crossword as the daily puzzle of choice. Many who would go on to 
careers cracking codes for their government recall that they were originally hooked by 
the playful element of cryptography. Just as long as the books and puzzles remained at 
this amateur level, U.S. intelligence agencies were unconcerned. The weirdness of the 
nineteenth-century crypto tradition resurfaced under grim circumstances in the late 
sixties with a string of murders by the so-called Zodiac Killer, who sent handwritten 
cryptograms to newspapers that attracted much attention, speculation, and of course 
fear. In response to this unexpected surge of attention directed at cryptography, the 
American Cryptogram Association (ACA) briefly entered the limelight by challenging 
the Zodiac Killer to devise the most challenging cipher in his ability, to reveal his true 
identity in a message so ciphered, and thus to match wits with the seasoned  pencil-
and-paper puzzle solvers who had kept up this humble hobby amid the essentially 
silent emergence of computational cryptography during the mid-twentieth century. 
Even the older, literary side of cryptographic culture endured to some extent even 
as computational cryptography eclipsed it in the minds of experts. In the postwar years, 





sense that had been more common in the nineteenth century — as the general practice 
of concealing meaning beneath the surface of a text. This often implied something like 
the pursuit of secrets in Shakespeare, but also applied much more broadly. Many of 
Vladimir Nabokov’s works contain word puzzles, notably Pale Fire, Ada, and a short 
story titled “The Vane Sisters,” which was at first rejected by The New Yorker before 
Nabokov pointed the editors toward the acrostic poem hidden in its final paragraph.210 
Nabokov described the inclusion of puzzles in his prose as a consequence of his lifelong 
fondness for chess and puzzles, not to mention an overt, competitive interest in 
challenging his readers to match wits with him. One such reader, the literary critic 
Kenneth Burke, stated in 1962 that his scholarly interests had become mainly 
“cryptographic,” by which he meant that he spent the bulk of his time seeking 
messages hidden in works of literature.211 Burke, in a seemingly naive 
misinterpretation of information theory, once wrote to Claude Shannon insisting that 
the mathematician had failed to understand a point Burke had posed during the Q&A at 
a campus lecture. Burke spelled out his interest in pairing terms from his theory of 
rhetoric like ‘action’ and ‘motion’ and the keywords of Shannon’s far different theory of 
communication. 
Secrecy would remain one of the defining themes in American literature throughout 
the second half of the twentieth century, with writers like Thomas Pynchon drawing 
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from Poe to depict their own age through a lens of secrecy, conspiracy, paranoia.212 
Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49 is particularly salient for its extended reflection on the 
paradoxical implications of information theory, with the overlapping sense and 
nonsense of its plot development described to the protagonist Oedipa Mas through the 
concept of entropy. A one-off character named Klapp describes the baffling 
contradictions inherent in Shannon’s information theory to Oedipa, saying “the more 
information is repeated and duplicated, the larger the scale of diffusion, the greater the 
speed of processing, the more opinion leaders and gatekeepers and networks, the more 
filtering of messages, the more kinds of media through which information is passed, 
the more decoding and encoding, and so on— the more degraded information might 
be.”213 Several years later, in his magnum opus Gravity’s Rainbow, Pynchon depicted 
both sides of the second World War as deranged war machines, driven by paranoia, 
obsessed with secrecy, entangled in a plot that similarly gives way to new puzzles in 
place of answers or resolutions, with characters hatching ever more peculiar plans to 
carry on their search for answers.214 Familar, unflattering depictions of the military-
industrial complex tend to present the archetype of a starchy, calculating bureaucrat, 
but Pynchon imagined that those closest to the radiant core of government secrecy 
were in fact twisted by the experience. Amid massive social movements to end the 
Vietnam War and dismantle the military-industrial complex, Pynchon captured a 
sinister glint in the surface of the new technocracy. He depicted the genuine torment of 
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secrecy as a hazardous condition of the postwar years. But despite Pynchon’s intense 
literary interest in secrecy and information theory, cryptography never passed through 
his work as a plot element. His work is only cryptographic in Burke’s sense: as a text 
concealing mysteries. It is striking to think that calling this ‘cryptographic’ today would 
seem not merely antiquated, but misplaced. 
• 
The NSA and NSF worked closely during the postwar years to suppress and classify 
cryptography research. When a group of researchers tried to reopen this subject in the 
1970s, they deliberately avoided public funds because they anticipated any 
entanglement with NSF funding could jeopardize their right to publish. (Chapter 5) 
More importantly, intelligence agencies had the privilege to monitor grant 
proposals, and the NSF would actively cross-check sensitive research subjects to flag 
and forward for review. Sensitive projects would be ushered into classified territory. In 
short, the ambitious project of post-war American science, presented as a project that 
would ennoble and enrich the work of scientists in the free pursuit of knowledge, was in 
fact hitched with a caveat that continued to redirect dangerous or otherwise sensitive 
projects into classified territory. While it is difficult to estimate just how many 
scientists might have tried to research cryptography within American universities in 
the post-War years, proposals to the NSF were actively monitored for material 
mentioning codes and ciphers.  
For those who remained in good standing within the post-War research 
establishment, the growth of the military-industrial complex carried considerable 





Science Foundation in 1945, he wrote that universities were “wellsprings of knowledge 
and understanding,” that scientists must be “free to pursue the truth wherever it may 
lead,” and that with the War’s conclusion, science could become more open as we 
remove “the rigid controls which we have had to impose, and recover freedom of 
inquiry and that healthy competitive scientific spirit so necessary for expansion of the 
frontiers of scientific knowledge.”215 
Bush himself had spent the second World War administering research projects for 
the OSRD, a body that was disbanded in 1945 and its functions assimilated by a branch 
of the NSF. His own wartime projects included efforts to build two different 
cryptographic computers, neither of which reached functional status by the end of the 
war.216 Bush conceived and directed the development of some of the first electronic 
machines for breaking codes: the Comparator, a dedicated cryptologic computer, and 
the Rapid Selector, an information processing machine with a broad set of functions for 
the time. Neither of these projects are as well known to historians or the general public 
as Bush’s famous differential analyzer, an early analog computer he built at MIT, or the 
Memex, an imaginary graphical information device that Bush described in “As We May 
Think.” The differential analyzer was superseded by digital computers, the Memex was 
purely imagination, and both the Rapid Selector and the Comparator were ultimately 
failures. Bush’s experimental codebreaking computers were scrapped as he readied 
himself to become the nation’s most powerful research administrator. 
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Bush immediately turned his attention to the imaginative potential of future 
technology, writing a piece for the Atlantic Monthly titled “As We May Think,” which 
was published the same month he proposed the NSF, and has since become a 
touchstone in computer history for its expansive survey of past information 
technologies and vivid description of what an information machine might look like in 
the future, when “men of science … turn to the massive task of making more accessible 
our bewildering store of knowledge.”217  As these machines grow more powerful, Bush 
predicts that they will grow to have “enormous appetites,” taking large quantities of 
punch cards and delivering results at unthinkable speeds. But Bush makes a point of 
pivoting to inform the reader that the computer of the future will be used for more than 
mere calculation. He compares the work of the mind to the operations of the computer, 
and begins a passage that sounds as though it imagines aloud “a future device for 
individual use, which is a sort of mechanized private file and library … in which an 
individual stores all his books, records, and communications, and which is mechanized 
so that it may be consulted with exceeding speed and flexibility. It is an enlarged 
intimate supplement to his memory.” Bush goes on to describe the device physically, 
and this piece is best remembered for offering a vivid piece of science fiction that Bush 
himself had the power and resources to make real. 
The publicly and privately supported colleges, universities, and research 
institutes are the centers of basic research. They are the wellsprings of 
knowledge and understanding. As long as they are vigorous and healthy and 
their scientists are free to pursue the truth wherever it may lead, there will be a 
flow of new scientific knowledge to those who can apply it to practical problems 
in Government, in industry, or elsewhere. 
                                                             





Scientific progress on a broad front results from the free play of free intellects, 
working on subjects of their own choice, in the manner dictated by their 
curiosity for exploration of the unknown. Freedom of inquiry must be preserved 
under any plan for Government support of science.218 
Federal funding agencies like the NSF and DARPA would go on to provide immense 
resources for the development of computers in the post-War years, as the vision of a 
general-purpose information machine was pursued at a number of the nation’s 
academic, industrial, and military research centers. The NSF gave John Von Neumann 
the funds to build one of the earliest electronic computers at the Institute for Advanced 
Study in Princeton. It was nicknamed the JOHNNIAC, a play upon the MANIAC 
computer that had crunched the numbers for the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos. The 
University of Pennsylvania and MIT were supported in a major expansion of the the 
computers that had been used for wartime ballistics research by Norbert Wiener. 
Despite Vannevar Bush’s lofty encouragement of open ideals in scientific work, and 
despite his own public proclamation that the end of the second World War would 
permit projects formerly housed under the OSRD to emerge into the light, cryptography 
remained an exception as the NSF and DARPA took hold of American science in the 
wake of the second World War. 
• 
It is fitting that the elder statesman Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s final policy offensive 
as a US senator in the nineties would be framed around a work of sociology published in 
1956, when Moynihan himself was an up-and-coming sociologist. Moynihan framed his 
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late-career denouncement of state secrecy as a reprisal of urgent arguments offered 
nearly half a century earlier by the sociologist Edward Shils, who had attempted to 
diagnose the spread of secrecy in the US government during the moment when this 
trend had first become apparent among academics and cultural critics in post-war 
America. In 1953, at the height of the Red Scare, Shils began compiling a series of 
essays called The Torment of Secrecy, and he described the book as “a broadside 
against the depredations of Senators McCarthy and McCarran and the unwholesome 
forces they had let loose by their example and encouragement.”219 By the time of its 
publication in 1956, the book had grown into an effort “to interpret the significance of 
the noxious happenings of the past ten years in the light of the tasks and traditions of 
American life and the principles of free society,” Shils wrote. “What began as a polemic 
became a reformulation of the principles of a free, lasting, and dignified society.”220 
Like Moynihan, Shils decried the escalation of state secrecy in the postwar years, 
but his effort to understand this phenomenon dealt more broadly with the 
interconnection of secrecy with the related concepts of privacy and publicity. Shils held 
that these three concepts push and pull against one another that the specific problem of 
secrecy during that historical moment could be observed in other times of political 
turmoil: a “disequilibrium” that disrupts the boundaries between spheres of social 
life.221 
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Against the issue of stolen nuclear secrets, Shils rejected the idea that scientific 
knowledge could be considered a state secret in the first place. These were the secrets 
of nature — the truths uncovered through the systematic decoding of the natural world 
— and since these secrets could, in principle, be uncovered by anyone through scientific 
labor, Shils argued that scientific knowledge could not be guarded without standing in 
opposition to science or nature itself. Following his former colleagues Karl Popper and 
Michael Polanyi,222 Shils aligned the aims of scientific inquiry with those of a 
democratic, open society.223  What’s more, he compared the work of the scientist and 
the cryptographer, a metaphor in use as early as the Early Modern period in Europe, as 
work in the service of decoding nature’s secrets through vigorous analysis 
At the same time that Popper, Shils, Mannheim, and Polanyi were formulating a link 
between the practice of science and the politics of a free society, the sociologist Robert 
Merton had etched these ideals into his canonical account of the norms, values, and 
social practices that guide the work of scientists — the principles that would come to be 
known as “Merton’s norms.”224 One of Merton’s four norms is “communism,” which in 
this case refers to the collective ownership of the knowledge produced by scientific 
labor. The individual scientist benefits mainly in recognition and esteem, according to 
Merton, with competition driven mainly by the desire to be perceived as original by 
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one’s peers. Even the most bitter scientific battles, such as the conflict between Newton 
and Leibniz, nevertheless resulted in the open circulation of the calculus to anyone who 
wished to learn it. This norm of free information exchange among scientists, according 
to Shils, Popper, and others, is a moral prefiguration of the stance toward information 
in a free, open society. This particular social philosophy, joining science and politics, 
was carried through unusual circumstances — widely celebrated, but often only given 
lip service.  
The sociologist Shils detected a substantial shift in the politics of information in 
America during the postwar period. Increased secrecy was compelled, along with 
increased surveillance and a general climate of suspicion. More information was 
gathered about private citizens, not just by government and law enforcement, but also 
social scientists, journalists, and detectives who had begun to reach further into the 
private sphere to gather data about individuals, their households, and the details of 
their lives. Shils offered up the concept of ‘intrusive perception’ to describe this trend 
toward “specialized occupational cultures” that center on the use of increasingly 
sophisticated technology to gather information about other people, as well as the 
“goodwill that accompanies it.”225 Michael Schudson has added that what distinguishes 
intrusive perception from the common concern for learning about other people is that 
it these intrusive techniques are specialized, relatively systematic, one-sided, as well as 
impersonal — all features that could be traced to the development of the journalistic 
interview in the nineteenth century.226 “Interpersonal surveillance grows and becomes 
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specialized with the rise of industry, city life, and large-scale, dense human groups,” 
Schudson writes. “Impersonal surveillance increases when the the technologies of 
communication, transportation, and information storage enable dense human 
interaction among people who are neither face-to-face acquaintances nor united by 
membership in common organizations nor connected by the propinquity of public 
space.”227 Similarly, Michel Foucault famously argued that disciplinary institutions 
changed over the course of the nineteenth century as increases in the capacity to 
surveil the general populace engendered new forms of control.228 Foucault argued that 
a population aware of the possibility of invisible surveillance with threat of punishment 
had paradoxically circumvented the actual need for constant surveillance, as people 
increasingly internalized the awareness of a disciplinarian authority that might be 
watching. Christopher Lasch would further argue that the act of observation itself, 
which was “initially conceived as a means to more effective forms of supervision and 
control, has become a means of control in its own right.”229 
• 
Cryptography served a critical role in the nuclear standoff, both as a tool of 
espionage and a means of protection against accidental or unauthorized nuclear 
detonations. The false equivalency between cryptography and weaponry was cemented 
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by 1954, with the passage of the Mutual Security Act.230 It laid out a vast program of 
economic and military assistance to counteract the global influence of the Kremlin, and 
placed explicit restrictions on the export of “arms, ammunition and implements of war, 
including technical data related thereto” (emphasis added).231 Presumably no one in the 
State Department thought that cryptographic devices were literally weapons, but the 
decision to regulate cryptography as though it were a weapon reflects a growing sense 
that information alone could be incredibly dangerous.  
Spies attempting to pilfer nuclear secrets coordinated their work and hid their 
tracks with encryption. For instance, KGB operatives working in the US made extensive 
use of the one-time pad cipher invented by Vernam and proved secure by Shannon. 
Both Vernam’s patents and Shannon’s theory of cryptography were, of course, public 
information. The majority of the work conducted in the Venona program was aimed at 
cracking these one-time pad messages by singling out the occasional error committed 
by an agent who might have re-used a pad to encode further messages. A recycled 
encryption pad creates telltale patterns over time as the structure of the underlying 
language begins to stand out against the background of a single random key that is used 
repeatedly. 
A series of postwar treaties and decrees established the pillars of the present-day 
American intelligence community and its partnerships with foreign allies. The UK-USA 
agreement was signed on March 5, 1946, coincidentally just three days before the first 
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Macy Conference on cybernetics. The purpose of UK-USA was to extend the intelligence 
sharing arrangement that the US and Britain had instituted during World War II with 
the BRUSA agreement in 1943. BRUSA allowed intelligence to be shared between the 
code-breaking teams at the US War Department at the Government Code and Cypher 
School at Bletchley Park, and it was this arrangement that facilitated Alan Turing’s visit 
to Bell Labs in 1943 — although, due to a hole in the paperwork, an Army officer ordered 
Turing to be sent home as soon as he landed in New York harbor, and it was only the 
direct intercession of Gen. Douglas MacArthur that confirmed the legitimacy of this 
British codebreaker.232 This intelligence sharing partnership grew much wider during 
the postwar years. Over the course of the 1950s, Norway, Denmark, West Germany, 
Australia, and New Zealand joined the UK-USA partnership. A decade later, as US 
military involvement in the former French Indochina began to ramp up, British-
occupied Hong Kong was actively providing surveillance data on the North Vietnamese. 
The National Security Act of 1947 led to the creation of the National Security Council 
and the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency. 
Though the CIA traditionally specializes in ‘human intelligence’ work, gathered 
directly by agents in the field, expansion of long-distance communication networks led 
to increasing reliance on ‘signals intelligence’ gathered through interception or 
eavesdropping, which became the purview of the NSA. Although the NSA was founded 
in 1952, its existence would not be publicly disclosed until two decades later, in the 
1970s, amid a series of Congressional investigations (discussed in Chapter 4). The 
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NSA’s heavy reliance on technology was bolstered by the passage of the Invention 
Secrecy Act of 1951, which permitted new inventions to be kept secret if they were 
deemed hazardous to national security.233 This broad mandate covered the growing 
array of machines built for cryptography, codebreaking, and general surveillance 
housed under the widening canopy of intelligence programs in the early years of the 
Cold War.234 
By 1945, the link between secrecy and security had become widely accepted under 
wartime conditions, but those unusual conditions did not relax after the war ended, as 
they often had in the past. Once the first set of atomic bombs were detonated over 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the secret was out. The Manhattan Project was disclosed — 
that is, the existence of this project was made public to explain the origins of this 
uncanny new weapon. The substance of this discovery remained highly classified. Los 
Alamos remained a highly secure facility, its staff tightly controlled, and weapons 
research would be one of the defining features of postwar geopolitics. Despite the 
shortcomings of the term ‘Cold War’ as a title for this stretch of history, the nuclear 
standoff at the heart of this global conflict raised the importance of gathering and 
securing intelligence, turning cryptography and codebreaking into proxies for 
defensive and offensive equipment in a war centered on information. 
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The atomic bomb presented an unparalleled case for persistent secrecy. It appeared 
to be an inherently dangerous form of knowledge, and efforts to conceal or attain this 
knowledge appear to be the prime movers behind the escalation of secrecy after World 
War II. At first, the US treated this knowledge as too dangerous for anyone else to 
possess. For the Soviet Union, it was knowledge too dangerous to be wielded by a single 
country. Even after the Soviet Union learned how to produce a nuclear chain reaction, 
secrecy became more central because the use of nuclear weapons seemed to demand 
constant monitoring. The US government began building a global surveillance 
apparatus, ostensibly to keep track of the Soviet Union and the threat of nuclear war. 
The bomb primed the world to accept that the Cold War required heightened secrecy 
and surveillance — not to mention suspicion — in order to safely navigate our perilous 
entry into the nuclear age. 
Even J. Robert Oppenheimer, the former director of the Manhattan Project, was 
denied access to data from the Atomic Energy Commission in 1954 on the grounds that 
his “doubtful associates” might pose a security risk.235 The associates in question were 
Oppenheimer’s brother and wife, both of whom were avowed Communists. 
Oppenheimer denied sharing their politics, and he even stated that he found it 
perverse for the Soviet Union to call itself “communist,” a word he associated with the 
ideals of community. This is, of course, the very same sense of “communism” that 
Merton had used to describe the ideal of scientific openness. For Oppenheimer, it 
presented “a cruel and humourless sort of pun that so powerful a present form of 
modern tyranny should call itself by the very name of a belief in community, which in 
                                                             





other times evoked memories of villages and village inns and of artisans concerning 
their skills, and of men of learning content with anonymity.”236 Oppenheimer delivered 
this sentimental depiction of the humble, selfless scientists during the BBC Reith 
Lecture in 1953, just a year before the US government would blacklist him from 
government research. Throughout his lecture, Oppenheimer spoke about the 
relationship between science and society at that moment in human history, and he 
urged for more institutions to model themselves after scientific communities: “The 
open society, the unrestricted access to knowledge, the unplanned and uninhibited 
association of men for its furtherance — these are what may make a vast, complex, ever-
growing, ever-changing, ever more specialized and expert technological world 
nevertheless a world of human community.”237 
Other, less prominent scientists were more vulnerable than Oppenheimer when 
they also came under HUAC suspicions. A number of them had even been 
Oppenheimer’s students at Berkeley, such as Joseph Weinberg, Bernard Peters, 
Giovanni Lomanitz, and David Bohm, whom Albert Einstein had once considered his 
heir apparent. Weinberg was fired from the University of Minnesota after testifying 
before the HUAC. Likewise, Lomanitz was indicted for contempt by the HUAC and fired 
from his faculty position. When Peters was called before the HUAC, Oppenheimer 
himself testified against him. Although Peters himself maintained his innocence, he too 
lost his job at the University of Rochester and spent the remainder of his career 
teaching in India. In Bohm’s case, his graduate research was immediately classified in 
                                                             






1943 when Oppenheimer realized that Bohm’s results would be pertinent to the 
Manhattan Project, yet Bohm’s file was marked suspicious at this time due to his 
participation in student activism at Berkeley. When Bohm was called to testify before 
the HUAC in the early fifties, he fled from Princeton to São Paulo, where Einstein had 
hastily arranged a teaching post. Several years later, Bohm settled into a faculty 
position at University College London, where he carried out the rest of his career trying 
to advance a theoretical unification of quantum mechanics and general relativity via a 
third path.238 Bohm’s work developed the scientific equivalent of a cult following. He 
was finally admitted to the Royal Society a year before his death in 1991, but his work 
never gained traction within either of the camps that he had hoped to put into 
conversation. The hysterical rise of postwar espionage suspicions had driven Bohm 
from the inner sanctum of theoretical physics to the relative margins, just as his 
colleagues Weinberg, Peters, and Lomanitz had their careers damaged much more 
substantially by the McCarthy hearings. It is worth recalling these stories because, even 
as the West celebrated its scientists in the postwar years and portrayed as a genteel 
contrast to the tyrannical research bodies of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, these 
scientists were also subjected to overzealous, sometimes even baseless official 
scrutiny. 
                                                             
238 The ‘third path’ Bohm proposed for quantum physics rests on a distinction between two levels 
of order in the physical world.  Observable physical phenomena exhibit what Bohm calls 
explicate order, and these are the emergent, often inconsistent manifestations of forces 
working on the level of implicate order, which cannot be perceived directly or even detected in 
neatly comprehensible ways with scientific sensors. According to Bohm, the disagreements 
between quantum theory and general relativity, for instance, reflect the fact that they both 
describe entirely different features of explicate order, but not the implicate order that gives rise 
to them both. And the counterintuitive qualities of quantum theory reflect the fact that human 





This reflects another dimension of postwar doublespeak about scientific openness 
— not just an array of exceptions to the Mertonian norm of ‘communalism’, but also an 
unsettling willingness to distrust scientists and even prosecute attacks upon them. The 
circumstances that elevated scientists to the status of heroes had also made them 
dangerous, and the security clearance that gave them access to the most exciting 
research projects of their time also penned them into a culture of secrecy, suspicion, 
and vulnerability. In this light, Shils’ critique in The Torment of Secrecy was quite 
prescient: the ideals of the ‘open society’ — as endorsed in the ideological stance of the 
Western powers and the political philosophy of many Western scientists —were in fact 
compromised by the growing tolerance of secrecy, in general, and the growing 
apparatus of secret research and invention, in particular. 
Shils’ critique of secrecy would only have its moment in the political limelight forty 
years later, after the collapse and dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, as Moynihan 
expected government secrecy to begin easing after half a century on the rise. As 
Moynihan looked for signs of greater openness in government in the following years, he 
realized that the gears of change were not moving on their own, even at this remarkable 
moment. Consequently, he devoted a considerable share of his fourth and final term in 
the US Senate to examining and curtailing the secrecy apparatus that had become 
stubbornly embedded in Washington. Tactically, Moynihan opted for the pulpit, 
decrying the rise in government secrecy since World War II and citing the damage this 
trend had caused to the nation over the past half-century.239 Moynihan, who had taken 
                                                             






up politics after first embarking on a career in sociology, was equipped to launch a wide 
range of attacks on this targets: he characterized secrecy as a thoughtless bureaucratic 
function (“secrets … are whatever anyone with a stamp decides to stamp secret”), as a 
political instrument to control the flow of information (“secrecy is a form of 
regulation”), and as ultimately pathetic (“secrecy is for losers,” an essentially ad 
hominem attack).240 
What was the target of this withering polemic? Moynihan had just finished leading a 
three-year Senate investigation into the origins, extent, and justification of secrecy in 
the US government. His committee was particularly concerned with assessing whether 
policies developed during the Cold War were still necessary or appropriate now that the 
country and the world had apparently entered a new era, widely vaunted in the West as 
the triumph of an open society defined by its free flows of information. 
In the course of the investigation, Moynihan learned about a codebreaking program 
that had remained secret for nearly half a century — a program that had been first 
noticed by a group of American historians researching the Communist Party of the 
United States of America (CPUSA) in an archive opened as a gesture of post-Soviet 
transparency in the KGB’s former Moscow headquarters.241 These archival materials 
mentioned an American intelligence program called “Venona” that had been 
established to decrypt messages sent in code between the KGB and their undercover 
agents in the United States, many of them affiliated with the CPUSA. The Venona 
                                                             
240 Ibid, p.1. 
241 Klehr, Harvey, Fridrich I. Firsov, and John Earl Haynes. The Secret World of American Communism. 
New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1995. Haynes, John Earl. Venona : Decoding Soviet Espionage in 





program began in 1944, but codebreaking efforts were apparently fruitless for two full 
years before they deciphered a message suggesting espionage directed at the highly 
secretive Manhattan Project. The Soviet Union had established a network of agents in 
the US whose purpose was to exfiltrate the information needed to construct an atomic 
bomb — still considered highly theoretical or even impossible by most physicists at the 
time. In 1949, most of the world was shocked when the USSR performed a successful 
underground nuclear test, and the political landscape instantaneously shifted as the 
Kremlin gained the clout of a nuclear power. 
The following year, in 1950, it was Venona’s codebreakers who gathered evidence 
that implicated Julius and Ethel Rosenberg as well as Klaus Fuchs in the theft of nuclear 
secrets.242 Moral panic at the apparent threat of Communist infiltration fueled the 
ensuing Red Scare, while prominent figures from the American government, media, 
and film industry were accused by the House Un-American Activities Commission 
(HUAC), often with little or no merit to the accusations. The notorious ringleader of the 
HUAC, Senator Joseph McCarthy, found the zeal to pursue these trials even though he 
himself did not have access to the Venona program or the intelligence gathered through 
deciphered cables. Decades later, while Venona’s work remained classified, many of 
those pursued by the HUAC had been vindicated in the public eye, and many Americans 
on the left remained skeptical of the cases brought against apparent spies. The 
innocence of the Rosenbergs, in particular, became an article of faith for ardent leftists, 
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with their case professed by numerous cultural critics,243 depicted by Pablo Picasso, 
fictionalized by E.L. Doctorow,244 debated at length in popular non-fiction,245 and even 
defended by the Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter.246 Under the cloak of secrecy, 
it was fair to suspect that the Rosenbergs’ highly publicized trial had been driven by the 
same reactionary impulses that had initially drawn support to the reckless and divisive 
HUAC hearings. But neither the public nor even President Truman were informed 
about the Venona program and the evidence it furnished against the Rosenbergs and a 
broader Soviet spy ring.247 Even after the Venona program was officially shuttered in 
1980, their work and the information they gathered would remain under the cloak of an 
indefinite secrecy order. 
What incensed Moynihan was a general failure to recognize cases where the 
disclosure of classified material can be a great public benefit, whereas disclosures are 
often halted only in consideration of distant, hypothetical risks — and sometimes no 
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perceptible risk at all. Moynihan viewed the ongoing secrecy of Venona as not only 
unnecessary, but entirely unreflective of its consequences, and thus emblematic of the 
failing secrecy apparatus he wished to reform. Moynihan argued that there would have 
been considerable social benefit decades ago to revealing certain information from the 
Venona program. Disclosure of these cables could have set the record straight on Soviet 
spying, confirmed that it was a real hazard in the postwar years despite the reckless 
treatment of this issue by the HUAC, and illuminated some of the causes behind the 
rapid escalation of the Cold War. When Moynihan learned about Venona, he held up the 
project as evidence that such secrecy in American government was excessive and 
harmful even in the midst of the Cold War, but that the nation’s approach to secrecy 
was in specific need of reassessment given the hopeful conditions of the time, following 
the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and general thaw of international politics. In the 
codebreaking program Venona, Moynihan found a case that could convincingly 
illustrate his broader point about secrecy in American government. Compulsive over-
classification of information, and persistent resistance to declassify, led to a decades-
long failure to disclose a matter that was vital knowledge for Americans to understand 
their circumstances. By the later stages of the Cold War, the value of transparency had 
become as well grounded in the American public as the will to secrecy had become in 
government. And even if the Venona program itself had remained secret, disclosure of 
its findings could have aided lawmakers and the public in understanding the conditions 
that led the US into the Cold War — to sort rumor and misdirection from genuine 





Once aware of Venona, Moynihan compelled another member of the Senate task 
force, CIA director John Deutch, to request Venona’s disclosure to the public.248 When 
Deutch spoke to NSA officials, he learned that disclosure of Venona had already been 
suggested in the past from inside the Agency, but no compelling reason for disclosure 
had emerged during that discussion. Now that a Senate committee had provided both 
justification and a somewhat forceful compulsion, the NSA set the declassification of 
Venona in motion — tallying 51 years after the program had begun, 15 years after it had 
been shuttered, and over four full years since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
On July 11, 1995, the surviving members of the Venona program were assembled at 
the entrance of CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia249 to commend them for their 
service in a public ceremony. One reporter described the scene as a tearful moment in 
which the retired codebreakers, all in their 70s and 80s, appeared to be honored by the 
festivities, but also relieved to be freed from the burden of a long-held secret.250 
Moynihan was less sentimental: “Here we have government secrecy in its essence,” 
Moynihan wrote. “Trust leached out of the political system, loyalties waned, betrayal 
became common,”251 as the intelligence community lost sight of the fact that some 
classified information hurts the American public when it remains secret. In the specific 
                                                             
248 As it turned out, disclosure of Venona had already been proposed within NSA, but there was 
little momentum behind the proposal until it was requested in the Senate hearing. 
249 It is worth noting that even though the Venona program was administered by the NSA during 
most of its tenure (all but the first eight years, before the NSA had even been founded) their 
commendation was not held at NSA's headquarters, Fort Meade, but instead the relatively more 
public grounds at Langley. In 1996, the existence of the NSA was officially acknowledged to the 
public, but the Agency still preferred to remain out of the public eye, as they do now. 
250 New York Times, “U.S. Tells How It Cracked Code of A-Bomb Spy Ring,” July 12, 1995. 





case of the secret codebreaking program Venona, the government had not just 
concealed its existence (a secret that helped it operate without notice), nor its 
techniques (since enemy cryptographers would only have adjusted their own 
techniques in response). They also concealed the very information the Venona program 
had uncovered, a strategy often justified under the banner of the ‘mosaic’ theory, which 
warns against revealing tiny fragments of information that could be reconstructed into 
a full picture.252 Venona intelligence had been held even after the program itself was 
shuttered, and even after the Soviet Union collapsed and split apart. Moynihan rebuked 
the institutional logic of the intelligence community, where classifying information had 
become increasingly reflexive, often unnecessary, justified in ways that are only valid 
within the narrow interests of the intelligence community, and ultimately a waste of 
information that would be valuable to the American people and public conversation 
about our government. Ultimately, Moynihan concluded that these secrecy practices 
were self-undermining, an argument made explicit in the two pillars adopted in the 
name of his task force: the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government 
Secrecy. “Unless secrecy is reduced, it cannot be protected,” Moynihan wrote in the 
chairman’s introduction to the Commission’s final report.253 Their objective was not to 
eliminate secrecy in government, but to insist on the judicious use of classification and 
a recognition that there are often distinct benefits to the American public when secrecy 
is lifted. Although Moynihan accepted the need for secrecy in politics, he maintained 
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that “there are no secrets in science”254 — a position many scientists hold as an article of 
faith, but which the vast program of classified research undertaken, like Venona, 
through the course of the Cold War, stands as a point of tension against the professional 
ideals of most scientists. 
Moynihan’s assault on government secrecy was valiant, inspired, and especially 
notable as one of the final charges he would lead during his long career in public life. 
Moynihan died just ten months before the September 11th attacks, and the escalation of 
government secrecy during the ensuing ‘War on Terror’ would reverse any momentum 
Moynihan had gathered in his efforts at secrecy reform. The number of documents 
classified each year would rise precipitously during the War on Terror, far exceeding 
Cold War practices, as would the annual costs of securing those documents, while the 
number of documents released continues to proportionally dwindle.255 
A considerable factor in the success codebreakers in the Venona program was the 
tendency among Soviet spies to reuse pages from their one-time pads. Reusing 
sequences of numbers created statistical regularities in their encrypted messages, and 
codebreakers were able to detect these regularities in messages intercepted over time. 
The one-time pad is theoretically unbreakable when used correctly, but nearly useless 
when it’s not. At the time, the most common explanation for this ill-advised practice 
was that it was a lazy mistake by agents who just didn’t understand how to use a one-
time pad properly. In reality, this blunder was caused by a resource shortage — and the 
resource was the randomness needed to produce fresh sequences of numbers. The 
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Soviet factory responsible for harvesting random numbers was reportedly prone to 
mishaps, momentarily halting their capacity to produce the numbers needed to issue 
new one-time pads throughout their worldwide intelligence network. The solution was 
for agents into the field to begin treating them as two-time or three-time pads instead, 
damaging the security model of the system and enabling Venona codebreakers to piece 
together certain messages.256 
The tension between the growing ideal of transparency and the growing reality of 
state secrecy in the post-war period is itself a puzzle. For Shils, a stark examination of 
rising secrecy in post-war America was not so much a critique of secrecy, itself, but an 
examination of how this development had pulled upon and damaged its two 
neighboring spheres, the public and private. 
The nation’s leaders championed the pursuit of scientific knowledge while strictly 
controlling select areas of scientific knowledge through a growing apparatus of state 
secrecy. The steady rise of the right to know during the postwar years led toward a 
considerable shift the the politics of information with the passage of FOIA, although this 
law included essentially unchecked freedom for government workers to deny requests 
and redact information. 
Bush’s concessions about military research in the NSF founding document suggest 
that his rhetoric about the necessity for transparency in science evinces at least a hint 
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of doublespeak, always carrying a sotto voce proviso excluding scientific work that is 
too sensitive to be treated under the same ideal.257  
A charitable reading of Bush’s soaring rhetoric regarding open science might grant 
him a similar measure of latitude. When he writes that scientific discoveries should be 
propagated throughout society, apparently he does not mean secret discoveries. His 
belief in transparency and commitment to its value in science applies only if an case for 
secrecy does not. This seems reasonable enough at face value, but it is worth stating 
this position clearly because it implies a hierarchy of values. In short, secrecy tops 
transparency. 
With respect to cryptography, what is most unusual about the shuffle of classified 
research after the War is that the only piece to make it into the public record within that 
decade was written by Bush’s most accomplished former student, Claude Shannon. 
Bush’s own wartime work on cryptography remained classified until the 1970s, the Sig-
Saly encrypted phone from Bell Labs and the codebreaking work at Bletchley Park by 
Alan Turing and others.  
Although the leaders of the postwar American research establishment touted ideals 
of open science and public knowledge, the image they projected of a shining 
technological future was in fact tainted by the encroachment of secrecy. Consider 
Oppenheimer, who led the top-secret Manhattan Project and agreed that nuclear 
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secrets were too dangerous to reveal, then turned face and began to rhapsodize about 
the marvelous transparency of scientific communities, treating the collective pursuit 
and perfection of knowledge as an ideal aspiration for society more broadly. All the 
while, Bruno Latour would suggest training our attention to the other side of the Janus 
face, an icon of doublespeak that Latour locates everywhere in scientific 
communications.258 The point is not to be shocked that Bush’s rhetoric is inconsistent 
with his behavior. The noble myth of science as an icon of open, democratic society is 
nevertheless a myth. Yet this particular myth would prove especially consequential for 
the fate of cryptography research. For cryptography to be treated as a special exception 
to the ethos of open science in fact agitated several researchers enough to focus ardent, 
strategic attention on breaking this subject loose from the grip of the closed literature (a 
story that unfolds in the next chapter). Crucially, in planning their dissent against the 
suppression of cryptography, these researchers had to operate on the leanest of 
budgets because they were aware that filing a grant proposal through NSF or other 
foundations could compromise the project. Over the years, the NSF has certainly done 
its share of noble work, supporting an unfathomable range of scholarly research that 
has shaped the world around us. But in the case of cryptography research, during the 
years when NSA was committed to maintaining exclusive, consolidated control over 
advances in cryptography, the NSF acted inconsistently with their principles when they 
aided in the suppression of open cryptography research.  
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The greater outcome of Vannevar Bush’s career as a research administrator was not 
to open up scientific work, nor to align it philosophically with the principles of scientific 
transparency that he offered in his proposal for the establishment of the NSF, but to 
manage an unprecedented flow of resources toward scientists working in American 
universities, corporate labs, and defense contractors. Bush crafted an inspiring mission 
statement, drawing inspiration from thinkers like Popper, Mannheim, and Shils, who 
found a compelling political and social justification for scientific transparency in the 
postwar moment.  
Bush’s vision was compromised, in large part, through the persistence of wartime 
organizational structures, carrying the momentum of a force that never fully 
demobilized to settle into peacetime. Wartime intelligence agencies proceeded forward 
with new names and charters. The war department more or less quietly became the 
defense department. Signals intelligence and codebreaking operations continued to 
hum along as they had throughout the war. And Bush’s role as one of the principle 
coordinators of wartime research would transition naturally into his role as the 
founding director of the NSF. 
Whether or not Vannevar Bush acknowledged the tension between secrecy and 
transparency that was implicit in the state-sponsored scientific body he spearheaded, 
this tension grew even stronger as the postwar research boom was grounded in the 
lofty rhetoric of an open society while quietly filtering out the projects that should 
remain unseen. The NSA had a direct mandate, bolstered by the Invention Secrecy Act 
of 1951, to apply a strict filter to any cryptography research that came over the transom 





cryptography projects that were rerouted to NSA through this tailor-made secret 
channel. Even so, by promoting the development of computers, and taking pains to 
frame these machines as something that Americans could envision in their everyday 
lives someday, it is remarkable that Vannevar Bush did not conceive of the role 
cryptography might someday play in the lives of everyday people in the technological 
future invested his career in creating, both by framing the future of computers and by 









Thinking About Information Security in the Sixties 






When Lyndon Johnson signed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) into law on the 
Fourth of July, 1966, his praise was certainly hollow, but he praised it nonetheless. 
Johnson spoke of the FOIA as an embodiment of deeply held American values, 
describing the nation as “an open society in which the people's right to know is 
cherished and guarded.”259 In the same breath, Johnson hedged this lofty ideal, citing 
the many limits that freedom of information would face in practice. 
This legislation springs from one of our most essential principles: A democracy 
works best when the people have all the information that the security of the 
Nation permits. No one should be able to pull curtains of secrecy around 
decisions which can be revealed without injury to the public interest. 
At the same time, the welfare of the Nation or the rights of individuals may 
require that some documents not be made available.260 
As practical curtailments to FOIA, Johnson specifically pointed to “military secrets”; a 
citizen’s right “to confide in the press without fear of reprisal”; the need for government 
officials “to communicate with one another fully and frankly without publicity”; and for 
                                                             







these officials to withhold documents when a request would force them “to disclose 
information prematurely.”261 In short, he described FOIA as tensely positioned between 
an acknowledged need for government transparency and a pragmatic appeal to 
maintain some level of secrecy, especially in matters of national security.  
If nothing else, Johnson was candid in offering this extensive list of caveats that 
limit the power of FOIA , but his pragmatic appeals to secrecy could come across 
differently in light of the fact that secrecy itself had been on the rise for decades, 
growing in tandem with the transparency interests that had motivated FOIA in the first 
place. Consequently, the drafting of FOIA was shaped by a tension between the rise of 
the right to know as a cultural value and a coinciding rise of both secrecy and 
surveillance practices in the postwar years. This period was, in the words of Michael 
Schudson, both “the age of transparency and the age of secrecy, the era of spin and of 
disclosure, a time of both confidences and the overturning of confidence.”262 It was the 
age when freedom of information became a right, and also an age of growing worry that 
practices of collecting information might violate our rights. FOIA was a watershed 
moment for a society in the process of ‘opening up’, inclined both to expect more 
information and to disclose more about ourselves. At the same time, the amount of 
information gathered about private citizens had caused increasing anxiety among 
many politicians, critics, journalists, and the general public, especially because this 
trend seemed to be accelerating through the use of computers.  
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Just three weeks after Johnson signed FOIA into law, Congress convened a hearing 
titled “The Computer and Invasion of Privacy” in which they examined the shifting 
politics of information from a different angle — not the citizen’s right of access to 
government information, but rather the looming threats that may emerge from 
gathering, centralizing, and automating access to data that the government gathers 
about private citizens.263 This hearing was held under the aegis of the Committee on 
Government Operations, the same group from which the California congressman John 
Moss had championed FOIA itself over the previous decade.264 From the outset, 
discussion was charged with searing rhetoric. Session chairs held forth on the menace 
of overzealous policing, the dangers of electronic surveillance, and the diminishment of 
cherished liberties. They envisioned humanity transformed by the callous logic of 
computing machines, the nation turned slavish through surveillance. In short, the 
stagecraft was breathtaking, and all the more remarkable for sounding early echoes of 
both technological fear-mongering and also prescient concerns about the emergence of 
the information society. 
Despite its thematic sprawl and rhetorical excesses, this hearing was convened for a 
specific and timely purpose: to debate the proposal of a “National Data Bank” (NDB) to 
link together the electronic records held by various offices and agencies of the U.S. 
government. And unlike FOIA, President Johnson gave the NDB proposal unequivocal 
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endorsement: “With new information technology now available, it is possible to make 
these systems both more efficient and, at the same time, more useful.”265  
Although the president viewed the NDB largely as an upgrade to the federal 
government’s bureaucratic efficiency, the broader debate presents an illuminating case 
of early concerns about the consequences of inviting computers to fill new roles in 
society. Several congressmen insisted on the need to think ahead, anticipate the social 
effects of new technology, and draft legislation to curb the negative outcomes they 
envisioned if a national data bank should be established without sufficient scrutiny of 
its effect on privacy. They warned that good intentions could slide into abuse, and even 
reasonable safeguards against these abuses could turn faulty themselves. Several 
members of Congress urged that explicit legal limits be placed on the disclosure of 
information that could identify individuals in federal data, but they also expressed 
skepticism that laws alone would be enough. Throughout the hearings, the 
representatives leading the discussion often asked: wouldn’t it be safer if we opted not 
to build this system at all? The Congressional committee was nearly univocal in 
expressing apprehension about not only the NDB, but also broader trends that had led 
toward the apparent need and supposed benefit of building a system to curate seamless 
access to all the information collected from across the US government.  
As a point of historical comparison, objections to the NDB did not center on the 
surveillance of communications, but rather on the collection and collation of 
information from various official sources — such as the census, law enforcement, 
central intelligence, and even local government. In short, the primary concern was not 
                                                             





that this information had been gathered illicitly or without a citizen’s knowledge. This 
information was already kept on record somewhere. The principal concern was with 
combining all the information on record about a person into a single, comprehensive 
dossier that any government employee with computer access can call up at all. A major 
source of anxiety expressed in these hearings was the conviction that the federal 
government should not be empowered with so much knowledge all at once because 
abuse of this power seemed both likely to occur and difficult to monitor. 
In comparison to present day surveillance concerns, this distinction remains 
important. Many objections that were leveled against the NDB have become perennial 
problems with an expanding range of likely offenders, from social media companies, to 
data brokerage companies, to identity thieves, all of whom compile information like 
names, addresses, and credit information, and sometimes a great deal more.266 As 
opponents of the NDB would argue, collection of private information becomes 
increasingly invasive as greater amounts are amassed and aggregated to form a fuller 
picture. What makes most people uneasy in cases like these is the idea that collecting a 
dossier from various information sources will facilitate knowledge of a different 
character than data scattered and isolated in different places. The image formed by 
these data gives the impression of becoming more vivid with every dimension added. 
What is most unusual about this presentation of an early ‘big data’ threat is that the 
term ‘data mining’ was a pejorative among statisticians at this point in time, and the 
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idea of insights emerging spontaneously with the increasing size of the data bank, 
which so worried the public, appeared as a gross misunderstanding to statisticians 
themselves.267 Years later, the NSA’s dragnet wiretapping of telephone and internet 
traffic is not only operating on a larger scale, but is practically incomparable to the 
National Data Bank. Today, even the humblest of credit bureaus has collected more 
data on every one of us than the NDB would have collected in a decade. Still, objections 
raised to the National Data Bank offer a window onto early expressions of concern over 
electronic surveillance in the computer age, however quaint the actual transgressions 
might have been compared to the contemporary state of things. On the floor of 
Congress, the interplay between politicians, social critics, legal scholars, and engineers 
often hinged upon points that remain topical today, such as the unchecked 
encroachment of electronic surveillance, and whether these hazards can be mitigated 
through policy or engineering. Bearing in mind from the last chapter that cryptography 
was still held as a classified research subject in the U.S. during the sixties, cryptography 
is conspicuously absent from this discussion of computer security, passing into 
conversation once and only briefly during the hearings.  
As an episode in the history of information security, the very absence of 
cryptography in this chapter contributes support toward two cases developed across 
other chapters: 1) The secrecy surrounding cryptography was effective enough to keep 
it out of consideration throughout the NDB debate, even though encryption presumably 
would not have been restricted from use in a federal computing facility, especially not 
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for one of such stature. This underlines that the suppression of cryptography research 
during the postwar quarter-century had fairly effectively pushed it out of people’s 
minds. 2) Skepticism voiced about the data bank displays a familiar cluster of concerns 
about computers, surveillance, and privacy that would later be used to justify the 
public’s need for strong encryption, beginning with the reemergence of crypto research 
in the seventies and continuing through later decades. Specifically, the definition of 
privacy in terms of controlling information; the critical scrutiny of computer networks  
as surveillance hazards; and the working assumption that government actors cannot be 
trusted to refrain from committing invasions of privacy if it is within their power to do 
so. This supports the case that cryptography was not invested with its current political 
commitments until its reemergence in the seventies. 
• 
In 1966, Oppenheimer stepped down from his position as director of the Institute for 
Advanced Study to undergo chemotherapy, and in his place the economist Carl Kaysen 
was appointed after serving on the Harvard faculty and in the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations. As the presidential liaison to the CIA, Defense Department, and State 
Department,268 Kaysen was a Cold Warrior at the very moment when this War was most 
precarious. Kaysen accompanied Averell Harriman to the Soviet Union in 1963 to 
negotiate the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which limited nuclear testing to 
underground detonations, a step taken mainly to ease tensions after the Cuban Missile 
Crisis. But even after Kaysen’s departure from Washington and return to academic life, 
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he found a project that would allow him to keep one foot in politics. Drawing on the 
expertise of the Institute for Advanced Study, where John Von Neumann had built one 
of the first digital computers, Kaysen spearheaded the establishment of a “National 
Data Bank” after reading a pair of reports issued by the Office of the Census (the 
“Ruggles Report”) and the Bureau of the Budget (the “Dunn Report”). These two reports 
had gathered enough momentum for the NDB proposal to be allocated funding in the 
1967 federal budget. The NDB only needed to pass through Congress, where Kaysen 
gave the proposal his highest endorsement and offered to chair the group that would 
draw up the specific plans for the NDB upon its approval. 
Although Kaysen was known for his good judgment, this would prove to be an 
inauspicious moment to propose a massive computer facility to gather information 
about the American public. A considerable part of the motivation for passing FOIA had 
been a growing sense that the federal government is gathering too much information 
about its citizens, even its elected officials, and the people have a right to know exactly 
what information has been gathered.269 In principle, one might have argued that a 
central computer data bank would ease the labor involved in processing FOIA requests, 
expediting fulfillment, perhaps ensuring greater thoroughness. Instead, the 
overwhelming reaction to the data bank proposal ranged from anxiety to outrage, with 
many politicians and other public figures concluding that it would only strengthen the 
information gathering capability that FOIA was intended to help monitor and keep in 
check. 
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Kaysen responded to this criticism with an article in The Public Interest, insisting 
that the data bank would be a boon for government efficiency, and those who devised 
the data bank proposal were motivated only by “professional concern for the quality 
and usability of the enormous body of government data to take on what they thought to 
be a necessary, important, and totally unglamorous task,” Kaysen wrote, suggesting 
some confusion at the need to explain himself and the unglamorous duties carried out 
by the staff of a data bank. “They certainly did not expect it to be controversial,” he 
added. 270 Nevertheless, Kaysen aimed to quell the public’s fear that their data would be 
abused somehow as it was gathered in a massive computer facility, but his case 
inevitably swayed back to efficiency gains, which were never counted among the public. 
“The risky potentials which might be inherent in a data center are sufficiently unlikely 
to materialize so that they are outweighed, on balance, by the real improvement in 
understanding of our economic and social processes this enterprise would make 
possible, with all the concomitant gains in intelligent and effective public policy that 
such understanding could lead to.” When he found the public unmoved by promised 
gains in government efficiency,  Kaysen turned to assurances that the information 
gathered in the data bank would be mundane statistics, not the sort of information that 
anyone would find intrusive.  
Throughout the sixties, Edward Shils observed the onset of the information age with 
special concern for steady trends of rising secrecy and surveillance, magnified through 
the improvement of information technology, with the National Data Bank proposal 
                                                             





reflecting an especially foolish mishandling of the “information explosion” in our 
midst.  
From this assembly of facts by various government departments, it is only a step, 
which some have already proposed, to the collation of all the information 
gathered about each individual into a computer-equivalent of a dossier. It is all 
conceived with innocent intentions, in the best of conscience, as if it were both 
necessary and just that each individual member of society should be 
exhaustively known by the government. The proponents of this have in mind no 
particular immediate use for these computer dossiers. The knowledge is 
available, so why not draw it all together and thereby add to knowledge — it 
seems to them self-evident that such knowledge is “desirable.” So far have they 
strayed from respect for privacy that they give no arguments other than the fact 
that it is possible and that it would be a good idea.271 
The proliferation of computers over the previous decade had contributed to this 
“information explosion,” but crucially for Shils this phenomenon has been driven by a 
behavioral tendency he calls “intrusive perception,” encompassing “The information 
explosion is not just an expansion in our knowledge of the laws of nature; it is also an 
expansion of simple raw descriptive information about particular individual human 
beings with names, individuality, and, in many cases, claims to the possession of 
souls.”272 
Shils cited the growth of professions whose purpose is “the acquisition of knowledge 
about human beings,” namely the relatively new ranks “sociologists, anthropologists, 
educationists, psychologists, political scientists,” as well as older professions “such as 
those attending to detection, intelligence, and counterintelligence.”273 Although it is 
striking that Shils did not include journalists in his enumeration of information 
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professions, even though they were presumably the ones tending to the new appetites 
of the increasingly literate masses, the point remains that the “information explosion” 
attributed to technology has deeper roots in over a century of social and economic 
changes. 
For the sociologist Daniel Bell, the nation’s shift from an economy based on heavy 
industry and manufacturing toward one based on information and service industries 
suggested a much broader set of social changes including “new principles of 
innovation, new modes of social organisation, and new classes in society.”274 Bell 
predicted that this post-industrial society would increasingly value knowledge itself as 
a commodity, shifting power toward the experts that command this knowledge, as well 
as institutions that produce knowledge and train experts, such as universities. Beyond 
the value of expert knowledge in itself, Bell also predicted the rise of “intellectual 
technology,” a category of tools for systematic decision making with “algorithms 
(decision rules), programming (software) models and simulations, in running the new 
‘high technology’.” In short, he described the post-industrial society as one in which the 
centrality of information and communication implies an array of technological 
infrastructure to facilitate the transmission, storage, and analysis of information.  
Beyond Bell, a sizeable body of literature of widely varying quality stacked up from 
the sixties through the eighties addressing roughly the same general set of the social, 
economic, and political changes.275 These trends are often bundled under terms like the 
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“information society” or “information age,” although the definition and implications 
may vary dramatically from writer to writer. The original use of the term “information 
society” is typically ascribed to the economist Fritz Machlup, whose study of patents 
suggested an increasing trend-toward knowledge-based invention during the first half 
of the twentieth century, raising both the value of information and our capacity to 
handle  it on greater scales,276 though Machlup himself was sharply critical of 
Shannon’s information theory, warping the essential meaning of information by 
stripping away meaning itself.Machlup found this treatment of information 
“infelicitous, misleading, and disserviceable.”  
Closer to the perspective of the national data bank’s opponents, other critics 
examining technology and social change in the sixties found the situation hazardous in 
a variety of ways, though not all of them were particularly convincing. Jacques Ellul 
offered a frankly alarmist account of the “technological society,” warning that if we 
continue to hand more and more of society’s core functions over to automated systems, 
society would soon become more technological than human.277 Today this critique may 
sound implausibly simplistic for a widely read public intellectual to hold, but at the time 
it rang true for a surprising number of readers. For Ellul and his audience, this 
technological society would be something quite horrifying since Ellul assumed 
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technology itself is destructive to the intellect, creativity, and the capacity to life a free 
life. 
Like Ellul, the critic Theodore Roszak was skeptical of a trend he termed the “cult of 
information,” and its deleterious effect on the art of thinking. Yet Roszak treated this as 
a conspicuous assemblage of poor judgment about new technology, rather than a 
monolithic force that is somehow damaging our judgment.278 Roszak found Shannon’s 
information theory particularly harebrained, describing with sheer astonishment the 
idea that a random string of characters could be considered ‘information’, let alone for 
its information contents to be measured against a string of letters that forms a cogent 
statement. Roszak had gleaned what was basically idiosyncratic about Shannon’s 
information theory, and he was perspicacious enough to explain this idiosyncrasy 
through cryptography — although he found this to be grounds for critique of the basic 
illogic of information theory rather than a reason to examine it more closely. 
Even gibberish might be ‘information’ if someone cared to transmit it. After all a 
message translated into secret code would appear to be gibberish to anyone who 
did not know the code; but it would be well worth sending by anyone who did. 
The early information scientists easily fell into thinking this way about messages 
and their transmission; many of them had served as cryptographers during the 
war.279 
The media theorist Marshall McLuhan perceived surveillance through databases as a 
personal threat to private citizens, but, like Shils, he linked this to broader social 
trends. “It is just when people are all engaged in snooping on themselves and one 
another that they become anesthetized to the whole process,” McLuhan wrote. “As 
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information itself becomes the largest business in the world, data banks know more 
about individual people than the people do themselves. The more the data banks record 
about each one of us, the less we exist.”280  Despite McLuhan’s well known taste for 
hyperbole, this final remark reflects a genuine concern, echoed by the Berkeley 
students protesting punch cards. Even to feed the most basic personal information 
through the computer could provoke an uneasy feeling, as though something essential 
about yourself had been broken down into bits and reconstructed in mechanical form. 
In contrast, while envisioning the emergent computer age in the sixties, media 
coverage of early computers often projected an air of optimism. This was how the 
information society had been sold by many politicians, on-air personalities, and other 
boosters for the high-tech industry: as a gleaming future delivered through American 
preeminence in science and industry. Still, in the early 1960s, many Americans had few 
if any encounters with computers. They were distant, mammoth fixtures of 
universities, corporations, and government. Although many would have heard the 
ambitious projections of people like Vannevar Bush, computers were still mainly seen 
as a tool for crunching numbers. The UNIVAC computer was used to successfully 
predict the outcome of the 1952 presidential election, a public relations coup which 
downplayed the fact that the computer had run a predictive model devised by a human 
being. TV hosts would invite their audiences into the rooms that housed these 
machines, where blinking lights and indecipherable printouts offered the stereotype of 
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a “black box” — a technology whose inner workings are left unexamined to the 
detriment of deeper understanding.281  
A more significant transformation was happening out of sight: with computers 
beginning to be linked into networks, these machines ascended from mere electronic 
‘brains’ to telecommunication devices. They were not merely tools to run algorithms 
and solve equations quickly. Once the theoretical implications of Shannon’s 
communication theory had been implemented in real computer components, which 
had taken nearly a decade, computers could facilitate the rapid transfer of information 
instantaneously over great distances.  The first computer networks began to be linked 
together in the late 1960s, opening a range of new possibilities: accessing a mainframe 
from a remote terminal, sharing time on these computers among groups of users, and 
eventually facilitating communication between computers in distant locations. 
Networking also broadened the scope of computer security concerns. For an isolated 
mainframe, physical security is the only concern; to access the machine or lift the data, 
one would need to physically enter the premises. But on computer networks, data 
might be intercepted in transit, while unauthorized users might gain access to the 
computers themselves. 
Elsewhere in the world, several other countries launched (or attempted to launch) 
projects distinctly different the American NDB during the late sixties, reflecting both 
alternative visions and false steps when applying computers as tools to coordinate a 
national economy using data gathered from across a network. Most notably in Chile, the 
                                                             
281 The concept of a ‘black box’ appears throughout the literature of Science and Technologies 
(STS), often as shorthand for what scientists and engineers gloss over, and what users of 





democratically elected socialist Salvadore Allende enlisted the British cyberneticist 
Stafford Beer to build an information hub from which to monitor and control the entire 
Chilean economy.282 Despite the space-age appearance of the Chilean command center, 
this experiment in cybernetic management did not rely on databases, or even 
computers to crunch economic figures, but rather a network of teleprinters linking the 
nation’s factories to a central control room where planners would receive printed 
reports, form strategies and reporting directions back to each node having assessed the 
latest updates from around the country. In short, the intervention of computers was in 
fact minimal in the Chilean data command center, which in this early stage was more 
like a communication hub where experts could receive information and send back 
orders. The Soviet Union’s early forays into computer networks were ostensibly also 
driven by the promise of efficiency in directing the national economy, but these efforts 
repeatedly went afoul over several decades due to infighting and incompetent 
management.283 
• 
For many Americans, the NDB debate presented the computer age not as a future 
possibility, but an event with manifest implications for their personal lives. “Today the 
computer is a central figure in our society,” said representative Frank Horton of New 
York. “The increasing rate at which it will change our lives exceeds the imagination, 
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exceeds even the imagination of the computermen who foster it.”284  Horton’s 
computerman of choice was Jerome Wiesner, an MIT dean and former science advisor 
to President Kennedy who urged caution but nevertheless conveyed great hope for the 
computer age: 
The computer, with its promise of a millionfold increase in man’s capacity to 
handle information, will undoubtedly have the most far-reaching social 
consequences of any contemporary technical development. The potential for 
good in the computer, and the danger inherent in its misuse, exceed our ability 
to imagine.285 
Although experts like Wiesner were steadily gaining influence and visibility in the 
1960s, promotion of computers was often met with considerable skepticism and 
outright hostility . In the April 1962 issue of Dissent magazine, editor Irving Howe 
dismantled a report titled “Cybernation: The Silent Conquest” which had been issued 
several months earlier by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Santa 
Barbara. The “Cybernation” report offered a sunny case for the computing and 
increased automation, which would obviate the need for unpleasant forms of labor, 
shorten the workweek, and increase the purchasing power of the average American 
consumer.286 The promise of future prosperity driven by technological progress was 
nothing original, of course, but the cybernetic framework of the “Cybernation” report 
provoked an especially fierce rebuttal from Howe, who balked at the suggestion that the 
general populace would rise with the tide of cybernetics.287 His critique was prescient: 
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“Whole areas of employment will soon be wiped out by cybernation, and not merely in 
the way most of us imagine,” Howe wrote. “Not only will many factory workers and 
farm laborers lose their jobs; so too will office workers, sales personnel, and middle 
executives.”288 Howe added that the brunt of the burden would fall on poor and black 
communities. “We face the danger of drifting into a society in which there will appear a 
new and fierce class division: not merely between owners and workers or rich and poor, 
but between various skilled elites living in prosperity and a stratum of permanent 
unemployable … The social discrepancies between advanced and underdeveloped 
nations will become still more startling, and a still greater cause of bitterness, as the 
advanced countries enter the cybernetic age while the underdeveloped ones still 
struggle to move into industrialism.”289 
Howe was also attuned to the political stakes of this development, and in particular 
to where an inattention to emerging technologies might place the left at a disadvantage. 
He wondered if the left had even taken notice of technological and cultural changes that 
the right might have been better prepared to address. “What strikes one with great 
force is that the political Right is preparing itself organizationally and ideologically for 
the battles of tomorrow, while the liberal Left, all too bemused with back-stair 
manipulations in Washington, does little to ready its followers in the trade unions and 
the political organizations.” While this prognosis is difficult to swallow, Howe’s line of 
reasoning reveals that he bought the dominant narrative of the coming computer age 
even though he rejected the way it was being sold. He was convinced, in short, that the 
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computer age really was taking hold of the nation, transforming industry, and bringing 
new rules of political engagement — a point accented with the worry that the right may 
already have a head start in learning the art of technocratic politics. 
Howe’s critique of labor automation and the heartless order of technocrats would be 
echoed in 1964 by student protesters at the University of California, Berkeley, who 
strung computer punch cards around their necks as protest signs. Some of the punch 
cards read “STRIKE,” but the most iconic slogan to emerge from this protest was “DO 
NOT BEND SPINDLE FOLD OR MUTILATE ME,” a call for human protesters to be 
handled with the same level of care as the punch cards themselves. For students 
partaking in this protest, the inscription of their personal information on these cards, 
which were fed into computing machines and processed en masse, served as a vivid 
symbol of dehumanization and the mechanization of the university. A year later, 
members of Students for a Democratic Society would stage a protest outside 
Princeton’s John Von Neumann Hall, selecting this building named for the famous 
computer pioneer because the subject of their protest was secret research conducted 
on campus, mostly for military contracts. Columbia’s much larger 1968 protest also 
carried this anti-secrecy grievance among the many brought against the university 
administration. 
Among the many reasons given for suspicion of technology in the sixties, the most 
enduring contributions to the contemporary privacy debate were two legal scholars, 
Alan Westin and Arthur W. Miller, whose opposition to the National Data Bank would be 
early touchstones in long careers challenging electronic surveillance and threats to 





dissertation at Harvard on “Privacy in Western Political History.” The next year, as the 
storm was gathering around the National Data Bank proposal, Westin completed the 
manuscript of his first book, Privacy and Freedom, and its release in the midst of this 
debate contributed to the exposure and influence of his particular framework for 
understanding the right to privacy and the emergent threats to this right. Westin 
depicts the right to privacy as uniquely precarious: underprotected by the law, 
undertheorized by scholars, and (following Shils) increasingly encroached upon 
through surveillance by government, police, scientists, and journalists, as well as a 
growing array of technologies to extend and automate surveillance practices.290 Westin 
also offered an original definition of privacy: the right to selectively reveal yourself to 
the world, controlling who knows what about you.291 Compared to the classic definition 
given by Louis Brandeis in a paper written with Oliver Wendell Holmes — the right to be 
let alone — Westin’s definition affords us granular settings to decide who is permitted 
or denied access to each individual unit of information about us. In an apparent 
coincidence, this is precisely the function of cryptography. 
Westin implicated computers in an emerging crisis of privacy, and urged for the 
right to privacy to be redefined as “control of one’s personal information.” Westin 
framed privacy as a matter of personal control. “The claim of individuals, groups or 
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information 
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about them is communicated.”292 Westin especially decried the lack of attention given 
to privacy as a social concern given its apparent centrality as a cultural value. “Few 
values so fundamental to society as privacy have been left so undefined in social theory 
or have been the subject of such vague and confused writing by social scientists.”293 
Westin is correct in asserting a broader neglect of his subject before the discourse of 
the emerging information age created a new sense of urgency around the social and 
political implications of this subject. Still, Westin did not oppose government 
surveillance in all cases. He considered wiretapping justified in criminal cases.294 
Westin argued that privacy rights needed to be reassessed because the capacity for 
mass surveillance had arisen rapidly and unexpectedly, without a commensurate 
change in legal protections to maintain the right to privacy. 
We founded the United States with certain very clear notions about the private 
life versus the life that was fought and was engaged in the public arenas. That 
worked for about 150, 170 years, essentially because the tools of intrusion were 
so crude, and because you couldn’t get into somebody’s brain, and you couldn’t 
look through the walls, you couldn’t take the sound from a rowboat in the middle 
of a lake. There was a fit between our theory about the importance of the private 
life and the private arena, and the existential world of intrusion. Privacy has 
become the word we use for a set of problems in the relationships of powerful 
organizations to people for which we don’t have another word. It’s not equality, 
it’s not free speech, it’s not quite what we’re used to when we use the word 
“liberty”. So for want of a better term, privacy has become the keyword that 
means, “how are larger organizations using the power of information technology 
over people.”295 
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Later that year, Miller wrote in The Atlantic that the nation would face “a grave threat to 
individual freedom and privacy” by creating a centralized data center. “With its 
insatiable appetite for information, its inability to forget anything that has been put into 
it, a central computer might become the heart of a government surveillance system,” 
Miller warned.296 
In testimony for the Senate hearings on the NDB, Miller warned that the data bank 
“may become the heart of the surveillance system that will turn society into a 
transparent world in which our home, our finances, our associations, our mental and 
physical condition are bared to the most casual observer.” Transparency, for Miller, 
was a term that evoked the danger of a glass house and not the prospect of a more open 
society. What was at stake, for Miller, was not secret information that the powerful 
should yield to the public, but rather private information that the powerful could gather 
unjustly, secretly, without accountability. In short, during the surge of concern about 
computers and privacy in the late 1960s, the idea of transparency could easily indicate 
something quite different from the people’s right to know: it signaled a potential crisis 
of information, access, and control during the emergence of the information age.  
Perhaps the most significant threats to personal freedom are presented by the 
inevitable linking of computers to existing surveillance devices for monitoring 
people and their communications. … When telephone communications are 
completely converted to digital transmission, it will be easy to prepare a ready-
made machine-readable record of communications made from each telephone 
that can be cross-correlated with the record of phone calls made from other 
telephones to establish an individual’s or a group’s associations.297 
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This passage is genuinely prescient. Miller’s vision links together the telephone, 
computer, and surveillance devices like the pen register into a single ensemble, 
essentially describing a modern smartphone and the network that links the user to a 
sprawling web of contacts. What’s more, he predicts that the convergence of multiple 
communications media into a single device will facilitate easier surveillance — a 
prediction made 20 years before the worldwide web opened to the public, 36 years 
before the release of the iPhone, and 42 years before the Snowden leaks would reveal 
the sheer scale of digital surveillance enabled through the mechanism described by 
Miller above. 
• 
The NDB proposal was received harshly overall, but not immediately dismissed. 
instead, the Committee on Government Operations in the U.S. House of Representatives 
established a committee to evaluate concerns that had been raised about how the 
government stores private data. They called it the Subcommittee on Invasion of Privacy 
(SIP) and convened a hearing in late July of 1966, just three weeks after Lyndon 
Johnson signed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) into law. The hearing was titled 
“The Computer and Invasion of Privacy” and the committee itself known as Special 
Committee on Invasion of Privacy of the Committee on Government Operation, and 
their ostensive purpose was to assess the material from the Dunn Report and the 
Ruggles Committee suggesting why and how a government data bank could be created. 
They proposed it as a means of streamlining government book-keeping, breaking down 





Yet the politics of information access at the time led the NDB proposal to be received 
in a starkly different light, agitating some of the same concerns that had motivated 
FOIA’s proponents. There was a growing sense of an unreasonable amount of 
information was being collected about private citizens. In short, whereas champions of 
the NDB wanted to augment the federal government’s capacity to use its ever vaster 
stores of information, the recent passage of the FOIA had been a motion to provide 
assurance against overreaching acquisition of information. 
The hearing was chaired by Cornelius Gallagher, a congressman from New Jersey 
who had been on Lyndon Johnson’s shortlist for a running mate in 1964. Gallagher was 
charming and erudite, a gifted speaker if slightly prone to hyperbole.  He had once been 
a faculty member at Rutgers, and even when the press was unfavorable to Gallagher 
they still noted his “good looks, charm, [and] intelligence.”298 Gallagher was selected as 
chairman of this committee due to his reputation for crusading against government 
surveillance, attacking both FBI director J. Edgar Hoover and Attorney General Robert 
Kennedy. In the wake of the hearing, Gallagher would suffer several major hits, 
beginning with a Life magazine article alleging mob connections through leaked 
wiretaps, followed by a federal indictment for tax evasion.299 Speaking to the Life 
reporter, Gallagher claimed that he had received overtures from attorney Roy Cohn 
asking him to shift the balance of his attacks on government surveillance toward 
Kennedy rather than Hoover or else step down. Although at first Gallagher denied the 
tax evasion and perjury charges, alleging pressure from Cohn and a frame-up by 
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Hoover, the eight-term Congessman finally pleaded guilty to the tax charge in 1972 and 
served two years in prison.300 
But for the moment, in July of 1966, Gallagher still had wind in the sail of his 
campaign against government surveillance. In his opening remarks, Gallagher narrated 
a genuinely dystopian vision: a society subject to pervasive surveillance, with 
intelligence collected in a central “databank” of computers. He described the danger of 
“law enforcement [officers] who had become overeager in enforcement of the law as 
they view it.”301  
Gallagher said these conditions would yield “The Computerized Man,” (a term he 
credits himself with coining) who is a citizen “stripped of his individuality and privacy” 
through constant monitoring.302  Bear in mind that Gallagher’s concern was not 
surveillance of computers, which is characteristic of privacy concerns today, but rather 
surveillance through computers, that is, through their capacity to store and recall 
information. Most people hadn’t seen a computer in 1966, let alone used one. Instead, 
Gallagher was concerned that computers would provide an unprecedented capacity to 
aggregate and index information that intelligence agencies were already gathering: 
We do not want to see the intended good use of a data center distorted so that it 
simply makes confidential information more readily available to more people. 
Nor do we wish to see a composite picture of an individual recorded in a single 
informational warehouse, where the touch of a button would assemble all the 
governmental information about the person since his birth. Such a hypothetical 
situation cold become very real, because into a data bank could be deposited 
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records covering his birth, schooling, military service, employment history, 
personality traits, credit status, and practically any other aspect of his life.303  
…The presence of these records in Government files is frightening enough, but 
the thought of them neatly bundled together into one compact package is 
appalling. We cannot be certain that such dossiers would always be used by 
benevolent people for benevolent purposes.  
Gallagher worried, in particular about a “less scrupulous person — or even a well 
meaning but overzealous Government official” and asked rhetorically whether they 
should designate “an elite who can narrow and dominate the ‘corridors of power’.” 
Tellingly, Gallagher frames his critique with the caveat that he does not want to 
deprive the country or its citizens of the “rewards of science” by limiting the use of 
computers, but that computers must be used so that “human dignity and civil liberties 
remain intact.” To establish a national data center, Gallagher would want to know “who 
would have access to it; who would control the computers; and, most importantly, how 
confidentiality and individual privacy would be protected.” His point centers not only 
on maintaining control over the machines themselves, but also curbing the abuse of the 
powers afforded by these machines, ultimately pointing to the danger of an “imbalance 
between technology on the one hand, and the law and public interest on the other.” 
Although Gallagher readily admitted that technology “has enriched human life, and 
a federal data center will undoubtedly add to this enrichment,” he cautioned that 
“democratic governments historically have secured the freedom of their citizens partly 
by controlling the fruits of scientific progress.” 304 He urged careful, forward-looking 
policy decisions to manage the social effects of technology, though he sharpened the 
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point with foreboding ‘or else’ scenarios. “Thought should be given to these questions 
now, before we awaken some morning in the future and find that the dossier bank is an 
established fact, and that liberty as we know it vanished overnight.” The leap from data 
to dossier was critical for many opponents of the NDB.  They enumerated what was, for 
the time, surely a great bevy of data that would reside in the databank, including 
“records covering his birth, schooling, military service, employment history, personal 
traits, credit status, and virtually any other aspect of his life,” according to Gallagher.  
“The presence of these records in Government files is frightening enough, but the 
thought of them neatly bundled together into one compact package is appalling.” 
And yet, the data bank proposal had already gathered bureaucratic momentum. By 
the time of the hearing, funds had already been allocated for the National Data Bank in 
the 1967 federal budget. And so, while the NDB had not been officially proposed by the 
time of the “Computers and Invasion of Privacy” hearings in Congress, this hearing was 
held preemptively in order to critically examine the Dunn and Ruggles reports, to 
identify safeguards that would be necessary if the NDB should be proposed in the 
future, and to raise a series of further concerns about the general state of domestic 
surveillance and invasion of privacy.  
Echoing the recently passed FOIA, Gallagher suggested drafting a law to “allow an 
individual citizen access to that information which pertains to him” in order to “check 
it for accuracy” and “keep the system more honest.”305 There was no objection; the 
whole Congressional gathering seems to have agreed that this would be a worthwhile 
move to safeguard data in the event that the NDB is installed. Yes, transparency 
                                                             





measures might make the system more honest, and more easily identified if it should 
veer into dishonesty, so to speak.  What became clear is that the machines themselves 
were not the primary subject of concern, despite the ease with which critics drifted into 
treatment of the computer itself as potentially nefarious. It was the potential for human 
abuse that emerged over and over again. They treated abuse of the system as inevitable, 
and asked whether it is worth bounding forward into apparent technological progress if 
we could simply get by without such a system instead. A recurring theme throughout 
the hearings is the danger of even isolated abuses of access to the data bank, for a trove 
of so much private information would be sure to attract the abuse of a few bad apples 
despite the overwhelming virtue and goodness of most ‘computermen.’ The tone is 
often beyond deferential, full of insistence that computermen are trustworthy, 
responsible, and committed to following a code of good conduct. Still, they suggest that 
such a wealth of information is likely to create pressures to misuse it. 
In discussing the many ways the data bank could be abused, one of the strawman 
subjects which made frequent appearances throughout the NDB debate was the 
“computerman,” that is, someone who professionally operates computers. Of course, 
this term evinces total disregard for the many women who worked on early computers, 
as well as the women who did calculation work under the professional title “computer” 
before these machines were invented, but the title “computermen” was specifically 
problematic in the hearings on “Computers and Invasion of Privacy” because the 
abstraction of the “computerman” led to ad hoc reasoning about the beliefs, behavioral 
tendencies, and moral character of government employees who would have access to a 





systems as good and fair and the computermen behind the console as honest and 
capable,” Horton said. “Even in these circumstances, there is danger that computers, 
because they are machines, will treat us as machines. They can supply the facts and, in 
effect, direct us from birth to death. They can ‘pigeonhole’ us as their tapes decree, 
selecting, within a narrow range, the schooling we get, the jobs we work at, the money 
we can earn and even the girl we marry.”306 
At times, the power of the computerman is framed as a source of danger:  
“Assuming a computerman who was dishonest, unscrupulous, or bent on injury,” 
Gallagher said. “There would be nothing sacred. We could be destroyed.” Having 
established just how dangerous these bad apples could be, even more time was spent 
offering reassurances that computermen in general were certainly good and decent 
people. It often seems as though the congressman placed extra emphasis on their 
personal familiarity with computermen in order to testify to their fine values. “I am 
pleased to say that computermen as a group are deeply concerned with the problem of 
controlling information storage and retrieval so that no one ever will be able to take 
away our basic freedoms through these means,” Horton said. Gallagher even appealed 
to the general wisdom of computermen to push further evidence for the foolishness of a 
centralized data bank. “Good computermen know that one of the most practical of our 
present safeguards of privacy is the fragmented nature of present information,” 
Gallagher said. “It is scattered in little bits and pieces across the geography and years of 
our life. Retrieval is impractical and often impossible. A central data bank removes 
entirely this safeguard.” Above all, the computermen were treated as a force that needs 
                                                             





to be closely monitored, in the manner of this hearing, to ensure that their course would 
not lead us toward hazardous consequences. “I have every confidence that ways will be 
found for all of us to benefit from the great advances of the computermen, but those 
benefits must never be purchased at the price of our freedom to live as individuals with 
private lives,” said Horton, adding, “Today the computer is a central figure in our 
society. The increasing rate at which it will change our lives exceeds the imagination, 
exceeds even the imagination of the computermen who foster it.”307 
Charles Reich of Yale Law School testified to dangers that may result from indefinite 
retention of information. Reich was not yet a public figure in 1966, but in 1970 he would 
write The Greening of America, a New Yorker article turned best-selling book in which 
he praised the sixties counterculture for developing a new form of consciousness, 
aimed at a better future, having “emerged out of the wasteland of the Corporate State, 
like flowers pushing up through the concrete pavement.”308 Reich had established his 
scholarly career with law review articles describing “The New Property” that the 
federal government both creates and regulates itself,309 and arguing for a “living 
Constitution,” one that’s subject to reinterpretation.310 
Reich said that one of the key axioms he asks his students to internalize is that 
“information becomes less reliable the further away it is from the source.” In the case of 
assessments the University asks its employees to file about students, the changes in 
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their ability and temperament over the course of earning their degree render these 
assessments highly dubious in just a matter of years. He adds that many people who 
stumble upon these records years later tend to be “shocked by the idea that they still 
exist, and wonder why they have not been destroyed.”311 Reich added that he often 
doubts his ability to accurately rate students on matters such as “emotional maturity” 
that require a closer relationship than he has with most students whom he does feel 
comfortable judging on their classroom performance. “What validity do these private 
decisions have?” Reich asked. “They can be a curse on the individual for the rest of his 
life, but you may not have any idea whether they are really accurate or not.”312 
Reich adds that individual rights would be infringed if any incorrect information is 
added to the database. He argued that such misinformation could be considered 
defamation of character under the common law, and that infractions by machine 
should be considered alongside infractions by a human being. Reich added that the 
damage of misinformation in a database would be compounded by the fact that it would 
happen in secret, meaning reputation damage could occur without the opportunity for 
legal intervention. “It seems to me without question a denial of due process of law to 
send forth bad information about a person in secret in that way,” Reich said, adding, “It 
is in this that I see the essence of evil of the automatic data center. It is in this notion of 
the petrification; that is, this man is called bad by somebody, hence he is bad forever, 
and there is nothing he can do about it. There is no remedy in the law.”313 
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“Beyond the invasion of the right not to be defamed is a second, and some people 
think, a more vague right, the right to privacy itself,” Reich said. “When information 
about a person of the type I have mentioned is distributed all over to everybody, 
certainly you could say at the very beginning that there is no privacy.” Though Reich 
noted that the right to privacy is not spelled out in the Constitution, but believes that 
this is because government was so limited in the eighteenth century, “the idea of 
privacy being invaded in the way it can be today never occurred to the people who 
wrote the Bill of Rights. But everything that did occur to them in the way of invasion of 
privacy they wrote in. So what you find if you read the Constitution is that in every way 
in which they understood privacy then, they protected it in the Constitution.” 
“They protected speech and expression and beliefs,” Reich said, “And those, it 
seems to me, are illustrations of privacy. They protected religion and conscience, each 
individual’s to be his own. … They protected people against the search of the person or 
the search of the home without a warrant and in unreasonable circumstances.”314 
“I say myself that this is privacy as they understood it. That is all of the invasions of 
privacy that they knew of in their time, and had they known of these, it seems to me 
they would have dealt with them the same way.” 
Reich added that Brandeis himself had interpreted the need for an explicit right for 
privacy along similar lines. When Brandeis recognized the potential for a form of 
defamation or slander that had not been accounted for at the time the Bill of Rights was 
written, he called for the right of privacy to be made explicit. 
                                                             





When the journalist and social critic Vance Packard was invited to speak before the 
“Computer and Invasion of Privacy” hearing, Gallagher praised him as “a public 
conscience for various actions by this Government and business that infringe on 
individual rights and individuality” and said Packard “is more responsible than any 
man in our country for alerting us to the dangers that lurk in the twilight of our 
sophisticated society and the changes that are coming about and creating perhaps a 
new environment.”315  Packard most recent book, The Naked Society, had detailed 
abuses of consumers’ private information, citing abuses by credit bureaus dating back 
to the 1930s, and he criticized the growing number of private detectives as a form of 
surveillance brought to market and given dubious status as a legitimate enterprise 
given that invasion of privacy is their core business.316 
Packard’s remarks on computerization and dehumanization echoed the punch-card 
protests at Berkeley several years earlier, and in the meantime student concern that 
they were treated as numbers by administrators had become a broader public concern. 
“Every one of us in this room is a statistic,” Packard said, “especially if the statistic 
involving us has our social security number attached. … No secrets would be kept from 
the central data center. The raw data about people’s lives would be fed into the central 
computers without concern for confidentiality and the computers would be 
programmed to act as the censors. If the government is sincere in saying that it is only 
interested in generalized statistics, then it would seem essential that all individual 
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identification of a statistic be removed before the kernel of desired information is fed to 
any central computer system.”317 
Many of Packard’s critiques can sound slightly chilling in their familiarity over fifty 
years later, especially when he underlines that the forward momentum of new 
technologies often puts them into use “without being sufficiently concerned about 
human values” that could have grounded a discussion of ethical data use beforehand. 
His closing remarks invoke Orwell, reminding the audience that 1984 is just 18 years 
away, but his argument also echoes Hannah Arendt’s analysis of Adolph Eichmann, 
which stirred controversy just two years before the NDB hearings by offering a novel 
and chilling theory: that evil moves fluidly through unthinking bureaucracies. “My own 
hunch is that Big Brother, if he ever comes to these United States, may turn out to be not 
a greedy power seeker, but rather a relentless bureaucrat obsessed with efficiency,” 
Packard said, implicitly invoking the banality of an evil that thinks itself neutral, 
normal, never having broken any laws, simply carrying out the the duty of his office. 
Packard too has asked his audience to consider that a relentless, unthinking bureaucrat 
would be a sufficient cause for even the most monstrous behavior, and that a national 
data bank could be the perfect bureaucracy for such an evil to emerge within. Though 
Packard was perhaps hyperbolic in describing “humanity in chains of plastic tape” as 
the “ultimate of horrors,” his testimony cast a specter of totalitarianism over the NDB 
hearing, provoking a noticeable rise in Orwellian warnings as the hearings proceeded. 
After all, the popular dystopian surveillance novel  Nineteen Eighty-Four equipped 
both the committee and the general public with vivid and familiar imagery for critics to 
                                                             





both express their own concerns and convince others to see the same irredeemably 
totalitarian tendencies at risk in a national data bank. The New York Times called the 
data bank an “Orwellian nightmare” and noted that the proposal had prompted a 
“vigorous protest, in which we join.”318 Even the erudite and highly original thinker 
Alan Westin found Orwell’s well-known dystopic vision useful for arguing his case 
against increasing surveillance. “Unless the issue is in the forefront of the planning and 
administration of future computing systems, the possibilities of data surveillance over 
the individual in 1984 could be chilling.” Still two decades away, this ominous year 
seemed close at hand to those attentive to the risk of  mass surveillance. “Looking down 
that path, assuming we get beyond 1984,” said Gallagher, “is it not one of the great 
responsibilities of our Government to guarantee and protect human values, and is it not 
necessary at this point to start programming our own Government toward this end?”319 
(emphasis added) 
The NDB hearing frequently referenced a recent magazine article describing the 
extent to which several offices of the US government already relied on mechanically 
automated decision making. This article, published just a week earlier in the Saturday 
Review by John W. Macy, Jr., in which Macy described outlined of government that were 
currently automated by computer, as well as the future promise of further automation. 
He described the marvels of automated accounting for medicare, automated payroll in 
the Veterans Administration, and automated grading of the civil service exam “by the 
thousands.” He extolled the “perfect memory” of the computer and its remarkable 
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efficiency, concluding that fears of “dehumanization” are unreasonable because the 
computer will “free the mind of man for more worthy use” and foreground the need for 
“imaginative and innovative managers who can grasp ideas, think in broad, 
philosophical terms, and apply such terms in decisions, relating to public welfare.”320 
In reviewing the automation measures outlined in Macy’s article, Horton reminded 
the audience that they should not misinterpret this account as a prediction of 
technology to come: “this is not something we are going to do five years from now, but 
this is what we are doing now.”321 Packard described Macy as “overly fascinated with 
the wonders of electronics in terms of reducing the cost of sorting and processing 
personnel. Since the Federal Government is involved in dealing with millions of people, 
he sees it in terms of millions, and dollar costs per unit.”322 
During the Congressional hearing on the National Data Bank, it was a frequent 
refrain from the side of technologists and computermen that it would be a mistake to 
blame the machine. When the legal scholar Reich consulted with an IBM employee to 
prepare for the hearing, he was told that the problem is not computers but proper 
legislation. “What is the matter is that you don’t have good enough laws to protect 
people. The machine will do the bidding of our society. It will turn out anything you 
want and there is nothing wrong with computers.” Reich added: “And I hope I haven’t 
come down here and blamed machines. It is a failure of laws.” Reich argued that the 
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typical government employee “needs a law to help him ignore something that he should 
ignore” and that “laws stiffen our backbone.”323 
Press coverage of the NDB proposal was, for the most part, equally negative and 
often just as breathless with concern. The Times coverage of the hearing itself continue 
to skew strongly toward the anti-database camp. They reported only the thoughts of 
Vance Packard and Charles Reich, two opponents of the data bank proposal. “A 
proposed giant 'dossier bank' that could pull together all the scattered statistics about 
any American was pictured today as an unforgiving, unforgetful judge that would never 
give a person a second chance.”324 An editorial in the Christian Science Monitor said 
they were “frankly repelled by the proposal,” and that the center's activities would be a 
“monstrous invasion of privacy and a threat to the liberties of every American.”325 
• 
The Rand Corporation was a somewhat unlikely source to tap for critics of the perils 
looming over the computer age, but as one of the sources for the very idea of the 
internet their staff also proved to be some of the most acute forecasters of the shape it 
might take.  
Willis Ware spent most of his career at Rand after helping to build one of the first 
digital computers at the Institute for Advanced Study.326 had emerged as one of the 
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most sophisticated forecasters of social consequences that would need to be monitored 
as computers became more tightly enmeshed in government, commerce, and everyday 
life. Ware published dozens of reports and papers warning about impending threats to 
privacy in the information age and urged lawmakers to account for these dangers as 
computers were certain to become ever more entwined in our society. Ware started on 
this path at roughly the same time that Westin was spinning up similar arguments from 
the perspective of the law. Both articulated the future role of computers in the lives of 
private citizens and the tension this could place upon a person’s right to privacy, but 
whereas Westin played the oracle, pronouncing warnings that the masses must attend 
to fast-approaching threats, Ware often aimed similar arguments at technical experts, 
putting his leverage closer to the point where technology and infrastructure itself could 
begin to pivot. 
Paul Baran of the Rand corporation was asked to design a communications network 
that could withstand a nuclear attack — the definitive scenario, exhaustively debated 
and observed from every angle by Rand under the direction of the calculating, often 
morbid military strategist Hermann Kahn. Rather than using analog circuit switching, 
Baran used digital packet switching.  
Although his project was never built, his design proved influential when J.C.R. 
Licklider of ARPA spearheaded a similar project several years later in hopes of joining 
together the fifteen mainframe computers that ARPA had placed in research centers 
across the country. One of the initial uses of the ARPANET had been to facilitate 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
under the direction of John von Neumann. This job was contracted by Rand, and Ware would 





resource sharing among these centers, given that computers were incredibly rare, 
expensive, and in high demand among many scientists. Beyond research, the first 
cohort of users on this network often also used it as a communication tool, sending 
email and sharing files.327  
• 
The case of the NDB proposal illuminates how many of the issues surrounding 
computers and invasion of privacy that are now definitive of the post-Snowden era have 
in fact been debated for at least fifty years. Privacy advocates in the 1960s had already 
identified many of the threats to individual liberties that were posed by the early spread 
of networked computers, databases of private information, and other forms of 
electronic surveillance. Computers had become a subject of concern for many 
imagining the information age to come. From Berkeley students who perceived the 
University’s computer punch card system as a symbol of institutional dehumanization, 
to the broader antiwar protest against the military-industrial complex, social concerns 
about technology from this period would continue to exert a strong influence even 
decades later, as the rise of digital utopianism in Silicon Valley created an unlikely 
fusion of countercultural ideals and military-industrial visions of a future transformed 
by computers.328 Even those observing and overseeing the development of the first 
computer networks recognized the ease of eavesdropping from the inside. The once-
classified Rand report that proposes and describes the Arpanet, the precursor of the 
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Internet, includes a brief discussion of the likely need for cryptography to protect data 
transmitted over its wires.  
• 
Negative public sentiment toward the idea of a National Data Bank continued in the 
wake of the hearings, and several figures who emerged from the hearings as leading 
voices of this cause began to push for legislation to protect the right to privacy as data 
collection continued growing in the future. Willis Ware chaired a congressional 
advisory committee that met in 1973 to debate the growing need for privacy, had they 
collectively recommended a comprehensive law to ensure protections of personal data.  
The bill was introduced by Samuel Ervin, Jr., a Democratic Senator from North 
Carolina who had already participated in two Senate investigations bearing on 
government surveillance and invasion of privacy: the Watergate investigation that led 
to President Richard Nixon’s resignation in 1973 and the committee that censured Sen. 
Joseph McCarthy in 1954, ending his overzealous campaign to uncover Communist spy 
rings.329 Senator Ervin consulted with Alan Westin on the drafting of the Privacy Act. 
“No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by any 
means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a 
written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the 
record pertains.”330 
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The Privacy Act explicitly responded to concerns about “increasing use of 
computers and sophisticated information technology, [which] has greatly magnified the 
harm to individual privacy that can occur from any collection, maintenance, use, or 
dissemination of personal information.” The Privacy Act mandated measures to 
“safeguard individual privacy from the misuse of Federal records.”331 The Privacy Act of 
1974 was the first law to place specific limits on government surveillance of citizens. 
Although the explicit purpose of the Privacy Act was “to safeguard individual privacy 
from the misuse of Federal records,” to grant access to one’s own records held by 
federal agencies and to create systems of oversight for those records. “the increasing 
use of computers and sophisticated information technology, while essential to the 
efficient operations of the Government, has greatly magnified the harm to individual 
privacy that can occur from any collection, maintenance, use, or dissemination of 
personal information.”332 
• 
Although the money for the NDB had already been earmarked in the 1967 federal 
budget by the time Congress called for a hearing on “Computers and the Invasion of 
Privacy,” the proposal was tabled amid overwhelming negative press, opposition from 
politicians, the diligent critical work from privacy advocates like Packard, Westin, 
Miller, and Ware, who had already begun to develop an argumentative toolkit for the 
defense of privacy rights in the computer age. Opposition to the NDB proposal marks a 
point of rising opposition to government surveillance and increasing consciousness 
                                                             






that the computer could be implicated in mechanizing, augmenting, and perhaps even 
transforming the capacity to gather and disseminate private information. 
Perhaps Congressman Gallagher was in fact hopelessly corrupt and drummed up 
this hearing to hold off the federal investigators on his trail. Perhaps Gallagher was, as 
he alleged himself, bullied and then framed by J. Edgar Hoover through abuses of the 
same information gathering practices that these hearings were aimed at restraining. 
Hoover’s extravagant overreaches of power are well documented. On the other hand, 
Gallagher was convicted of tax evasion a second time in 1988, well after both Hoover 
and his enforcer Roy Cohn were gone. 
Although the NDB proposal itself ended in failure, it would only mark the failure of 
this specific proposal. Other large federal databases and inter-agency data sharing 
schemes would come. Proponents like Carl Kaysen would learn not to place these 
measures in the public eye with reports and op-eds praising the marvel of future 
national data banks. 
Still, the NDB backlash launched a conversation about computers and the invasion 
of privacy. It made the issue reactions from politicians, journalists, and the public, 
whose separate concerns about surveillance and the rise of the computer were together 
amplified with the spectre of a government data center. This hearing and public debate 
had considerable momentum, leading to the passage of the Privacy Act in 1974. 
And yet, amid the debate in Congress over how to protect private information — both 
at rest and in transit, as it is collected in a centralized database — cryptography was 
mentioned only once in the entire series of hearings. This is a telling omission, and 





from those carried out on the same subject today. In the midst of the secrecy that 
surrounded cryptography research from the postwar period through the sixties, 
cryptography was not yet envisioned in projections of the computer age, even among 
those like Westin and Packard who voiced some of gravest concerns about information 
technology and the future of individual privacy. 
It is remarkable, in retrospect, to see an entire debate on computers, privacy, and 
surveillance transpire with cryptography mentioned only briefly, in passing, and 
dismissed so readily — as probably too expensive. The classification and regulation of 
cryptography had, indeed, made it nearly invisible even amid a political discussion so 
voluminous, far-reaching, speculative, and frankly longwinded as the NDB hearings 
had been. Even when such dire, intensely felt concerns about computer security were 
brought before Congress, even with a bevy of experts on hand to discuss how a 
centralized federal data center might protect private information, cryptography passed 
largely unnoticed throughout the discussion. It was only in 1973 that NIST opened 
discussion of developing a national cryptography standard for the sake of data 
protection, especially in the context of IRS data, but NSA’s efforts to control and weaken 
this digital encryption standard had the unintended effect of motivating independent 
researchers to develop cryptography outside the secrecy controls that NSA had 
successfully maintained since the fifties (a subject covered in the next chapter). 
In the decade following the 1966 hearings on “Computers and the Invasion of 
Privacy,” as concerns about surveillance grew broader and more salient for many 
Americans, these same concerns would become a source of motivation for a cadre of 





information age. In other words, it is telling that the NDB hearings echoed a set of 
concerns that would later be used to justify the need for public cryptography research, 
even though these concerns had not yet been attached to cryptography while it lay in 
relative obscurity as a classified research subject. The researchers who embarked on 
this bold effort to defy classification orders recall their own worries about information 
security beginning to emerge in the late 1960s, though they tend to take credit for this 
as a concern that emerged from their own reflection rather than one that circulated 
through the press and in Washington, leading to a groundswell of vehement opposition. 
The next chapter examines the social and political context in which the first wave of 
academic cryptographers embarked on open research, with particular attention to the 









 Cryptography’s Public Reemergence in the Seventies:  






There was an unmistakable tone of hesitancy in Martin Hellman’s writing when, in 
1974, he prepared an internal report for his colleagues in Stanford’s Computer Science 
department to share the findings of his recent, fairly intrepid foray into cryptography 
research. 
“If I am right in my belief that the concept of a random cipher led to the concept of a 
random code,” Hellman wrote, “then the very birth of error-correcting codes was due to 
an advance in cryptography.”333 To slow this down a bit: if indeed the error-correcting 
codes that descended from Shannon’s theory of communication had really grown out of 
this “little known” study of cryptography which Hellman had just excavated, it would 
suggest that the suppression of cryptography as a classified research subject had left a 
profound mystery at the heart of information science, a field in which the twenty-nine-
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year-old Hellman’s prodigious past research had already earned him tenure in one of 
the world’s leading departments.  
“The strong resemblance … leads one to believe that Shannon, having solved the 
problem of reliable communication in the presence of noise then applied these same 
techniques to analyzing the secure transmission of information.”334 Hellman uncovered 
a hidden chamber in the research space he had occupied since graduate school, but 
crossing its threshold was, of course, politically fraught. Essentially every other 
computer scientist treated cryptography research as taboo, if not worse.  
Cryptography was bound in a web of rumors and received wisdom that discouraged 
working on the subject. When Hellman first began inquiring about crypto, for instance,  
he remembers hearing that  cryptography was most likely speeding through a very 
active regime of scientific study, just entirely out of view.335 His colleagues warned 
working on cryptography would be a patently foolish risk that might undermine his 
career in any number of ways. On the one hand, you could unwittingly duplicate work 
that had already been conducted in the classified literature. Without access to these 
classified articles, it would be impossible to know if you were pursuing a solution to a 
problem that had already been settled in secret years ago. Hence no article to advance 
your career. On the other hand, even if he did land upon something new, Hellman’s 
peers predicted the powers that be would swoop down and suppress his findings. 
Hence no article to advance your career.  
                                                             
334 Hellman, “Information Theory of Cryptography,” p. 5. 







Still, Hellman was skeptical, reasoning that this scenario violates a basic scientific 
principle: credit to those publish first, with secret research having no purchase in the 
public life of science. Hellman recalls perceiving weakness in these arguments, 
especially after he heard them repeated essentially verbatim by several different 
naysaying colleagues, and the case he makes today for pursuing cryptography research 
against the received wisdom of his peers in fact suggests something more: the values 
and justifications that shaped his thinking, drove his decisions, and directed a chain of 
events leading toward the emergence of open cryptography research. 
Hellman coyly mentions the purpose behind Shannon’s work on cryptography: “It is 
interesting to note that during World War II the transatlantic radio telephone 
conversations of Churchill and Roosevelt were protected by scrambling.” Only recently 
declassified, the Sig-Saly system was still a strange subject, and it’s worth noting that 
Hellman does not even bother connecting this point to Shannon as he attempts to draw 
forward the significance of this subject. 
Hellman also argued that  the growing value of information itself should 
demonstrate a clear commercial purpose for cryptography to secure this information at 
rest and in transit. Hellman points to a recent data breach in which the agrochemical 
giant Monsanto had been pinched of proprietary information whose  “value was on the 
order of $500,000,000.” Echoing Daniel Bell’s forecast that the value of information 





that firms should be prepared to “protect such information as carefully as it would 
$500,000,000 in cash.” 336 
Coyly again, Hellman offhandedly discusses the ease of intercepting telephone 
traffic by skimming microwave signals traveling between the relay stations of the Bell 
system. This invisible, unobtrusive means of signal interception was routine  
throughout the Cold War, and remains common today because it is so straightforward, 
politically tidy, and microwave links remain a key part of global communications 
infrastructure. Messages traveling through these relay points are open to anyone 
equipped to listen on the microwave band, a process no more complicated than tuning 
in to a radio station, albeit a station on a wavelength the FCC reserves for this specific 
purpose.  
Finally, Hellman addresses the immanent rise of networked computing, placing this 
again in the context of commerce. “Recent changes in our ways of doing business, most 
notably the growing number of remote access, time shared computers, have stimulated 
increased commercial interest in cryptography,” he writes. “Concurrently, as 
commercial uses of cryptography become more commonplace due to these new 
developments , older problems which can be dealt with by cryptographic techniques 
will come to light.” 
Hellman names all of these as grounds “for unclassified studies of cryptography,” a 
subject that in 1974 needed to be comprehensively justified to his academic peers. All 
of this served as framing for the matter that followed in this internally circulated report, 
where Hellman moved beyond the practical justification for research in cryptography 
                                                             





by diving into the theoretical fascinations it proffered through unexamined links to 
Shannon’s canonical work on information theory. He vigorously examined Shannon’s 
assumptions, pointed to the value of recent work by his colleague Donald Knuth for 
revising some of Shannon’s points, but above all Hellman tried to prove to his 
colleagues that it was worth resisting the received knowledge that cryptography ought 
to be left alone as a research subject. 
The same was true of Hellman’s new collaborator Whitfield Diffie, a precocious and 
intellectually daring graduate student whose own unshakeable compulsion to research 
cryptography had led him to Hellman’s doorstep. After graduating from MIT, Diffie had 
worked around Cambridge for firms developing early computer networks. In the course 
of this work, he became concerned at the thought of private communications traveling 
over these networks in clear text, but he was particularly vexed by the idea that it would 
be impossible to initiate an encrypted conversation over a clear-text computer network 
since the keys could be observed as they traveled from one party to the other. 
Once, the general assumption in cryptography had been that keys must be 
exchanged in person. This is called a symmetric system: you and I need to possess the 
same key so I can use my copy to encrypt a message, and you can use your copy of the 
key to decrypt the message by reversing the process. But how could you exchange keys 
over a computer network, which could have any number of eavesdroppers? It would be 
about as secure as sending an encryption key by telegram. This was the aspect of 
computer cryptography that had drawn Diffie toward this understudied field. He 
worried that internet traffic would be subject to limitless surveillance, hence requiring 





of exchanging keys so that you don’t have to meet someone in person in order to begin 
sending encrypted messages back and forth. Their answer was, in brief, to split 
cryptographic keys in half, leaving a private key to keep secret and a public key to post 
somewhere in the open for prospective correspondents to find. Using your public key, I 
can send an encrypted message that only you can read because you have the 
corresponding private key.337 Under this scheme, called public key encryption, you can 
send money to your bank without picking up crypto keys from the bank beforehand. 
You can buy something with a credit card without the store setting up a crypto scheme 
with the bank beforehand. Using public key cryptography, you can send a tip to a 
journalist, email your social security number to your accountant, or verify that a 
message was actually sent by the person listed in the subject line — all without setting 
up a crypto scheme in advance with journalists, accountants, or any other 
correspondents. 
These are familiar political stakes, but unlike the discussion in the sixties about 
stopping government surveillance and taking countermeasures to prevent a 
surveillance state, the issue had begun to hinge on the strength of cryptography — 
although this hinge is itself contingent on many other dimensions of information 
security.338 In the two decades between the reemergence of cryptography research in 
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the seventies and the series of debates surrounding cryptography policy in the nineties, 
not only had cryptography become entrenched the discipline of computer science, but 
it had also become framed as one of the principle tools to shore up the right to privacy 
that had begun to seem so gravely threatened in the sixties. 
Given the late emergence of cryptography as a domain of computer science, it’s 
unclear how Shannon’s theory of cryptography began to be granted paradigmatic 
status. Given that Shannon’s work is apolitical at best, it is also curious ground a subject 
so politically fraught as cryptography has become. Given that Shannon’s single article 
on this subject was mostly ignored for decades, its resurfacing and entry into the 
computer science canon requires some explanation, if only because it is so unusual for 
a theory to emerge from obscurity to be recognized after several decades, especially 
when the author remains alive and yet has opted not to participate in the resurgent 
recognition of the forgotten work. Existing accounts of Diffie and Hellman’s work tend 
to center on their resilient insistence on publishing. We have a good sense of why they 
did it, but to my knowledge there has never been a satisfactory explanation given for 
how they succeeded. Others had tried before them, buckling and compromising in their 
work. Even the historian David Kahn was harassed and threatened not to carry on 
writing his book, though he finished and published his work, as well.339 So what was it 
about this moment in history that not only made cryptography research feel urgent, but 
also made it possible for these researchers to resist the suppression of this subject that 
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had carried on in America from the postwar years forward? And how were the science 
and politics of cryptography shaped by the unusual conditions of its death and rebirth? 
The core thesis of this chapter is that reopening cryptography as a non-classified 
research subject in the U.S. was facilitated by the political conditions following 
Watergate, the Pentagon Papers, and the “Year of Intelligence,” a period spanning 1971-
4 in which both journalists and Congress conducted a remarkable number of 
investigations into secret government programs. During this period of unusually harsh 
public exposure, the intelligence community was enervated, just as a creature native to 
one habitat might feel suffocated in another. During this moment culminating the rise 
of the right to know as a cultural value in America, the right to research cryptography 
and share scientific results with the public had somewhat counterintuitive 
implications. Techniques once associated with secrecy began to be treated as means to 
secure the right to privacy. The means of concealing speech were treated as subjects of 
the First Amendment.  
Beyond motivations, it is worth looking for the factors that supported the successful 
reemergence of cryptography research at this particular moment. What made it 
possible for cryptography research to break through into the public literature at this 
specific moment in time? Why was this bold endeavor not quashed, with the group 
imprisoned for violating of international arms control restrictions, as several 
threatening letters insisted? Previous accounts have played up the heroic features of 
this narrative, as though boldness and genius alone were sufficient for these 
researchers to succeed in both rekindling and reinventing the field of cryptography in 





final one offers a compelling explanation. The silence held over cryptography research 
since the postwar years became untenable after Watergate, the definitive event in a 
dense cluster of shocking news, document leaks, federal investigations, and 
congressional hearings in the early-to-mid seventies.  
For cryptography to reemerge at this moment involved the convergence of many 
supporting factors, and it is entirely possible that this outcome was overdetermined by 
several forces working in the same direction. With apprehension growing over the 
arrival of the computer age, and the potential invasions of privacy through systems like 
a national data bank, open cryptography research gained the status of a social cause. 
Stanford’s lawyers hatched an argument treating any effort to suppress their research 
as a prior injunction on free speech, and hence a First Amendment case that they had a 
good chance of winning. Diffie and Hellman also bolstered their position by marshalling 
the support of their colleagues. Framing this work as a scientific breakthrough 
attracted attention, and encouraging others to colonize this unsettled research area 
brought others to their side, making suppression increasingly unlikely over time. This 
case evinces the political work that plays a critical role in scientific success, as 
described by Bruno Latour and others in actor-network theory.340 Marshalling a 
network of supporters is an effective indicator of success when one theory is pitted 
against another. 
Diffie and Hellman played a strategic game, and in retrospect it’s clear that they 
chose well when taking risks. And yet, of the many factors in play, what was most 
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essential to the reemergence of cryptography research was the condition of weakness 
afflicting the intelligence community in the wake of the Pentagon Papers, Watergate, 
and the ensuing ‘Year of Intelligence’. The precipitous decline of public trust in 
government secrecy, the momentary enfeeblement of intelligence agencies under 
scrutiny, and a press so emboldened in this moment that they did not hesitate to report 
on the intimidation efforts levied at Diffie and Hellman. Put another way: the same 
factors at work in forming journalism’s so-called ‘Golden Age’ in the seventies also 
supported the reemergence of cryptography as a subject for open research after nearly 
25 years in which it had been strongly controlled and often suppressed in the US. 
Even in the 1970s, after a quarter century had passed and Shannon’s information 
theory could be seen everywhere from machine logic to economic forecasting, 
Shannon’s cryptographic theory remained little noticed. During this period, the future 
of cryptography tended to be discussed only when ethical discussions of the coming 
information society prompted some lawyers, politicians, and computer scientists to 
raise concerns about threats to privacy and security. The framing of this debate still 
looks fairly similar fifty years later: then as now, people were anxious with the idea that 
a computer could know more about them than they themselves did, and many worried 
that the collection of this information in centralized government databases posed an 
undue risk that this information could be abused. 
• 
Very few American scientists had the privilege of knowing the path cryptography 
research had taken in the postwar years. The few civilian exceptions would have 





like the Special Cryptography Advisory Group (SCAG) that Friedman organized in the 
early fifties. Most participants were highly talented mathematicians who cared little 
about cryptography itself. Shannon, for instance, does not appear to have ever worked 
on cryptography unless he was asked to do so.  
Horst Feistel, on the other hand, spent most of his career in a string of jobs where he 
was forbidden from applying his considerable interest and talent in cryptography. 
Why? As a German emigre to the United States during the years before the second 
World War, Horst Feistel was treated with considerable suspicion by many of his 
neighbors and colleagues, but his fascination with cryptography attracted extra 
attention. He studied physics at MIT and Harvard, then found work with Lincoln 
Laboratory and the Mitre Corporation, his overtures to develop digital cryptography 
systems were repeatedly discouraged and he was never invited to participate in 
classified projects on this subject. After nearly thirty years of unsuccessful attempts to 
broach this subject, Feistel was approached by IBM in 1966 and offered the opportunity 
to lead a small team focused on cryptography.  
Before the 1960s, IBM honored general orders and stayed clear of cryptography. 
They worked closely with the US government, and the government preferred to keep 
cryptography research entirely under its own jurisdiction. For a while, that was fine, 
but by the mid-sixties IBM convinced their contacts in the intelligence community to 
allow them to develop a basic cryptography standard, albeit with the direct oversight of 
NSA. The firm made its first official foray in 1966, establishing a team under the 
direction of Feistel. Still, his understanding of this subject proved useful in unexpected 





worked on what is called an “identify friend or foe” (IFF) system which used encrypted 
radio signals to tell pilots if another airplane is a genuine ally.341  Using encryption, a 
quick radio transmission could do the tricky work of sorting friends from foes. Despite 
continuous discouragement from pursuing original work in cryptography, his 
continued to press his interest as he moved on to work at other defense contractors like 
the Mitre Corporation, closely connected to MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory. Finally, in 1966, 
IBM invited Feistel to lead a small team in developing a digital cryptosystem. By the 
mid-1960s, IBM’s upper management had become conscious of information security as 
an undeveloped area of their increasingly profitable business producing mainframe 
computers. They sold Feistel’s initial cryptosystem on an exclusive contract to Lloyd’s 
of London. And that could have been the end of it, before the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) invited IBM to submit a digital cryptography system 
to be considered as a national standard for applications in banking and finance as these 
industries moved increasingly toward using computers to run their businesses. 
The principal opposition to the Data Encryption Standard (DES) was marshaled by 
Martin Hellman, who was at the time the only computer scientist openly researching 
cryptography within a university, specifically without the blessing or oversight of the 
NSA. Hellman recalled: “I was working at IBM Research and they had just started their 
cryptographic effort that led to the DES. The guy they hired in to start that, Horst 
Feistel, was in the same department as me. So, I’d have lunch with him. He’d explain to 
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me how a lot of things worked and I could see IBM was spending good money and so, it 
reinforced in my mind that there was a growing commercial need.”342 
Even an article in Science magazine echoed the sentiment of critics like Hellman 
who charged that DES had been deliberately weakened in accordance with a secret 
order. “Some critics suspect that this coding system was carefully designed to be just 
secure enough so that corporate spies outside the government could not break a user's 
code and just vulnerable enough so  that the National Security Agency could break it.”343 
Although DES was finally adopted as the official standard for digital cryptography by 
NIST in 1974, the controversy surrounding its mandated key length had the effect 
intended by its opponents, chiefly Diffie and Hellman. Many potential users of this 
encryption standard were uneasy at the thought of using cryptography that was 
apparently weakened under secret order, although the weakness of the key was 
considered immaterial by a reasonable share of users, especially corporate and 
government clients who were eager to have a secure system in place, even if that 
security might diminish years down the road and require replacement. 
• 
In 1969, Martin Hellmann joined the MIT department of electrical engineering, 
alongside both Peter Elias, who had recently stepped down as chair, and Claude 
Shannon, who had held a distinguished position there since leaving Bell Labs in 1956. 
Like Hellman, Elias worked in information theory, which essentially meant that he 
worked out practical means of implementing the purely formal insights that flowed out 
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of Shannon’s “Mathematical Theory of Communication” in 1948. Elias conducted most 
of his research on noise and errors in computers themselves, where signals traverse 
various modules throughout the general functioning of the machine. So Elias developed  
‘noisy computation’ as his niche, asking how unreliable computer processing, as well as 
reading and writing from memory could be interpreted under the same rubric as the 
transmission of messages.344 The work was highly useful for computers at the time, as 
the relative lack of displays and feedback systems could mean errors from noisy 
computing would throw off calculations due to simple, unreliable components. In this 
primitive age of computers, noisy computing could leave one second-guessing 
important results that might have been thrown off by an unexpected failure somewhere 
deep in the circuitry. For his efforts, Elias was the youngest professor ever to chair the 
electrical engineering department at MIT. Before there even was a computer science 
department, and at a time when even some members of the MIT administration were 
skeptical that computers were more than an expensive, passing trend, Elias oversaw 
the expansion and rise of the department during a time when mainframes and time-
sharing became more accessible to researchers.345 Elias also served with Colin Cherry 
as editor of the journal Information and Control until 1962, and the journal was a 
leading forum for the first-wave, Macy Conference cyberneticians whose interest 
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endured even after those particularly magical conferences ended.346 With Elias based at 
MIT and Cherry at Imperial College London. Perhaps due to this cybernetic 
cosmopolitanism, Cherry had the rare distinction of citing Shannon’s 1949 theory of 
cryptography in the wake of its initial publication, claiming the fourth citation on 
record, and one of only twelve between 1950 and 1970.347  
Of the two, Elias was surely the more interested in Shannon’s cryptography paper. 
He seems to have been fond of passing it along to potentially interested readers, 
including Hellman.348 In this way, Elias had a direct role in Hellman’s growing interest 
in cryptography, which for both of them proved to carry a serendipitous also explaining 
the counterintuitive connections that it surfaces between error-correcting codes and 
the opposite case — a code that flips itself into an error state, noisy and unreadable, but 
can flip itself back with a key. That is, Elias explained to Hellman that Shannon had 
developed a theory of cryptography that interfaces with the information theory that lay 
at the core of the academic discipline they had spent their careers researching.349 
After MIT, Hellman returned to Stanford, where he continued to write papers in 
information theory and received tenure in 1971. Having attained the security of tenure, 
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Hellman turned his attention to at the subject of cryptography, which had impressed 
upon him at each of the post-doctoral stops he took before arriving back at Stanford. At 
IBM, Hellman noticed that a cryptography research group had been founded, which led 
him to surmise that there was some unnoticed commercial potential to this arcane art. 
Then at MIT, Elias passed along a paper that changed how Hellman saw the field of 
information theory. It was a paper on cryptography by Claude Shannon, whose 
reputation as ‘founder’ of information theory had already been cemented. 
Hellman had a sophisticated grasp of Shannon’s information theory and the 
advancements made by people like Peter Elias over the last two decades. But as 
Hellman began to examine Shannon’s obscure theory of cryptography, it shook his 
understanding of a field in which he was already recognized as an expert. Hellman first 
began to doubt the chronology of the two papers after he found that Shannon’s 1949 
publication on cryptography was based on a previously classified report from 1945. “So 
in many ways information theory appears to have grown out of cryptography,”350 
Hellman said in an interview. “I believe it was probably Shannon’s work in 
cryptography that gave him some of the key insights that led to that seminal 1948 
paper.” Hellman goes on to explain how the clever uses of noise in Shannon’s work 
suggest the primacy of cryptography in his reasoning: 
There are certain concepts, like the idea of a random code. Random error 
correcting code is kind of intuitively unobvious. Who would think of using a 
random that looks like a noisy code to correct errors? And yet a random cipher, 
which he uses in the 1949 and presumably in a classified 1945 paper, makes 
                                                             





perfect sense. If you apply the wrong key to a cryptogram, you get gibberish 
coming out, random working data.351 
After reading Shannon’s two papers side by side, the once-unrecognized connections 
between his “Mathematical Theory of Communication” and his “Communication 
Theory of Secrecy Systems” would be seared into Hellman’s mind. 
They are almost duals to [doubles of] each other. That is, error-correcting codes 
and cryptography. So when Elias gave me this paper when I was teaching at MIT 
— he had known Shannon over many, many years — I saw that information 
theory, which I was working in, had actually come out of cryptography probably. 
And it was an interesting area. In fact, I played with it, kept it in the back of my 
mind, and then my playing in my off hours on it led to a small publishable result. 
I began to think maybe I could do more work in this area, maybe I could actually 
do this during the day, so to speak, rather than just on the weekend, divide our 
time up that way.352 
Their efforts began modestly, especially in light of the apparent resources directed at 
the same problems from within the closed literature. Hellman later recalled that 
rumors circulated about classified research among information theorists, claiming that 
“governmental security agencies have spent billions on pure and applied cryptographic 
research, and that therefore a neophyte has no hope of discovering something that is 
not known in the classified literature.” 
Still, it took Hellman less than a year to work through the implications of Shannon’s 
lost work on cryptography. Hellman would make this connection between information 
theory and cryptography quite explicit in the coming years as he worked this neglected 
subject into the edges of his research agenda. His 1974 report reestablished the critical 
examination of Shannon’s cryptographic theory after a quarter-century in hibernation. 
                                                             






Here,353 Hellman both critiques and extended Shannon’s theory of cryptography.354 This 
1974 report on cryptographic theory begins by defining the field as “the study of codes, 
ciphers and related techniques for providing secure transmission or storage of 
information.” His choice of words marks a departure from earlier definitions. From the 
Renaissance to the post-War years, cryptography tended to be framed around secrecy 
rather than security, and writing rather than information. To move beyond writing 
toward the medium-agnostic usage of ‘information’ the influence of Shannon, whose 
broader departure in his theory of communication was the abstraction of information 
from the medium in which it is transmitted. Still, the emphasis in Shannon’s wartime 
work remained squarely in the domain of secrecy, carrying the echoes of state power 
that had accompanied this art for centuries. For Hellman to define cryptography in 
terms of security rather than secrecy marks a turning point.  It shifts the matter away 
from state secrecy, toward a more general emphasis on the question of whether a 
message has been compromised in some way. Without fully adopting the term ‘privacy’ 
yet as the definitive purpose of cryptography, Hellman was already shifting toward a 
framework for discussing information security that had been developed by privacy 
activists over the previous decade. 
Hellman’s piece reintroduced a forgotten piece and a lost dimension of Claude 
Shannon’s work, and his writing reveals a cautious handling of material that would be 
unfamiliar to most of his audience. Following the lead of Elias, Hellman describes a 
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deep connection between error-correcting codes and cryptography in Shannon’s work. 
For these two processes to work as mirror images in fact presupposes the conceptual 
equivalence of signal and noise in digital coding. Hellman treats encryption and 
encoding as equivalent. In short, the application of digital encoding schemes like ASCII, 
which assign a number to each letter, or Morse code, which assigns a series of dots and 
dashes to each letter, are equivalent in Hellman’s mind to the more complicated 
algorithms that transform plain text to cipher text cryptographically. When Hellman 
first ventured into cryptography research, he not only followed Shannon’s lead and 
reintroduced his neglected work on this subject, but also made critical revisions of key 
points. Whereas Shannon’s theory of cryptography had relied on true random numbers 
gathered from a physical source of entropy, computer scientists had since developed 
reliable algorithms for producing pseudorandom numbers — which appear random 
even though they are derived from deterministic calculations. 
In light of advancements in the quality of pseudo-random number generators over 
the previous two decades, Hellman reasoned that it was no longer necessary to use 
truly random crypto keys, like the Sig-Saly keys which were drawn from thermal noise 
in a vacuum tube. “This analysis shows that the Vernam system possesses a degree of 
overkill, particularly for languages with small values of D [redundancy]. For example, 
numerical computer output possesses very little redundancy and can thus be protected 
with much shorter keys than required by the Vernam system.”355 That is, . “Perhaps a 
more interesting class of self-inverse operations are pseudo-random bit generators 
which add the bit stream produced to a binary representation of the messages. If the 
                                                             





pseudo-random stream were truly random we would have the unbreakable Vernam 
system. The hope is that a good pseudo-random stream would be un-breakable in 
practice if not in theory.”356 
“Highly structured pseudo-random bit generators allow their structure to be 
exploited in cryptanalysis. It is indicated, therefore, that unstructured, random looking 
pseudo-random bit generators are to be preferred in cryptographic use.”357Hellman 
points to work by his Stanford colleague, the pioneering computer scientist Donald 
Knuth, who developed a pseudo-random number generator called ‘Algorithm K’ whose 
output was “super-random,” but which Knuth himself concluded to have “very poor 
properties from any point of view.”358 
However, Hellman adds: “While Knuth’s conclusion is probably true for pseudo-
random sequences designed to pass statistical tests, it probably does not apply (and 
was not intended to apply) to sequences designed for cryptographic use.”359 Since 
random error correcting codes are essentially the best possible and random ciphers are 
essentially the worst possible, and since redundancy is needed for error correction but 
weakens a cipher, we are tempted to label these problems as duals or opposites. The 
reason for this duality stems from the very opposite goals of error correcting codes and 
ciphers. An error correcting code is designed to be noise (uncertainty) immune, 
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whereas a cipher is designed to be key (uncertainty) sensitive. The cryptanalyst is 
trying to remove the “noise” and we want his job to be as difficult as possible.360 
Hellman’s principle advancement upon Shannon’s foundational work in 
cryptographic theory was due primarily to advancements in the concept of pseudo-
random numbers in the intervening twenty-five years. The difference between 
randomness and pseudo-randomness is notoriously slippery. In a truly random 
sequence, every possible outcome is equally likely to occur, and past outcomes have no 
influence upon future outcomes. For instance, a fair coin given a fair throw is equally 
likely to land heads or tails, regardless of any apparent runs or streaks in recent throws. 
As more throws are recorded, the tally of heads and tails should become roughly equal, 
but also longer sequences of two or three outcomes should occur with even frequency. 
This is the case because each coin throw is independent of the last. Games of chance 
are carefully designed to be as non-deterministic as possible, but computers are by 
definition deterministic. They begin with discrete starting conditions and execute 
discrete instructions that lead to predictable outcomes. In order for a computer to do 
something random, it must be fed a source of randomness, very often by way of a 
thermal sensor that reacts to minute, entropic fluctuations of heat. The decay of 
radioactive materials may also provide a natural source of true randomness for 
computers. But these are cumbersome and complicated, so some of those working on 
the earliest computers began to wonder if they could develop an algorithm that could 
take non-random input and return a sequence of numbers that passed statistical tests 
                                                             





for randomness. John von Neumann devised an incredibly simple method the first  
pseudo-random number generator. 
• 
Diffie and Hellman would later explain their actions, in part, through the 
surrounding zeitgeist of dissent, in particular the widespread public opposition to 
official secrecy in the early seventies. As Hellman explained, “this was post-Watergate, 
and so it didn’t hold much water to say ‘we can’t tell you why, but for reasons of national 
security, please be quiet.’” 361   
Diffie, on the other hand, has been more inclined to emphasize the looming 
emergence of the information society as the principal concern that drove his original 
interest in cryptography. He recalls marveling at the potential of networked 
information systems while he was a student and researcher at MIT, but Diffie also 
recalls premonitions of the impending danger posed by an unbridled, worldwide, all-
encompassing information system. He describes venting these concerns with 
colleagues during the late sixties, often over long meals at Chinese restaurants near the 
MIT campus, but Diffie recalls only shrugs and the occasional caution that working on 
crypto could get you burned. Even amid the wider debate about computers and the 
invasion of privacy in Washington at this time, Diffie felt isolated in his concerns even 
while situated at MIT, the actual epicenter of digital computing in the late sixties.  
The problem of surveillance was framed by the distinct structure of 
communications that had begun to be envisioned in networked computing 
environments — that is, in a model of an information society in which digital computing 
                                                             





would link the people of the world, but could threaten breaches of privacy that were 
articulated during the 1960s by some of the key figures in the 1966 congressional 
hearings on computers and the invasion of privacy. 
Hellman himself has identified the “post-Watergate” atmosphere as one of the 
factors that motivated him to carry on his research on cryptography despite warnings 
of severe consequences, such as prosecution under the Espionage Act. But motivation 
was not enough: it was the post-Watergate climate of suspicion for government secrecy, 
coupled with the emergent cultural value of transparency, that facilitated the possibility 
of success for Hellman and his collaborators in reclaiming cryptography as a research 
subject. This event was part of a much broader wave of changes in America toward a 
more open, transparent society where people demanded both a right to know and a 
right to privacy. In 1975, each branch of the US government launched investigations 
into the activities of the CIA, FBI, NSA, and even the IRS, in what was possibly the 
boldest challenge to official secrecy in the nation’s history. In the Senate, these 
investigations were led by Frank Church of Idaho, and the hearings of the Church 
Committee resulted in some of the most damning revelations and the fiercest 
indictments of those responsible.  
And yet, despite the fervor of the Church, Pike, and Rockefeller hearings, as well as 
the severity of the transgressions uncovered, nobody was brought to trial. In fact, 
according to the NSA whistleblower James Bamford, the Department of Justice 
investigators concluded that the results of their secret investigation into the NSA were 





had uncovered.362 Before these hearings, the very existence of the NSA was treated as 
classified information, but after the Church Committee hearings, NSA director Bobby 
Inman would be the first occupant of his office to address the public. For this agency 
that prized its ability to remain invisible, mere exposure the public stage was withering. 
Ceteris paribus, the NSA’s exposure and blame during these hearings was negligible 
compared to the public drubbing of the FBI and CIA during the Church and Rockefeller 
hearings. Only three years had passed since the death of J. Edgar Hoover, the notorious 
FBI director who had earned the enmity of many figures in Washington through 
surveillance and intimidation over the course of four decades. The CIA was scrutinized 
at least as harshly in these hearings. Although the  investigative journalist Seymour 
Hersh had already published an article in the New York Times revealing some of the so-
called “family jewels,” that is, the secrets the CIA guarded most closely because they 
revealed illegal or embarrassing activities.363 
Although the ‘year of intelligence’ placed a brief spotlight on the NSA, revealing 
them to the public for the first time, far more would be revealed about the NSA when 
their former employee and whistleblower James Bamford published an exposé of his 
time at the Agency in 1982. Bamford had worked at the NSA’s listening station in Puerto 
Rico, where he wiretapped many prominent Americans who had been connected to the 
New Left, the sixties counterculture, or were otherwise treated with suspicion.364 
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Although it is unsurprising that intelligence officials objected when they learned that 
Bamford intended to publish an exposé of their activities, their opposition involved an 
attempt to reverse a FOIA disclosure, and it was ultimately unsuccessful. While 
compiling his book, Bamford had received a number of documents through FOIA 
requests, including the justice department report on the investigations conducted 
during the Church and Rockefeller hearings. Some time after Bamford received his 
request, NSA tried to reclassify them, claiming they never should have been treated as 
declassified in the first place. A series of stern letters demanded Bamford return the 
documents, as well as any copies, and he was threatened with prosecution under the 
Espionage Act.365 
• 
In addition to writing about cryptography, David Kahn lent his expertise on this 
arcane subject to other journalists. When The New York Times weighed the legal and 
ethical implications of publishing the Pentagon Papers, they anticipated the accusation 
that America’s enemies could compare decrypted messages in the Papers to encrypted 
messages that they had intercepted, but were unable to decode. Studying the 
correspondence between plaintext and ciphertext messages could then, theoretically, 
make it easier to break American codes in the future. After assessing the codes, Kahn 
assured the Times editors that the disclosures could cause only minimal damage to 
American cryptographic systems.366  
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Contributing to the wave of interest building around cryptography in the mid-
seventies, a handful of notable wartime projects were declassified in close succession. 
A July 1976 New York Times piece announced the Sig-Saly encrypted telephone project 
that had served as the model for Shannon’s theory of cryptography. In 1975, the work of 
Bletchley Park cryptographers in decrypting the Enigma machine was made public, 
along with details of the Bombe and Colossus computers built to perform the daily task 
of breaking new codes.  
When intelligence officials were first notified that a few Stanford academics were 
attempting to break the informal research embargo on cryptography, Hellman received 
a threatening letter. It told him that researching cryptography would put him in 
violation of federal law as well as international arms treaties. He and his students could 
go to prison.  
Shaken, Hellman consulted with Stanford’s in-house lawyer, who saw the matter 
differently, surprising Hellman when he simply lamented that the principles of 
academic freedom are not protected by law. The lawyer reasoned that suppressing the 
presentation of their work at a conference could be viewed as a violation of the First 
Amendment. He explained to Hellman that a prior injunction on presentation of 
academic research could be considered an unconstitutional restriction of free speech, 
thus a First Amendment case. In 1976, they presented and published their work in 
defiance of government warnings. They were not arrested, their work was celebrated, 





When Hellman first began to present this research, he took special precautions to 
shield his student research assistants. Although it is the norm in computer science for 
graduate students to present papers that were co-authored with faculty, but Stanford’s 
lawyers advised Hellman to present the papers himself since, as a tenured faculty 
member, he could more easily weather any government backlash. On the other hand, a 
lengthy legal battle could destroy a student’s career. The students’ parents agreed. So 
Hellman presented the paper at conference, his students standing silently beside him 
onstage.  
• 
In 1976, when Diffie and Hellman presented the work that would be published as 
“New Directions in Cryptography,” it was immediately treated as a breakthrough. The 
editors of the IEEE Transactions on Information Theory requested the manuscript, 
without formal review, as soon as they learned it had been written. Upon publication, 
others rushed to develop practical uses for the theoretical insights in this paper. 
“We stand today on the brink of a revolution in cryptography,” they paper begins.367 
In recent years, the cost of computing had been growing incrementally smaller, the 
means of digital communication had extended further into government and industry, 
and movement toward a consumer market for computers continued to inch toward 
fruition, but the means of securing digital communications had remained essentially 
stagnant for decades. Although cryptography research had withdrawn into a closed 
literature (as described in Chapter 3), Diffie and Hellman had aimed their work toward 
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reviving this stagnant field. At the time of its publication, “New Directions in 
Cryptography” was only the fifteenth article to cite Shannon’s 1949 article on secrecy 
systems, with ten of those citations falling in the prior three years.368By framing their 
work around Shannon’s little known, one-off article from 1949, they saturated their 
findings in an aura of serendipitous rediscovery. In the end, they would frame the 
research agenda of these “new directions” around a growing need for information 
security amid the rise of the information society. Instead of secrecy, they described 
cryptography as a tool of privacy. Instead of taking their project to the NSF to request 
funding, which could lead to the suppression of their findings, they opted to proceed 
without external funding. And as they worked up a case for the urgency of cryptography 
in the coming computer age, they appealed not only to civil liberties like privacy, but 
also to commercial interests that would inevitably require both strong cryptography 
and more clever means of distributing cryptographic keys. 
The development of cheap digital hardware has freed it from the design 
limitations of mechanical computing and brought the cost of high grade 
cryptographic devices down to where they can be used in such commercial 
applications as remote cash dispensers and computer terminals. In turn, such 
applications create a need for new types of cryptographic systems which 
minimize the necessity of secure key distribution channels and supply the 
equivalent of a written signature. At the same time, theoretical developments in 
information theory and computer science show promise of providing provably 
secure cryptosystems, changing this ancient art into a science.369 
Just as Hellman had made certain to foreground commercial arguments in his 1974 
report reviving Shannon’s crypto theory, Diffie and Hellman placed commercial 
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interests at the core of their justification for this work, knowing that this is how IBM had 
justified their own work on the subject. The falling cost of computing meant the general 
cost of digital cryptography would also continue to fall, placing commercial crypto 
within reach for organizations that handle sensitive information, whether in business 
or government. They also hint at the novel insight to be developed in the body of the 
article: in order to “minimize the necessity of secure key distribution channels,” they 
have developed a new way of exchanging cryptographic keys by breaking from the 
longstanding premise that only a single key could be used to encrypt and decrypt 
messages.  
Public key cryptography received a considerable boost of publicity when the subject 
was covered by Martin Gardner, the longtime author of a column on puzzles, math, and 
logic games for Scientific American. When Gardner devoted his July 1976 column to the 
subject of public key cryptography, his readership found a cogent, entertaining 
explanation of an otherwise abstruse subject.370 In much the same way that Warren 
Weaver had directed the public’s attention to the promise of Shannon’s communication 
theory with his lucid essay in this same magazine, Gardner illustrated both the 
technical principle and the transformative promise of public key encryption. 
Although NSA Director Bobby Inman threatened to prosecute researchers working 
on cryptography without official permission, his invocation of arms export regulations 
established in the 1950s would prove tenuous. Instead, they would need to establish a 
new international arms regulation to place explicit restrictions on cryptography 
exported outside the United States and hence, by extensions, a system to monitor  
                                                             





domestic crypto research. The ITAR agreement of 1977 included a clause that made 
explicit legal matters from some of the NSA’s threats to Diffie and Hellman. The ITAR 
classified strong cryptography as a weapon that could not be exported outside the 
United States. 
A 1977 article in the IEEE journal Technology and Society addressed the legal issues 
and even threats that had been directed at this organization, the leading professional 
society of electrical engineers.371  They lead with  an uncommon nod to the puzzling 
tradition in cryptograph: “Since cryptography traditionally has been a subject of 
interest primarily to puzzle enthusiasts and military intelligence agencies, the reader 
might reasonably ask why there should be any resistance to the idea of leaving it to 
NSA.” The articles sarcastic approach to the issue continues as they explain to the 
membership of the IEEE, the worldwide professional association of electrical engineers 
and computer scientists, that the trouble has emerged from progress in their own field.  
“The answer lies in the growing use of computers to store and process a wide variety of 
data that impact the everyday lives of almost everyone. With so much data circulating 
in digital form, problems of privacy and security have inevitably arisen. A major 
argument against the growing use of computers is the ease with which large quantities 
of data concerning many people can be misused.”  
The first effective implementation of Diffie and Hellman’s scheme for public key 
encryption was designed by three MIT mathematicians, Ronald Rivest, Adi Shamir, and 
Len Adleman, who named the algorithm RSA after their initials. Steven Levy's Crypto 
dramatizes the months of agony for Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman as they attempted to 
                                                             





devise a scheme for the trapdoor functions proposed in theor for Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange. In contrast, Martin Hellman has said that it was fairly obvious to most 
observers that the scheme would rest on the problem of factoring large semiprime 
numbers. The trick was to work out the details for a secure algorithm. Rivest, Shamir, 
and Adelman patented this algorithm and planned to take it to market amid the 
growing demand for digital security in business, finance, and government. Building on 
the work of Diffie, Hellman, and Merkle, the RSA group was well ahead of even IBM, 
whose cipher developed by Feistel was hobbled and weakened by pressure from the 
intelligence community. The RSA company grew through the 1980s as more businesses 
recognized the need to protect their valuable digital information. The computerized 
society that had been projected in the 1960s and 70s was beginning to appear inevitable 
to many Americans. The personal computer market was growing, as was the Internet. 
An increasing share of business was conducted electronically and stored in databases. 
RSA became profitable by selling the means to protect this information 
cryptographically, both in transit and at rest, building on concerns about computer and 
invasion of privacy that had gestated since the sixties and served as justification to 
break open cryptography research in the seventies. 
As Hellman began to delve more seriously into Shannon’s overlooked cryptographic 
theory, two younger collaborators were sent his way based on his reputation as 
essentially the only computer scientist working in this area. Whitfield Diffie had been 
an electrical engineering student at MIT when it first dawned on him that cryptography 





was just an undergraduate at Berkeley when it first occurred to him that cryptography 
presented problems that remained largely unaddressed. One semester, he submitted 
two proposals for a final paper, and his professor strongly steered him away from the 
one addressing cryptography.372 The problem continued to trouble Merkle, he 
continued to raise the subject whenever possible, and eventually he learned that 
another computer scientist, Hellman, had begun working on cryptographic problems 
across the bay in Palo Alto. 
• 
Beyond policy debates, cryptographic software also prompted social and political 
discourse building on the common refrain of the 1970s and 80s that computers 
promised to become technologies of the human spirit. Apple cofounder Steve Jobs 
famously referred to the computer as a “bicycle for the mind” — a tool that could 
elegantly redirect human energies to feats above their physical limits. This was typical 
of the utopian cyberculture, but even among the digital cognoscenti there were many 
skeptics of this vision. Science fiction books had fostered a fascination with technology, 
but also an active sense of caution that a future driven by technology would run the risk 
of elevating powers more corrupt and oppressive than we had seen in the past — a 
perennial trope of the cyberpunk genre that made hackers into heroes as the ones 
equipped to resist a digital dystopia. Driven by the same pulsing sense of untapped 
possibility that inspired digital utopians to embrace commercial ventures on the web, a 
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number of fringe programmers, hackers, activists, and cryptography researchers 
coalesced as a group called the Cypherpunks in the early nineties with a flexibly 
conceived mission to explore the untapped potential of cryptography as a disruptive 
tool.  
“A specter is haunting the modern world,” wrote Timothy May. “The specter of 
crypto anarchy.”373 In 1994, when May began outlining the philosophical commitments 
of the Cypherpunks, its length expanding to nearly 150,000 words before he named it 
the Cyphernomicon and shared it through the group’s listserv.374 May advocated 
treating “strong crypto as building material for a new age,” and described the early 
nineties as presenting “a fork in the road, a Great Divide” in which transformative 
change was momentarily possible if they could grasp hold of cryptography’s enormous 
potential. He stated that there could be no middle ground, no room to compromise in 
the debate of “surveillance vs. freedom” in online politics. They rejuvenated the 
political stance that Diffie and Hellman had taken in the 1970s, treating strong crypto as 
necessary for digital rights, but they urged a more radical examination of crypto as an 
offensive tool for actively dismantling the establishment.  
“Just as the technology of printing altered and reduced the power of medieval guilds 
and the social power structure, so too will cryptologic methods fundamentally alter the 
nature of corporations and of government interference in economic transactions,” May 
wrote. “And just as a seemingly minor invention like barbed wire made possible the 
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fencing-off of vast ranches and farms, thus altering forever the concepts of land and 
property rights in the frontier West, so too will the seemingly minor discovery out of an 
arcane branch of mathematics come to be the wire clippers which dismantle the barbed 
wire around intellectual property.”375 
Many of the Cypherpunks were academics, carving out radical corners of Computer 
Science departments, others worked as activists, and a fair number were hackers of 
either the white-hat (legal) or black-hat (illegal) persuasions. In short, few were tech 
entrepreneurs, and the gravitation of money and power to the world of computers was 
viewed with intense suspicion. For the Cypherpunks, and for counter-utopians more 
broadly, the single-note enthusiasm of Silicon Valley was a naïve fantasy. They were 
concerned with developing the means of resistance for a digital world, often as free 
software. Although the Cypherpunks shared the Silicon Valley inclination toward 
libertarian politics, more often they promoted outright anarchism. “ 
Whereas the predominant ethos of Silicon Valley had carried the utopian DNA of the 
sixties counterculture, the counter-utopian Cypherpunks had aptly named themselves 
with reference to the punk movement, whose principle motive a decade after the 
collapse of the sixties dream had been to articulate disgust with most of society, from 
the power held by governments and corporations, to the people and lifestyles complicit 
in that power. If it was anarchy the punks wanted, the cypherpunks thought crypto 
might be how to get it.  
John Gilmore, one of the founding members of the cypherpunk community, was 
also one of the founding board members of the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Gilmore 
                                                             





is credited with minting a pithy affirmation of online liberty: “The Net interprets 
censorship as damage and routes around it.”376 As a catchphrase for the  apparent 
liberties embedded in computer networks themselves, Gilmore’s sound byte has been 
countlessly repeated and misinterpreted by those inclined to see the internet as a force 
of free speech, democracy, and collective social action unfettered by state power. This 
has been repeatedly shown to be an illusion,377 but it remains a powerful idea. 
• 
“There are two types of cryptography in this world,” wrote Bruce Schneier in his 
popular textbook Applied Cryptography. “Cryptography that will stop your kid sister 
from reading your files, and cryptography that will stop major governments from 
reading your files.”378 This textbook had nearly been banned upon its release because it 
contained source code for a strong cryptography algorithm called RSA. Federal charges 
had been brought against a programmer named Phillip Zimmerman for writing and 
distributing his own version of this algorithm called PGP. The U.S. government had 
proposed installing cryptography units called Clipper Chips in consumer electronics, 
leaving a spare set of keys on hand for law enforcement (a system called key escrow), 
Schneier joined a chorus of rebuttals from cryptography advocates who treated the very 
idea as tainted: “Once the technology is in place, there will always be the temptation to 
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use it,” Schneier wrote. “And it is poor civic hygiene to install technologies that could 
someday facilitate a police state.”379 
“The right to speak PGP is like the right to speak Navajo,” said the legal historian 
Eben Moglen to the New York Times in 1993.380 “The Government has no particular 
right to prevent you from speaking in a technological manner even if it is inconvenient 
for them to understand.” Moglen was not teaching that day, but representing two clients 
charged with violating international weapons export regulations. The men were not 
gun runners, but software salesmen whose products used  freely distributed, strong 
encryption. Their tools were modeled after the public-key exchange protocol devised by 
Diffie and Hellman plus the RSA algorithm, both developed almost two decades 
earlier.381 
“The investigation is the latest round in a growing battle between the National 
Security Agency and a variety of groups in this country over the role of coding software 
in protecting computer data,” the Times reporter John Markoff wrote. “The N.S.A., 
whose role is to monitor electronic communications around the world, has consistently 
acted to block the adoption of new technologies that would make its mission more 
difficult.” 
The most unusual outcome of the ‘Crypto Wars’ is that this conflict could be framed 
as a victory for the whole gang — the crypto-anarchists, digital utopians,  computer 
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scientists, tech entrepreneurs, banks and the general public — essentially everyone 
except the feds. The feds buckled against opposition to key escrow via the Clipper Chip. 
They dropped the trumped up cases for arms export that they had thrown at 
Zimmerman’s PGP software and Schneier’s cryptography textbook.  
Although the Security and Freedom through Encryption (SAFE) Act didn’t pass, 
Congress did convene a large committee to issue a statement affirming “Cryptography’s 
Role in Securing the Information Society.” The opening line of this Congressional 
report frames their support of liberal access to strong cryptography with a spurious 
historical claim: 
For most of history, cryptography—the art and science of secret writing—has 
belonged to governments concerned about protecting their own secrets and 
about asserting their prerogatives for access to information relevant to national 
security and public safety.382 
As this dissertation has argued, the idea that cryptography “belonged to governments” 
for most of history is just wrong. Crypto was hardly a concern for the U.S. government 
until at least World War I, and draconian control over cryptography was a Cold War 
invention. It was under the strict classification regime of the postwar years that 
cryptography’s non-military history began to fade from view. When a team of Stanford 
researchers chose to disregard the secrecy order in the post-Watergate years, they were 
driven by belief in the scientific virtue of transparency and a will to create technology 
that would help people defend their rights in the computer age. The latter goal has since 
been a driving force behind advocacy for public access to strong cryptography, 
                                                             
382 Dam, Kenneth W, Herbert Lin, National Research Council (U.S.), and Committee to Study 
National Cryptography Policy. Cryptography’s Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, 





including the work of the Cypherpunks and mainstays of the cyberculture like the EFF. 
Facing forward, there’s little concern for who holds claim to cryptography’s past. 
In the spirit of complicating the stories that typically accompany this moment in the 
history of cryptography, it is worth noting several points that are often obscured by the 
heroic narrative often granted to Diffie and Hellman. For one, NSA’s exclusive grip on 
cryptography research first began to loosen when IBM convinced them to develop 
commercial crypto with Feistel’s research group. 
Throughout his 1974 report introducing the need for public cryptography research, 
Hellman lightheartedly refers to himself and his peers as “the noble cryptographers of 
truth and light,” while opposing their work to that of the “evil cryptanalysts of 
darkness.”383 This is cheeky, but it’s more than just colorful prose. Hellman revels in the 
paradoxical implications of placing cryptography in the sunlight, researching this 
subject for the sake of openness and transparency. It also gestures at a striking 
disparity with the language applied to cryptography by intelligence agencies and law 
enforcement officials in the US today who speak of widely available strong encryption 
as a threat of “going dark,” the sudden inability to perform investigations on criminal 
suspects rendered untraceable. Hellman saw a distinction, however cheeky, between 
cryptographers who wish to operate in darkness, versus those who operate in sunlight. 
Diffie and Hellman have since received no shortage of recognition for developing 
the insight behind public key cryptography.  They were awarded the 2017 Turing 
Award, the equivalent of a Nobel Prize for computer science. Textbooks, news articles, 
encyclopedia entries, and most historical surveys credit them with the first 
                                                             





advancement in cryptography since Shannon, though the gap between these two points 
usually goes unexplained. The recent history of crypto has been so often driven and 
determined by politics that it may be the clearest case available of the social shaping of 
scientific knowledge, let alone in the sparser literature focused on social factors in the 
history of mathematics. 
This unexplained political context impoverishes the subject of cryptography’s 
public reemergence. It is crucial to recognize that the very possibility of cryptography 
research in the 1970s, after two decades of near total suppression or silence, was not 
just due to a breakthrough in a stagnant field. Diffie and Hellman persisted in their 
work through threats of prosecution as arms traders.384 One of the reasons that Diffie 
and Hellman are now recognized as fathers of modern encryption, and not Horst 
Feistel, is that the German emigre Feistel was so thoroughly intimidated by agents of 
the US government when he broached the subject of building commercial cryptography 
for computers as early as the 1950s. Feistel had been stonewalled when he proposed 
this project to his managers at the Mitre Corporation, one of the defense contractors 
that would work on early internet infrastructure, and where Diffie worked immediately 
after graduating from MIT. As we have seen, when IBM finally acquired consent to 
develop cryptography in 196x, they hired Feistel to lead this group, and Hellman was 
vaguely aware of Feistel’s project during his brief stint at Yorktown. As a condition of 
working on this subject, IBM’s project was closely monitored by the NSA, who insisted 
that the data encryption scheme they develop should  have a low-bit key length, 
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presumably to ensure that they could break the encryption with relative ease. Before 
Diffie and Hellman had even completed their own original key encryption scheme, they 
had already spent several years critiquing the shortfalls of IBM’s encryption scheme. 
They were successful in opening up cryptography because they brought the subject into 
public conversation, insisting on transparency for this once-secret subject, and doing 
so at a time when transparency itself had been invested with an unusual level of public 
support and secrecy had been pockmarked with considerable public suspicion. Given 
that earlier efforts to open up cryptography failed, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
political context of Diffie and Hellman’s work was a critical factor in not only their 
motivation and framing of this subject, but also their success. Looking at the birth of 
modern cryptography in its broader social context reveals the extent to which the 
political and scientific values invested in cryptography today are due to the conditions 
in which it took shape — not just fading from view amid turbulent postwar politics, but 
















In 2014, a hacker conference in New York City bridged several generations of 
whistleblowers when they billed their keynote address as a conversation between 
Daniel Ellsberg and Edward Snowden — albeit with Snowden coming through on a video 
screen, dialed in from exile in Moscow. While Ellsberg’s own work in the sixties had 
been decidedly ‘offline’, its most sophisticated technological point being the use of a 
photocopier, in recent years Ellsberg had become a vocal advocate of digital encryption 
as a means of ensuring that future whistleblowers could safely share information with 
reporters. The two also share an affiliation through the Freedom of the Press 
Foundation, where Ellsberg was a co-founder and remains a board member, while 
Snowden now acts as the organization’s president. The FPF’s main project, at least 
through its early years, has been to develop and proliferate an encrypted 
whistleblowing platform specifically designed for newsrooms called SecureDrop. This 
project stands as a clear example of the “over-engineered solutions” that Snowden 
described in his early emails with Poitras as a means of resisting mass surveillance 





The connection between these two whistleblowers goes deeper, as I argued in 
Chapter 5. For the groundswell of opposition to official secrecy by Ellsberg and others 
in the early seventies also aided the contemporaneous push for open research on 
cryptography, not to mention bolstering the argument for its necessity as a safeguard of 
private information. I have argued that without whistleblowers like Ellsberg to blow 
open state secrets, without reporters like Seymour Hersh to drive more aggressive 
reporting, and without an intense series of Congressional investigations from 1971-4, 
digital cryptography would have taken a very different shape than it has today.  
The scientific principles underlying cryptography have settled into a stable 
paradigm since the seventies, the locus of cryptography proper firmly centered on the 
principles of information theory, itself rooted in the spread of probability and statistics 
throughout the natural and social sciences. Modern cryptography requires vast 
reserves of random, but more often pseudorandom numbers produced by purpose-
built algorithms. The encrypted message takes on the appearance of noise, just as 
random as thermodynamic motion or radioactive decay. Nevertheless, these are 
treated as natural phenomena, grounded in physics, undersigned by mathematics, and 
thus they could seem to stand apart from humanity or the social world even as they are 
treated as socially transformative technologies.  
For Snowden, Assange, and the cypherpunks, the entropy in nature is both a 
resource and a transcendent ideal in itself. Entropy represents a natural force 
apparently working in their favor, or at least a ready resource for developing 
technology with these values baked in. To recognize the usefulness of a force so 





a counterintuitive and often misunderstood theoretical leap during the formation of 
information theory in the 1940s, a subject outlined in Chapter 2. The transcendent 
perfection invested in cryptography descends initially from the work of Claude 
Shannon, but follows through the rediscovery of his work in the seventies and the 
development of even more stunning mathematical perfections in the development of 
trapdoor functions like RSA, which offer an asymmetrical advantage to the encrypter. 
Yet the scientific foundations of modern, computational cryptography cannot 
explain the social and political ethos invested in cryptography as a vehicle of counter-
power, which Manuel Castells calls “one of the few natural laws of society” and defines 
as “the capacity by social actors to challenge and eventually change the power relations 
institutionalized in society.”385 Whether or not counter-power is really a natural law of 
society,’ cryptography has only recently emerged as an apparent form of counter-
power. As I argue in Chapter 1, cryptography was not freighted with political 
significance before the twentieth century. In Chapter 3, I describe a period beginning in 
the 1940s when the United States government began to strictly control cryptography 
research during a dramatic rise in official secrecy, while Chapter 5 locates the origins of 
cryptography’s current political commitments only in the 1970s, when the newly 
emergent field was essentially a tabula rasa to be imprinted with the ethos of the time. 
Recalling the passages quoted above, Snowden and Assange take it as given that 
modern cryptography is a lever of popular resistance, a natural force to undermine 
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domination, whether to hold our ground or to reshape the political landscape.  It is a 
messy fusion of political, metaphysical, and aesthetic commitments. Assange, in 
particular, reveals a taste for the esoteric, promising arcane knowledge and power 
through cryptography. This tendency to marvel at the wondrous, distant, even 
fearsome power of cryptography carries the essential qualities of the sublime. To 
believe a message is perfectly inscrutable to human reason can make it appear 
boundless, even beautiful. An unreadable wall of text may inspire awe, wonder, even a 
hint of uneasiness. Like hieroglyphs, which once provided a deep reserve of fantasy 
precisely because they could potentially mean anything at all, decipherment is 
tantamount to disenchantment. Today, for many who invest political hopes in 
cryptography, the transformation of a message into random characters through 
cryptography aligns with a political stance in which the natural world, conceived as an 
extra-human space, may provide refuge from the state. For proponents of widespread 
public access to strong cryptography, it is treated as the mortar ensuring the structural 
integrity of the digital world. Backdoors, built-in weaknesses, and other compromises 
to the strength or soundness of modern cryptography have come to be treated as 
anathema, with even a Congressional task force in the nineties asserting 
cryptography’s essential role in securing the information society.  
Still, beyond cryptography’s advocates and reluctant allies, others remain wary of 
widespread public access to encryption. The strength of cryptography that is celebrated 
by Snowden and Assange is treated as a threat by those who would prefer, in a manner 
of speaking, for the ‘laws of nature’ not to overtake the ‘laws of man’. The former FBI 





as a fearsome tool in the hands of criminals, terrorists, and other villains. Echoing a 
failed campaign to institute ‘key escrow’ technology in the nineties, Comey and others 
have pushed for tech companies to include ‘backdoors’ that would allow law 
enforcement access to encrypted messages in the course of their investigations. By and 
large, tech companies tend to be unwilling to poke holes in their own security. Most 
have not complied with official requests to weaken their encryption, and through a 
combination of both active and passive adoption, a steadily increasing share of all web 
traffic is now transmitted using some form of encryption. In short, those pushing for 
weaker crypto are faced instead with more and stronger crypto. Former Director of 
National Intelligence James Clapper reported that whistleblowers have had a 
measurable impact on the trend of increasing cryptography use among the general 
public. “As a result of the Snowden revelations, the onset of commercial encryption has 
accelerated by seven years,” Clapper said, adding that this has hampered their pursuit 
of terrorists. When asked if the resulting security benefits for average citizens could be 
treated as a positive outcome, Clapper said: “From our standpoint, it’s not … it’s not a 
good thing.”386 Losing ground, the transcript suggests fatigue, and as more tech 
companies continue build cryptography into their products by default, the sides are 
shifting by fiat as cryptography is increasingly enmeshed with everyday life. 
Today, among advocates of digital security, cryptography is treated as a means to 
safeguard individual liberty, privacy, and the freedom of the press; to facilitate free 
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markets; to check or even undermine the reach of government. And yet, cryptography 
was not invested with such strong political associations until very recently, despite its 
long history. A century ago, cryptography was neither framed as a science, nor treated 
as political, nor even claimed by the US government as its sovereign jurisdiction. 
Although cryptography can be traced deep into antiquity, and a variety of methods for 
concealing writing have proliferated across culture, codes and ciphers haven’t carried 
the weight of safeguarding liberty until very recently, with the earliest examples in this 
study appearing in the 1970s. I argue in Chapter 5 that cryptography could not have 
become invested with such deep political commitments if it hadn’t been suppressed in 
research and the media during the postwar years. The greater the force exerted to 
dissuade writers and scientists from studying cryptography, the more the subject 
became wrapped in the luminous aura of civil disobedience. The tone that surrounded 
the reemergence of crypto in the 1970s was one of urgent public need. It was a stance of 
dissent, part of a greater groundswell that traveled out of the social movements of the 
sixties. Yet this protest was distinct as an early case of computer experts stepping in to 
protect the public from dangers on the horizon of the coming information age. Unlike 
any other branch of mathematics or computer science, cryptography is embedded in 
social life, and many of the figures who have gravitated to cryptography since its 
reemergence have viewed their work as inherently political.  
As I argue in Chapter 4, one of the major factors that enabled a cohort of computer 
scientists to reopen cryptography research in the 1970s was a uniquely tumultuous 
moment in Washington politics, when demands for transparency reached a fever pitch 





Watergate, and a stream of aggressive, ambitious investigative journalism, the US 
government suffered a series blows in the public eye that increasingly aligned public 
opinion with the antiwar movement of the sixties. Many Americans had grown skeptical 
of government secrecy, in general, and intelligence agencies in particular. The 
disclosure of the Pentagon Papers had validated many of the concerns voiced by 
antiwar protesters throughout the 1960s. The collapse of the Nixon administration 
amid the Watergate investigation suggested that even the president could not be 
trusted to use his powers justly. The hearings of the Church and Rockefeller 
committees pried open the clandestine operations of the CIA and NSA to reveal not only 
ethically questionable practices, but also programs that violated US law, international 
law, and the agencies’ respective charters. This string of revelations in the early 1970s 
marked a moment when the need to protect state secrets began to appear suspicious to 
many Americans, including elected officials. Meanwhile the growing demand for 
legislation to protect privacy rights culminated in the Privacy Act of 1974, which 
requires government agencies to issue public notice of the information it gathers about 
private individuals, and prohibits disclosure of information without an individual’s 
written consent.387 
By the mid 1970s, concerns about privacy and government transparency had come 
to outweigh the case for secrecy that had once seemed justified during the early years 
of the Cold War and the rapid growth of the intelligence community. The computer 
scientist Martin Hellman points to this volatile political moment in the post-Watergate 
                                                             






era as a factor that motivated him and his collaborators to work on new cryptography 
methods in defiance of restrictions placed on this subject. Although he and his 
collaborators received numerous warnings and even threats, they were adamantly 
opposed to secrecy, especially in science. And as the senior figure in a cohort leading 
the reemergence of research in this field, Hellman was in a position of considerable 
leverage to place Shannon at the core of the field, even as he revised and updated 
Shannon’s work to account for developments in the field of information science during 
the intervening years. Since then, Shannon’s work has been treated as the conceptual 
origin of modern cryptography even though this work was utterly obscure and totally 
unused by computer scientists for twenty-five years after it was published. The 
rediscovery and promotion of Claude Shannon's cryptographic theory in the 1970s was 
driven by Hellman’s own scholarly investment in Shannon’s better known work, the 
mathematical theory of communication. That is, Hellman worked in a field where 
Shannon's related work had already been established as canonical. It was 
straightforward for Hellman to read this obscure paper from 1949, grasp its neglected 
significance, and use it as a lens for entirely new and groundbreaking work. Hellman 
critiqued and revised the weaknesses that had arisen in the intervening decades, but 
for the most part Hellman deserves credit for claiming Shannon as a father of modern 
cryptography after Shannon’s work on this subject had been mostly ignored for 
decades. 
When researchers campaigned to publish on the subject of cryptography in the 
1970s, they justified their work on political grounds and discussed it in public forums. 





for cryptography’s public need to be reassessed by politicians as well as officials at the 
agencies resisting his right to publish. Advocates of cryptography and the broader field 
of computer security in the 1960s and 70s actively reframed these subjects and 
promoted them as a means of guarding the boundary between the public and private 
sphere in the information age.  
These emergent political investments in cryptography have since become standard 
lines among civil libertarians (like Edward Snowden and the EFF), radical transparency 
activists (like Julian Assange and other hacktivists), computer scientists (among whom 
cryptographers are still some of the most politically active), and journalists (who 
increasingly use encryption tools to communicate with sources). This dissertation 
outlines the sources of narratives and other cultural forms that frame cryptography 
today, as well as sources of conspicuous omission in cryptographic history. 
Cryptography has become distinctly political, even radical over the last century, but the 
history of this subject is still poorly developed, narrow in scope, and out of sync with the 
broader field of social studies of science and technology. Historians of cryptography 
have not reckoned with social constructionism or actor-network theory. They have not 
faced postcolonial, feminist, or even Marxist critique. A field that has persisted with 
such consistency amid vigorous changes in scholarly conversation could be considered 
the definition of an intellectual backwater, and this is particularly unfortunate given the 
political stakes surrounding cryptography today. A critical history of cryptography 
should be skeptical of linear progress narratives, inquiring into the social factors that 





History often turns on momentous coincidences, illustrating the “social significance 
of statistically insignificant events,” as Michael Schudson puts it. When historians are 
able to identify those critical events and traces the forking paths through time, what 
emerges is a “record of events moving people and institutions irretrievably in this 
direction and not that one.”388 Some events are chancy, improbably hinging on an 
apparent twist of fate, while others may be determined or even overdetermined by 
forces like social movements, media narratives, policy, commerce, or the emergence of 
new technologies. Still, some events push us toward certain outcomes, precluding 
others, forming a path-dependent sequence, and our understanding of the past is itself 
a force in the present. 
In light of the developments outlined in these chapters, it would be more accurate 
and charitable to the history of cryptography for a distinction to be made between 
techniques for computational cryptography and other techniques, which do not rely on 
algorithmic transformations of text but on some other way of concealing 
communications. Today, non-computational means of concealing a message or its 
contents tend to be accepted only as historical precursors of cryptography proper. This 
is a bit like saying that an old wooden bridge is only technically a bridge, and if you built 
a bridge like that today it really wouldn’t be a bridge at all. It could be unwise to direct a 
city’s rush-hour traffic over a wooden bridge built with carts and horses in mind, and it 
is a genuinely impressive feat of engineering for modern bridges to remain secure 
under so much force. The sophistication of computational cryptography is similarly 
impressive. When assailed through brute force, modern cryptography remains resilient 
                                                             





even against the onslaught of today’s supercomputers, an asymmetrical advantage to 
the defender. The same clever math forms the foundation underlying cryptocurrency. 
But still it is an error to grant computational forms of cryptography sole, paradigmatic 
privilege, drawing a boundary that excludes techniques that cannot be fitted to 
Shannon’s schema. For Shannon’s very definition of cryptography insists on the 
assumption that ‘the enemy knows the system,’ disqualifying any form of 
steganography, or hiding messages. Many pre-digital codes have yet to be cracked, 
from manuscripts written in eccentric, invented shorthand, to undeciphered ancient 
scripts like Linear B.389 
Perhaps the most common trope in writings on the history of cryptography is to 
gesture toward its ancient origins, typically with passing reference to places like Egypt 
or Babylon, often punctuated with the claim that the invention of cryptography nearly 
always follows shortly after the invention of writing itself. The trouble with this trope is 
not that it’s inaccurate, nor unsupported, nor even unimportant, but rather that authors 
seem to deploy it with the intention of establishing cryptography’s deep, long-standing 
connection to the broader history of communication, but unfailingly abandon any 
deeper inquiry into these connections. Let us not assume that privacy and secrecy are 
                                                             
389 Several linguists have found success recently using computational methods to decipher 
manuscripts written in unknown symbols, but their work rests heavily on their own ability to 
form hypotheses about the potential structure of the code in question before they build a 
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the inevitable motives of cryptography. If the next question is ‘why?’ then the 
conversation often turns reductive, often with an appeal to human nature, living side-
by-side in settlements, discovering the affordances of written communication. I leave 
this study most convinced of a realization I reached in Chapter 1: the reasons for 
writing in codes and ciphers could very well be limitless, and the narrow conception of 
cryptography as one set of practices or another has impoverished our understanding. 
The difference between written language, code, and cipher breaks down quickly under 
examination, leading to the variety of legal argument posed by Moglen when he says 
that the right to ‘speak PGP’ is like the right to speak Navajo. This is the same fuzzy 
distinction that has made codebreaking techniques historically useful for deciphering 
ancient languages, as well as scanning the cosmic background radio noise for the 
possibility of alien signals. The root assumption is that the sense, the signal, something 
nonrandom will emerge. And yet, in the most difficult cases, it is noise that gathers the 
greatest scrutiny, which holds the greatest fascination, and this is the basis of the 
cryptographic sublime — what in the digital age may plausibly undersign our rights and 
liberties more soundly than the law itself. The more ubiquitous cryptography becomes, 
the more this claim may become grounded as a social fact, true if only because it is built 
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Chart 1: Citation counts by year for three publications by Claude Shannon. Data 
collected from the Web of Science database in February, 2017. 
 
1948(1) Shannon, C. E. “A Mathematical Theory of Communication.” Bell 
System Technical Journal 27, no. 3 (July 1, 1948): 379–423.  
 
1948(2) Shannon, C. E. “A Mathematical Theory of Communication.” Bell 
System Technical Journal 27, no. 4 (October 1, 1948): 623–56.  
 
1949 Shannon, C. E. “Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems.” Bell 
System Technical Journal 28, no. 4 (October 1949): 656–715. 
 
 
  Publication Year      1948(1)     1948(2)      1949 
1949   6   5  
1950 11 11  
1951 22 16 3 
1952 12 10  
1953 19 19 2 
1954 15 12  
1955   9   9  
1956 17 12  
1957 11 14  
1958 19 14  
1959 14 11  
1960 10   8  
1961 25 20  
1962 20 20  
1963 29 19  
1964 20 17  





1966 37 35  
1967 38 27  
1968 44 45  
1969 42 41  
1970 45 41  
1971 37 30  
1972 35 37  
1973 42 40 2 
1974 42 37 2 
1975 56 39 5 
1976 46 38 3 
1977 46 28 8 
1978 59 40 5 
1979 69 51 6 
1980 73 52 5 
1981 66 51 4 
1982 75 52 8 
1983 62 41 9 
1984 70 45 5 
1985 77 58 6 
1986 63 61 9 
1987 95 74 2 
1988 76 69     11 
1989 82 66 3 
1990 91 66     18 
1991     128 77     11 
1992     106 83 4 
1993 99 77 6 
1994     119 91 7 





1996 141 108 10 
1997 131 111 15 
1998 175 103 23 
1999 208 83 24 
2000 258 126 28 
2001 258 120 30 
2002 329 130 40 
2003 410 173 52 
2004 435 203 58 
2005 382 280 73 
2006 427 367 74 
2007 491 384 92 
2008 445 510 122 
2009 468 560 155 
2010 508 543 118 
2011 769 717 124 
2012 565 804 155 
2013 100  1345 251 
2014   40  1547 209 
2015   52  1677 284 
2016 102  1493 215 
      Overall Total    9045               13223  2304 
      Total in 1970      459      406          5 
      Total in 1975      660      630        17 











Figure 1. A letter matrix used for poly-alphabetic ciphers. Reproduced from 
John R. G. Hassard. “Cryptography in Politics.” The North American Review 128, 







Figure 2. Pigpen cipher inscribed on the tombstone of James Leeson in Trinity 
Cemetery, New York, NY, 1794. Figure from S. Brent Morris, “Fraternal 
Cryptography Cryptographic Practices Of American Fraternal Organizations,” 






Figure 3.  A print designed at Riverbank to illustrate the use of the Baconian 
biliteral cipher by designing a visual code to be ‘read’ in the illustration. Courtesy 






Figure 4. A print designed at Riverbank to illustrate other creative uses of the 
Baconian biliteral cipher, perhaps in a botanical drawing. Courtesy of the New 






Figure 5. A print designed at Riverbank to illustrate the use of the Baconian 










Figure 6. Claude Shannon working at a chalkboard in the West Street office of 












Figure 8. A noise measuring set in use among AT&T engineers circa early 
twentieth century. Image from Fagen, M. D., Amos E. Joel, G. E. Schindler, and 
Bell Telephone Laboratories, eds. A History of Engineering and Science in the 








Figure 9. The Sig-Saly encrypted telephone system. Reproduced from Fagen, M. 
D., Amos E. Joel, G. E. Schindler, and Bell Telephone Laboratories, eds. A History 












Figure 10. Diagram of a communication channel and its components. From 
Shannon, C.E., “A Mathematical Theory of Communication,” Bell System 


















Figure 11. Diagram of a secrecy system and its components. From Shannon, 
C.E., “Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems,” Bell System Telephone 









Figure 12. Shannon’s handwritten experiment to see how much of a message 
could be reconstructed just by guessing the letter that most commonly follows 






Figure 13. Peter Elias outlines a computer module for performing probabilistic 
error-correction using codes derived from Shannon’s theory of communication. 






Figure 14. Peter Elias’s diagram to illustrate noise (Xs and Os) entering a 
transmission (As and Bs), and the use of redundant codes to ensure that the 
message can be corrected to its original state through the techniques originally 
described in Shannon’s communication theory over ten years earlier. Image 
courtesy of the MIT Archives. 
 
 
